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Patterns and Predictors of Debt:
A Panel Study, 1985-2008
RICHARD

K.

CAPUTO

Yeshiva University - Wilf Campus
Wurzweiler School of Social Work

Relying on panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY79), this study finds that about half the study sample
(N = 5,304) never experienced annual debt between 1985 and
2008, that the vast majority of those who incurred annual debt
were short-term (1 year) or intermittent debtors (2-4 years), that
the proportion of the study sample in debt for the most part declined over time, but also that the level of debt increased. Multinomial regression results indicated that health status and level of
changes in income are robust predictorsof debt in general, that age
and race/ethnicity are robust predictors of short-term and intermittent debt, that locus of control,family structureduring adolescence, SES, work effort, and maritalstatus are robust predictors of
intermittent and chronic debt, and that self-esteem, gender, SES,
and work effort are robust predictors of chronic debt. Findings
challenge blanket contentions that a culture of debt characterizes
individuals and families in the U.S and they present a more nuanced portrait of debtors than the stereotype as young and single.
Key words: Consumer debt, culture of debt, economic well-being,
socioeconomic status, wealth

This study has three main aims: (1) to examine the prevalence, depth, and patterns of consumer debt over time; (2) to
explore the influence of sociodemographic background characteristics of attitudinal/psychological variables on duration and levels of consumer debt; and (3) to determine what
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 2

8

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

characteristics or attributes, if any, differentiate chronic
from short-term and intermittent debtors, thereby reassessing the typicality of debtors as primarily young and single.
Theoretically, the study seeks to shed light on the role of background or upbringing factors on indebtedness and to assess
the merits of prior research suggesting that indebtedness has
become a way of life, that a "culture of debt" has come to
signify the socioeconomic experiences of families in the U.S.
The study explores whether poverty and absent parenthood in
one's early upbringing, theorized as imparting a greater sense
of present-orientation than of delaying gratification, are robust
predictors of later life indebtedness (Strotz, 1956). To the extent
poverty and absent parenthood do impart a sense of presentorientation, they can be viewed as contributing to a culture of
debt, providing a structural context which is likely to appear in
later life as indebtedness.
Likewise, to what extent are locus of control (one's sense
that s/he can influence events) and self-esteem associated with
the depth and duration of later life indebtedness? To the extent
that a sense of a lack of control over events and low self-esteem
show association, they too can be viewed as contributing to a
culture of debt, signifying a psychological mechanism at work
during adolescence that is also likely to be associated with indebtedness in later life. To what extent are younger age and
single marital status robust predictors of debt, that is, when
accounting for background and other socioeconomic factors?
What policy and practice implications flow from such theoretical considerations and empirical findings?
Literature Review
Over the past two decades there has been increasing
public concern about and scholarly attention to consumer
debt. Increased borrowing among families in the U.S. since
the 1980s was noted in the 1990s as family debt and assets
grew in tandem between 1989 and 1995. Debt as a proportion
of assets held steady at about 16% over the period ("Family
debt in the United States," 1998), but increased thereafter
(Kennickell, 2009; Kish, 2006). U.S. household debt increased
from about 60% of GDP in 1990 to nearly 100% in 2008,
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paralleling increased personal consumption from about $5.32
trillion (in 2010 dollars) peaking at about $10.25 trillion (Baily
& Lund, 2009; Hamm, 2008). A slow recovery from the 20082009 recession, prompted by a subprime mortgages-related
financial crisis (Beitel, 2008; Gerardi, Lenhert, Sherlund, &
Willen, 2008), kept debt at the forefront of public concern even
as interest rates subsequently reached lows not seen since the
1950s (Bernard & Anderson, 2008; Bowley, 2010; Dash, 2009;
Foster & Magdoff, 2008; Pressman & Scott, 2009).
In the view of some, debt had become a way of life in the
U.S. by the early 1990s (Lea, Webley, & Levine, 1993). More
recently debt was dubbed a "new safety net" for families and
households in the U.S. (Draut, 2007), in the short term providing relief from more formidable social problems associated
with delinquent if not foregone mortgage and credit card payments and declared bankruptcies (Caputo, 2008). Although
household borrowing peaked in 2008 and dropped thereafter (Baily & Lund, 2009), household debt peaked in 2009 and,
given stagnant wages and incomes for most workers and their
families in the U.S., remained higher than that throughout
the 1990s thereafter (DeNavas-Wait, Proctor, & Smith, 2010;
Eckholm, 2010; Zezza, 2009).
In addition to public concern, over the past two decades
there has been a steady stream of scholarly research focusing
on factors associated with consumer debt. Webley & Nyhus
(2001, p. 424) reviewed earlier research and contended that
much of it was a-theoretical in nature, characterized by an
eclectic empiricism. They noted that the earlier research had
nonetheless provided a reasonable albeit incomplete portrait
of correlates of consumer debt: (1) the prototypical debtor
was a young, single parent living in rented accommodation,
with economic variables such as income and assets by themselves as predictors of debt; and (2) psychological factors such
as locus of control and attitudes toward debt and credit were
also found to be good predictors of consumer debt beyond
economic factors. Causality, especially in regard to psychological measures associated with debt, was difficult to discern
given that many of the earlier studies were cross-sectional.
Further, methodological limitations associated with cross-sectional studies that relied on returning mail surveys precluded

10
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adequate treatment of short-term from long-term debt.
The inadequate treatment of short-term and long-term
debtors has both theoretical and practical implications: (1)
short-term debt need not be considered a social problem per
se, may be accounted for by expectations about future income,
and may be more responsive to individually-oriented residual or temporary policy interventions; and (2) long-term debt
is more likely to be considered a social problem reflecting, in
part, a culture of debt if distributed along sociodemographic
lines, may require alternative explanations, and may necessitate more institutional or structural-oriented policy interventions. Theoretical and policy implications flow from the extent
that either short-term or long-term debt or both are pervasive and deep and how either or both are distributed across
sectors of society stratified by class, gender, and race/ethnicity
(Attanasio & Banks, 2001).
Much research since 2000 sought to overcome limitations
associated with cross-sectional studies, particularly those
relying almost exclusively on SES measures. Webley & Nyhus
(2001), for example, relied on three waves of panel data (1994,
1995, and 1996) that included SES and psychological measures,
with the aim, among other things, of extending our understanding of the economic psychology of debt. Results of the
study corroborated earlier studies (e.g., Lea, Webley, & Levine,
1993) showing that economic measures were good predictors
of debt, although psychological factors such as locus of control
and attitudes toward debt also had explanatory power. For
most individuals in the Webley & Nyhus study, debt was a
short-term temporary problem, that is, present in only one of
the three study years. Their findings cast doubt on Lea, Webley,
and Levine's (1993, p. 85) contention that conditions for the development of a sustaining "culture of debt" existed. Chronic
debtors, that is, those in debt in 1994 and again in either 1995
or 1996 in the Webley & Nyhus study, had lower net incomes
and fewer partners and they were more present-oriented than
temporary debtors.

11

Patternsand Predictorsof Debt
Method

Data and Subjects
Data for this study come from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), a nationally representative sample
of young men and women aged 14 to 22 years of age when
first surveyed in 1979 (N=12,686). The U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) and the Census Bureau sponsor and coordinate NLSY79 data collection; BLS regulates data availability
to the public, and the Center for Human Resource Research
(CHRR) at The Ohio State University manages the NLSY79
data files. NLSY79 respondents were surveyed annually from
1979 through 1994 and biannually thereafter through 2008,
the most recent year of available data at the time of this study.
During this time NLSY79 respondents formed their own families and entered the labor force. By 1985 all respondents were
deemed eligible to be asked questions about home ownership,
signifying that everyone met criteria determining independent
household status.
The study sample was derived from the 5,407 NLSY79 respondents who participated in each of the 23 waves of data
acquisition between 1979 and 2008. Relying on these "continuous" NLSY79 participants minimized the extent of using
imputed values for missing data on ordinal and interval level
measures, namely assets and income. The final study sample
comprised the 5,304 respondents for whom information on
all other study measures was known. The BLS made available customized sampling weights to ensure representativeness given experimental mortality and initial oversampling of
Black, Hispanic, and low-income youth (Zagorsky, n.d.). The
customized sampling weight for NLSY79 respondents who
participated in each survey year was used for this study.
A preliminary analysis on family and other background
measures obtained in Round One of the survey in 1979 and
using the 1979 sampling weight, found no appreciable differences (that is, > 10%) between the continuous participants and
other NLSY79 respondents by the nominal measures of race/
ethnicity, living with their mothers and fathers at 14 years of
age, region of residence at age 14; no appreciable differences
were found by interval level measures of age in 1979, mothers'

12
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highest grade completed, fathers' highest grade completed,
and number of siblings. About $3,000 was found to separate
the total family income of continuous participants ($20,843)
from other respondents ($17,918) in 1979. A slight difference
was found by sex, with females more likely to be continuous
(54.1%) vs. non-continuous (43.7%) participants. Differences
between the study sample of continuous participants and
other NLSY79 respondents for total family income and sex
were deemed acceptable, given twenty-three waves over
nearly thirty years of data collection from the same sample
of individuals. Nonetheless, generalizations about the cohort
based on the study sample were cautiously made with aforementioned limitations of representativeness in mind. Further,
it should be kept in mind that NLSY79 represents one cohort
of youth in the U.S and is not representative of other youth
cohorts or of the population as a whole.
Measures
The dependent measures of debt. Debt has been measured in
a variety of ways with varying degrees of methodological sophistication and rigor, with all measures having some limitations (e.g., see Dessart & Kuylen, 1986; Lea, Webley, & Levine,
1993; Webley & Nyhus, 2001). For purposes of the present study,
annual family net worth was used to determine the amount or
level of annual debt. The NLSY79 included a variety of asset
and liability measures in most survey years between 1985, the
first year when everyone in the cohort sample was also eligible for survey items related to homeownership, and 2008, the
most recent year of available data at the time of this study. In
addition to home ownership and related debt measures, this
study included money assets, vehicle ownership and related
debt. In 2008 the Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR,
n.d.a) released to the public a revised asset series to account
for top coding, missing values, and other possible sources of
bias and created a measure of net worth for every survey year
which had an asset module. Family net worth equaled home
value - mortgage - property debt + cash savings + stocks and
bonds + trusts + business assets - business debt + car value car debt + possessions - other debt + IRAs + 401Ks + CDs. For
purposes of this study, all dollar values of annual net worth

Patternsand Predictorsof Debt

between 1985 and 2008 were converted to 2010 dollars. Family
net worth was not available for survey years 1991, 2002, and
2006.
A main limitation of using net worth as the basis of debt
determination, especially level of debt, is that it is market
driven, subject to period effects reflecting, for example,
housing bubbles, market exuberance, and the like. This would
be more problematic in a cross-sectional study if the examined
year were an exceptional spike or trough rather than typical.
Reliance on multiple observations over time, as is the case in
the present study, makes it possible to identify exceptional
years if they were to occur, to minimize the biasing influence
of period effects, and to smooth out the experience of debt over
the time period. The use of family net worth was justified for
theoretical and practical reasons. The family has been shown to
have theoretical relevance to family preferences about wealth
accumulation, intra- and intergenerational transmission of
income, and wealth across a variety of family types or structures (Bergstrom, 1996).
Debtors were those whose annual family net worth fell
below $0.00. In each survey year between 1985 and 2008, they
were coded as 1, others as 0. The dependent variable of interest, Debtor Status, was a multinomial measure coded such
that 1 (non-debtors) = those who reported no debt in any survey
year between 1985 and 2008, 2 (short-termdebtors) = those who
reported one year of debt, 3 (intermittent debtors) = those who
reported 2-4 years of debt, and 4 (chronic debtors) = those who
reported 5 or more years of debt.
The independent measures or predictors. Adopting Webley
& Nyhus (2001) who relied on household income, family net
income was used to calculate change in income measure (available annually for changes from 1985 through 1996 and biannually thereafter). Annual family net incomes were converted
to 2010 dollars. A 9-point ordinal level scale was created to
reflect changes in annual family net incomes from one survey
year to the next, ranging from 1, which signified a decrease
of 80% or more, to 9, which signified an increase of 80% or
more. The middle category of 5 was assigned to changes in
income of + 20% and for purposes of this research signified No
Change in Income between survey years. For purposes of the

14
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multinomial regression procedure described below, dummy
measures were created from this income scale: Number of
years of no changes in annual family net income over the 16
survey years between 1985 and 2008 was determined and
served as the reference category; other dummy measures reflected incremental increases greater than 20% and decreases
greater than 20%.
Two measures were used to capture SES: average incometo-poverty ratio (IPR) and average wealth-to-income ratio
(WIR). IPR was based on official annual Federal poverty
thresholds that accounted for family size. Annual IPRs were
summed and an average calculated for the study period 19852008. Respondents were accordingly classified as on average:
Poor, that is, living in families with income-to-poverty ratios
(IPR) -< 1; Near Poor with IPR > 1 -< 2; and More Affluent with
IPR > 2. WIR was measured as the ratio of average annual net
worth to average annual net family income between 1985 and
2008. Annual WIRs were summed and an average calculated
for the study period 1985-2008, with larger positive values
signifying greater capacity to carry debt and larger negative
values signifying decreased capacity over the study period.
WIR was stratified into quintile rankings and coded such that
1 = Highest Quintile, 0 = other.
Background sociodemographic measures included age,
race/ethnicity, sex, SES in 1979, and three measures of respondents' living circumstances at age 14: whether they lived
with both parents, whether they lived in the U.S. South, and
whether they lived in an urban area. Other related measures
used as controls included education level, health limitations,
geographic residences in 2008 (that is lived in the U.S. South;
lived in an urban area), and marital status in 2008. Education
classified respondents according to highest grade completed at
the time of interview in survey year 2008: < high school, high
school graduate, some college, or college graduate. Health limitations was operationalized as number of years respondents
reported that health conditions precluded their working or affected the nature and type of work they did between 1979 and
2008. Marital status in 2008 classified respondents as married,
divorced/separated/widowed, or never married.
Attitudinal or psychological measures included the Rotter
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Internal-External Locus of Control Scale and the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (CHRR, n.d.b). The Rotter Locus of Control
Scale is a four-item abbreviated version of a 23-item forcedchoice questionnaire adapted from the 60-item Rotter Adult
I-E scale developed by Rotter (1966). The scale is designed
to measure the extent to which individuals believe they had
control over their lives through self-motivation or self-determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent that the
environment (that is, chance, fate, luck) controls their lives (external control). Scores range from 4 to 16 in the external direction, that is, the higher the score, the more external the individual. The summed score on the NLSY79 abbreviated version
was found to correlate well with self-esteem (r = -.278, p < .001)
and education (r = -.215, p < .001), and to a lesser extent social
class ([family income] r = -.086, p < .001), but the internal consistency of the scale was quite low for the whole cohort (alpha
= .36). Separate estimates by race and sex did not yield significantly higher reliability estimates for the whole cohort. The internal consistency of the scale was lower for the study sample
(alpha = .21).

The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was administered during
the 1980, 1987, and 2006 interviews (CHRR, n.d.b). This
10-item scale, designed for adolescents and adults, measures
the self-evaluation that an individual makes and customarily
maintains. It describes a degree of approval or disapproval
toward oneself (Rosenberg, 1965). The scale is short, widely
used, and has accumulated evidence of validity and reliability. It contains 10 statements of self-approval and disapproval
with which respondents are asked to strongly agree, agree,
disagree, or strongly disagree. In earlier studies, the scale was
found to be highly internally consistent, with reliability coefficients that ranged from .87 (Menaghan, 1990) to .94 (StrocchiaRivera, 1988), depending on the nature of the NLSY79 sample
selected. The internal consistency of the items obtained in 1980,
which constituted the scale used for this study, was also found
to be highly consistent for the study sample (alpha = .82).
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Findings
Descriptive Statistics
In regard to Debt Status, over half the study sample (54.6%
weighted, n = 2,614) reported no years of net debt (Non-debtors)
between 1985 and 2008; 15.5% (n = 906) reported one year
(Short-term debtors); 21.4% (n = 1288) 2-4 years (Intermittent
debtors); and 8.5% (n = 496) 5 years or more (Chronic debtors).
As can be seen in Table 1, most nominal level study measures
were found to be significantly related to Debt Status. These
statistically significant measures are shown here for heuristic
purposes and were included in the multinomial regression
procedure, whose results are presented in the next section. No
further discussion of them was warranted, given the stated interest in robust predictors.
In regard to attitudes, as can be seen in Table 2, both locus
of control (F = 325.89, p < .001) and self-esteem (F = 877.55, p <

.001) were found to be significantly related to Debt Status, as
were several other nominal level measures, such as years of
health limitations between 1979 and 2008 (F = 1000.95, p < .001)

and most other ordinal and interval level measures between
1985 and 2008: average income-to-poverty ratio (F = 2391.86,
p < .001); average net worth (F = 171.80, p < .001); average
number of weeks worked (F = 28.45, p < .001); and the ratio

of average net worth to average net family income (F = 3.38,
p < .05). Each of these was made into a dummy measure for
purposes of the multinomial regression procedure. No further
discussion of these statistically significant measures was warranted here given our interest in robust predictors.
As can be seen in Table 3, the proportion of the study
sample in debt for the most part declined between 1985 and
2008, ranging from a high of 12.4% in 1986 to a low of 5.5% in
2004. The level of debt, whether measured as a mean or the
median, however increased over time. The average amount
of debt was nearly six times higher, increasing from nearly
$8,300 in 1985 to more than $49,000 in 2008, and the median
was nearly three times higher, increasing from nearly $3,900 to
more than $11,000 in 2008.

f

Patternsand Predictorsof Debt
Table 1. Nominal Level Characteristics of the Study Sample by
Debtor Status
.....

Debtor Status

Nomina Level
Characteristics

Nondebtors
(0 yrs. of
net debt)
(n=1,614)

Shortterm
(1 yr.
of net
debt)
(n=906)

Background
At 14 years old
Lived in US South
55.7
No
52.1
Yes
Lived with mother & father
45.9
No
57.4
Yes
Urban
55.4
No
54.3
Yes
Race/ethnicity
40.0
Black
45.9
Hispanic
57.9
White
SES in 1979
41.8
Poor (IPR_1)
42.7
Near Poor
(IPR>1 2)
60.2
Affluent (IPR>2)
Sex
1!
57.0
Male
1E
52.1
Female
In 2008
Highest Grade Completed
34.8
2(
< HS
52.5
1d
HS Graduate
1
54.8
Some College
1
59.3
Coll. Graduate
Marital Status
1
49.0
Never Married
59.5
14
Married
42.8
1
Sep/Wid/Div
Lived in US South
56.5
1
No
1
51.4
Yes
Urban
1
55.5
No
54.3
1
Yes
Other 1985-2008
Average annual % A in family income
1 5.1
59.6
No A (lowest to
< 20% +)
52.4
1 4.5
20% < 40%
1 6.5
48.4
40% < 60% +
1 5.2
51.5
60% < 80% +
80% > +
48.2
1 6.7

Intermittent
(2-4 yrs. of
net debt)
(n=1,288)

Chronic
(5+ yrs.
of net
debt)
(n=496)

X2

Sig.

20.44

*

62.11

***

3.87
154.23

*

121.12

*

38.12

***

50.71

135.35

***

20.70

***

5.60

60.63
18.6
22.6
24.2
26.6
24.7

Note: Weighted percentages are shown. The lowest percentage change in annual
family income between 1985 and 2008 on average was -13%, resulting in their inclusion in the No change category. ***p < .001.
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Table 3. Debt by Year (in 2010 dollars)
Debtors
# (%)

Mean
Debt

Median
Debt

Greatest
Debt

Least
Debt

1985

1605 (34.7)

$6,619

$3,857

$172,550

$1,015

1986

1852 (39.1)

7,067

3,980

298,500

995

1987

673 (39.4)

14,455

4,800

327,360

48

1988

686 (42.1)

12,741

4,968

1,320,200

50

1989

672 (43.2)

12,695

4,400

1,038,752

33

1990

664 (45.0)

15,855

5,511

672,008

167

1992

608 (45.1)

13,400

5,425

379,750

39

1993

590 (42.6)

13,849

5,055

1,510,000

68

1994

511 (40.4)

13,430

5,865

299,880

37

1996

492 (37.7)

18,859

6,255

326,859

97

1998

438 (36.8)

21,241

6,700

1,352,596

67

2000

400 (38.2)

20,459

6,414

770,266

64

2004

349 (25.5)

37,526

9,200

1,005,584

12

2008

377 (30.3)

49,290

11,110

1,612,970

22

Note: Percentages are weighted. Dollar amounts are rounded.

Multinomial Regression Statistics
As can be seen in Table 4, the only predictors sufficiently
robust to distinguish non-debtors from short-term, intermittent, and chronic debtors, respectively, were health limits,
income changes, and SES. Those who reported no health limitations regarding the type or extent of work they could do
were 1.2 times more likely than those reporting some health
limitations to be non-debtors than were short-term debtors,
1.46 times more likely than were intermittent debtors, and
1.74 times than were chronic debtors. Those who reported
no increases in average annual family income between 1985
and 2008 were less likely to be non-debtors than those who reported some increases and those who reported greater increases were, for the most part, even less likely to be longer term
debtors. Those reporting average increases of 80% or more
were 1.34 (1/.726) times less likely than those who reported no
increases to be non-debtors than to be short-term debtors, 1.44
times less likely than to be intermittent debtors, and 1.58 times
than to be chronic debtors. Of the two SES measures, the ratio
of average net annual wealth to average net family income
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Table 4. Multinornial Regression
Parameter Estimates
95% Confidence
Level for Exp
(B)
Debtor Status
Short-term Debtors
Age (1=Young)
Race/ethnicity
Black
Hispanic
Health limits (1=None)
Income change
(1=80%+ increase)
SES
Average Wealth-Income Ratio
(1=Highest Quintile)
Intermittent Debtors
Age (1=Young)
Attitudes
Locus of Control
(1=Lowest Quintile)
Race/ethnicity
Black
Hispanic
Health limits (1=None)
Income change
(1=20% < 40% increase)
(1=40% < 60% increase)
(1=60% < 80% increase)
(1=80%+ increase)
Lived with mother & father at
age 14
Marital Status
(1=Sep/Divorced/Widowed)
SES
Average IPR
(1=At or < 2x poverty level)
Average Wealth-Income Ratio
(1=Highest Quintile)
Weeks Worked
(1=Highest Quintile)

B

Sig

-. 264

**

-.419
-.458
.183

Wald

Exp(B)

Lower
Level

Upper
Level

7.98

.768

.640

.922

15.32
16.17
4.54

.657
.633
1.200

.533
.506
1.015

.811
.791
1.420

-.321

**

8.45

.726

.585

.901

.656

***

37.27

1.927

1.561

2.378

-.189

*

4.97

.828

.701

.977

.241

*

6.35

1.273

1.055

1.535

-.253
-.441
.383

6.79
18.48
24.94

.777
.644
1.467

.642
.526
1.262

.939
.787
1.706

-.265
-.363
-.409
-.366
.169

7.14
7.42
5.62
13.31
4.32

.767
.696
.665
.694
1.185

.631
.536
.474
.570
1.010

.932
.903
.932
.844
1.390

-.382

10.80

.683

.543

.857

-.349

**

9.75

.706

.567

.878

1.135

***

118.01

3.112

2.536

3.820

.566

*** 29.87

1.761

1.438

2.157

was the only predictor sufficiently robust to distinguish nondebtors from short-term, intermittent, and chronic debtors.
Compared to those in other wealth-income quintiles, those
in the highest were 1.93 times more likely to be non-debtors
than they were to be short-term debtors, 3.11 times more likely
than they were to be intermittent debtors, and 9.42 times more
likely than they were to be chronic debtors.
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Table 4. Multinomial Regression, continued

Parameter Estimates
95% Confidence
Level for Exp
(B)
Debtor Status
Chronic Debtors
Attitudes
Locus
Lo of Control
es t nt le
(1 =Lowest Quintile)
Self-esteem (1=Lowest Quintile)
Health limits (1=None)
Income change
(1=20% < 40% increase)
(1=40% < 60% increase)
(1=80%+ increase)
Lived with mother & father at
age 14
Marital Status
(1=Sep/Divorced/Widowed)
SES
Average IPR
(1=At or < 2x poverty level)
Average Wealth-Income Ratio
(1=-Highest Quintile)
Sex (1=Male)
Weeks Worked
(1=Highest Quintile)
-2 Log Likelihood
Goodness of Fit
Nagelkerke R-Square

B

Sig

.357
-.378
.552

**
***

Wald

Exp(B)

Lower
Level

Upper
Level

5.92

1.429

1.072

1.905

8.75
24.70

.685
1.737

.533
1.397

.880
2.159

.750
.633
.632
1.545

.566
.441
.479
1.235

.994
.909
.835
1.933

-.288
-.457
-.458
.435

***

4.01
6.13
10.46
14.45

-.650

***

16.90

.522

.383

.712

-.556

***

13.54

.574

.427

.771

102.41

9.420

6.101

14.544

5.18
18.95

1.290
2.126

1.036
1.514

1.606
2.986

*
**

2.243
.255
.754

*

11102.49 (X2 - 820.63, p < .001)
2
X = 12800.07, p = .961
.157

Note: Only statistically significant measures are shown. Reference category for the
Model = Non-debtors between 1985 and 2008; for Income change = No notable %
change in annual average net family income defined as Lowest to <20% increase; for
Race/ethnicity = White; for Marital Status = Married. For Average Wealth-Income
Ratio, Locus of Control, and Weeks Worked, 0 = Other.
•p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Two measures were found to be sufficiently robust predictors distinguishing only short-term and intermittent debtors
from non-debtors: age and race/ethnicity. Younger subjects
were 1.3 times less likely than older subjects to be short-term
debtors and 1.2 times less likely than older subjects to be intermittent debtors. Compared to White subjects, Blacks were 1.52
times less likely to be short-term debtors and 1.29 times less
likely to be intermittent debtors; Hispanics were 1.58 times less
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likely to be short-term debtors and 1.55 times less likely to be
intermittent debtors.
Five measures were found to be sufficiently robust predictors distinguishing intermittent and chronic debtors from
non-debtors: locus of control, living with mother and father
at age 14, marital status in 2008, SES measured as average IPR
between 1985 and 2008, and average annual number of weeks
worked between 1985 and 2008. Those in the lowest quintile
scores on the Rotter locus of control scale, that is, those with
a greater sense of internal control, were 1.27 times more likely
than those in the other quintiles to be non-debtors than were
intermittent debtors, and 1.43 times more likely to be nondebtors than were chronic debtors. Those living with mother
and father at age 14 were 1.19 times more likely than those in
other living arrangements to be non-debtors than were intermittent debtors, and 1.55 times more likely to be non-debtors
than were chronic debtors. Separated, divorced, or widowed
subjects were 1.46 times less likely than never married subjects to be intermittent debtors and 1.92 times less likely than
never married subjects to be chronic debtors. Those whose
average IPR between 1985 and 2008 was at or below twice official poverty levels were 1.4 times less likely than more affluent
subjects to be intermittent debtors and 1.74 times less likely
than never married subjects to be chronic debtors. Compared
to those in other weeks-worked quintiles, those in the highest
were 1.76 times more likely to be non-debtors than they were
to be intermittent debtors and 2.1 times more likely than they
were to be chronic debtors.
Two measures were found to be sufficiently robust predictors distinguishing only chronic debtors from non-debtors:
self-esteem and sex. Those with low self-esteem, that is, in the
lowest Rosenberg self-esteem scale score quintile, were 1.46
times less likely than those in other quintiles to be non-debtors than they were to be chronic debtors. Men were 1.3 times
more likely than women to be non-debtors than they were to
be chronic debtors.
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Discussion
On the whole, findings of this study corroborate Webley
and Nyhus (2001), who reported debt as a short-term temporary problem, and they cast further doubt on Lea, Webley, and

Levine (1993) who posited a "culture of debt." Findings also
expand to our understanding of young, single parents as the
"prototypical debtors" (Webley & Nyhus, 2001) by showing
variation of attitudinal and sociodemographic characteristics
of individuals and their families associated with short-term,
intermittent, and chronic debtors.
Findings indicate that about half the study sample never
experienced annual debt between 1985 and 2008, that the vast
majority of those who incurred annual debt were short-term (1
year) or intermittent debtors (2-4 years), that the proportion of
the study sample in debt for the most part declined, but also,
that the level of debt increased over time. Multinomial regression results indicated that health status and level of changes in
income are robust predictors of debt in general, that age and
race/ethnicity are robust predictors of short-term and intermittent debt, that locus of control, family structure during adolescence, SES, work effort, and marital status are robust predictors of intermittent and chronic debt, and that self-esteem,
gender, SES, and work effort, are robust predictors of chronic
debt. As noted above, findings challenge blanket contentions
that a culture of debt characterizes individuals and families in
the U.S. and they present a more nuanced portrait of debtors
than the stereotype as young and single.
Policymakers and others interested in the economic wellbeing of families are on solid ground to respond with individually-oriented or targeted temporary policy interventions. This
is not to say that attention to structurally-oriented interventions is unwarranted, especially if structural factors primarily
account for preventing individuals from gainful employment
or force them to lower their living standards by working less or
for less money than would be the case otherwise. What follows
are implications for policy and practice guided by those robust
predictors found first for likely short-term or intermittent
debtors, for intermittent or chronic debtors, and finally for
chronic debtors only.
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Policy & PracticeImplicationsfor Likely Short-term and
Intermittent Debtors
Study findings suggest which types of participants are
more likely to experience short-term and intermittent debt
and might thereby benefit from targeted interventions. Being
Black and Hispanic as well as younger age persons are robust
predictors of both short-term and intermittent debt. It is important to stress that these characteristics are not predictive
of chronic debt-at least as operationalized in this studynamely, experiencing debt in 5 or more years between 1985
and 2008. Given that the majority of individuals are likely to
experience positive net family wealth in any given year and on
the whole, findings suggest that a realistic objective of debtrelated interventions would be to decrease the likelihood of
short-term debtors of ever experiencing debt and of intermittent debtors of experiencing debt beyond one year. Although
relatively young and minority populations in the U.S. generally have higher unemployment rates and less labor market
attachment than do Whites and prime age persons (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2011), findings of this study suggest that
increasing employment opportunities, although desirable for
other reasons, need not be included in a primary intervention
aimed at those likely to become short-term debtors, but might
help those likely to become intermittent debtors.
To reduce the likelihood of clients from becoming shortterm debtors, especially Black, Hispanic, and younger clients,
human service agencies that do not already do so might do
well to consider adding financial counseling to their array of
existing services. In addition to money management, financial
counseling should include ways of handling pressures from
lending agencies so as not to borrow against their means as can
best be determined by a realistic assessment of their employment prospects or income streams from other family members.
Such services would also benefit likely intermittent debtors,
but they would need to be supplemented with links to an array
of employment-related services that can be responsive to their
immediate needs: job search skills for those out of work, career
enhancement education and training or investment strategies
to increase human capital for those in low-wage work or those
seeking higher paying employment opportunities, and the
like.
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Policy & PracticeImplicationsfor Likely Intermittent and Chronic
Debtors
Study findings also identified robust predictors of those
who are more likely to experience either intermittent or chronic
debt and might thereby benefit from either targeted or structural interventions, or some combination of both. Those with
a greater degree of external control are more likely than those
with a greater sense of internal control to experience either intermittent or chronic debt. Neither the length of time nor the
depth of debt need be totally beyond one's control, especially
over a twenty year period or longer. Policymakers and human
service professionals would do well to identify and influence
cultural, educational, and social factors thought to affect an
individual's sense of his or her capacity to affect their circumstances. To the extent locus of control is amenable to change, interventions aimed at increasing one's sense of internal control
would reduce the likelihood of experiencing intermittent or
chronic debt.
Policymakers and human service professionals can benefit
from knowing that the background characteristics of family
structure and current marital status are also robust predictors
of intermittent and chronic debt. Individuals growing up in
families with their mothers and fathers are much less likely to
experience intermittent or chronic debt. Separated, widowed,
or divorced persons are much less likely than married persons
to avoid debt than they are to be either intermittent or chronic
debtors. These findings suggest that there is something about
two-parent families, beyond the prospect of two income or
wealth streams, which enables them to manage their financial
situations such that they are less likely to experience intermittent or chronic debt. It would be incorrect to infer that the institution of marriage is the explanatory factor. Despite statistical
controls, the study reported here lacks the experimental controls to establish causality. It is quite plausible that those who
enter into marriage self-select by virtue of their initial commitments to problem-solve, raise children together, and minimize
financial risk-taking that may jeopardize their economic wellbeing. Policymakers would be well advised to avoid zero-sum
solutions when devising interventions aimed at decreasing the
likelihood of intermittent or chronic debt. That is, interventions
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favoring separated, widowed, or divorced persons should not
be implemented at the expense of married persons.
When devising and implementing interventions, policymakers and human service professionals can also benefit from
knowing that socioeconomic status and work effort are robust
predictors of intermittent and chronic debt. Those living in
low-income families are more likely than those in more affluent families to experience intermittent or chronic debt than
they are to avoid debt. This finding suggests that ending tax
advantages geared toward higher income families and redistributing that income to lower income families would decrease
the likelihood of lower income families experiencing intermittent or chronic debt. Although the study reported here did not
focus on mortgages as a specific source of debt, findings nonetheless suggest that getting money into the hands of lower
income families, for example, by underwriting mortgages or
by providing tax credits to those who can demonstrate that
their houses are worth considerably less, determined perhaps
by a politically acceptable formula related to income. Finally,
any policy or program intervention aimed at increasing work
effort would decrease the likelihood of families in any socioeconomic bracket experiencing intermittent or chronic debt.
Policy & PracticeImplicationsfor Likely Chronic Debtors
Study findings also suggest two robust predictors of those
more likely to experience chronic debt and thereby more likely
to benefit from either targeted or structural interventions, or
some combination of both, namely those with low self-esteem
and women. Those with a lower sense of self-esteem are more
likely than those with a greater sense of self-esteem to experience chronic debt. As is the case with locus of control, policymakers and human service professionals would do well to
identify and influence cultural, educational, and social factors
thought to affect an individual's sense self-esteem. To the
extent self-esteem is amenable to change, interventions aimed
at increasing it would reduce the likelihood of experiencing
chronic debt. On the whole, women are more likely than men
to experience debt, and this is especially so for chronic debt.
This finding highlights the economic vulnerability of women
and reaffirms a need for sustained structural interventions to
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enhance women's economic well-being. As is the case with
marital status, policymakers would be well advised to avoid
zero-sum solutions when devising interventions aimed at decreasing the likelihood of women's experiencing chronic debt.
That is, interventions favoring women should not be implemented at the expense of men.
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Social Capital, Human Capital, and Economic
Well-Being in the Knowledge Economy:
Results from Canada's General Social Survey
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Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Canadian welfare state's devolutionary transformation ushered in an era which potentially increased the importanceof social capitaland human capitalas mechanisms for promoting socio-economic advancement. In this study,
the authors analyze data from Canada's General Social Survey to
assess how social capitaland human capital influence the reported
incomes of the Canadianpopulation.The primaryfindingswere that
both social and human capital influenced income and that human
capitalhad a largereffect on economic mobility than did social capital. The implications the study's findings have for policy and programmatic interventions within the 21st century knowledge-based
economy are discussed,andfuture studies which can further understanding in the area of social and human capital are also proposed.
Key words: social capital,human capital,income, social networks,
social support, education

The concept of social capital arose as an extension of human
capital, that is, education levels and job skills that individuals offer to their prospective or actual employers. As an asset,
social capital, like human capital, is considered to have potential for translating into productivity within the labor market,
but it specifically refers to social relationships rather than
educational attainment or technical expertise (Harris, 1993;
Putnam, 1995; Schneider, 2006). In the seminal essay Social
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 2
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Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, Coleman (1988) proposes that social capital, like physical and human capital, "is
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends
that in its absence would not be possible" (p. S98). Reflecting
on its relational nature, Schneider (2002) refers to social capital
as "social relationships and patterns of trust which enable
people to gain access to resources such as government services or jobs" (p. 36), while Li (2004) suggests that social capital
refers to the social relationships which people try to cultivate
within various social settings as well as the "potential resources of these relationships that people may use to pursue social
and economic goals" (p. 172).
In accord with the above definitions, there is considerable evidence that the accumulation of social capital is associated with positive socio-economic outcomes. For instance,
higher levels of social capital have boosted employment opportunities and incomes, reduced poverty and work-family
conflict, increased savings and assets, and improved access to
credit (Brisson, 2009; George & Chaze, 2009; Yusuf, 2008). In a
similar vein, a positive link between social capital and career
advancement and the adoption of technology has also been
detected (Manturuk, Lindblad, & Quercia, 2009).
Social capital is also associated with positive outcomes
regarding welfare reform efforts, as the acquisition of social
capital can assist in low-income persons' efforts to exit welfare
and secure employment and valuable services such as child
care and health care (Lvesque, 2005; Parisi, McLaughlin,
Grice, Taquino, & Gill, 2003; Schneider, 2002). Likewise, a low
level of social capital is linked to prolonged welfare dependency and food insecurity (Henderson & Tickamyer, 2008).
On the other hand, Pichler and Wallace (2009), as well as Seo
(2005), suggest that social capital has little, if any, influence on
the economic well-being of the studied population. Moreover,
other studies (Adato, Carter, & May, 2006; Chantarat &
Barrett, 2008; Livermore & Neustrom, 2003) yielded findings
that social capital can actually have a detrimental impact on
various indicators of economic welfare, including economic
mobility, employment, and productivity.
In addition, the literature provides mixed results regarding the relative effects of social and human capital on
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economic well-being. For example, there is evidence that social
capital has a larger effect than human capital on economic wellbeing (Abdul-Hakim, Abdul-Razak, & Ismail, 2010; Fafchamps
& Minten, 2002; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). In contradistinction, Rupasingha and Goetz (2007) arrived at a conspicuously
different conclusion as they reported that human capital has
a larger impact on economic welfare than does social capital.
It is evident that the body of knowledge surrounding social
capital and its influence on economic mobility and advancement is anything but unequivocal, as is our understanding of
the comparative magnitude of the effects of both social and
human capital on economic mobility and welfare. In light of
the present evidence, the purpose of this study is to: (a) evaluate the effect of social capital in the form of social networks
and social support (these concepts are operationalized below)
on the economic well-being of the population of Canada; (b)
evaluate the effect of human capital in the form of educational
attainment and health status on the economic well-being of
the population of Canada; and (c) compare the magnitude of
effects that both social and human capital have on the economic well-being of the population of Canada.
Canada is a particularly relevant nation for examining
these issues outlined above, since beginning in the mid-1990s
the nation underwent substantial policy reforms which resulted in the federal government eliminating national standards
for social welfare programs and delegating greater authority
to the provinces for designing and implementing their own
safety nets (Habibov & Fan, 2008, 2010; Weaver, Habibov, &
Fan, 2010). As discussed below, this major restructuring of the
Canadian welfare state resulted in a greater emphasis on people's capacity to prosper within the market economy and thus
amplified the importance of implementing effective strategies
for promoting socio-economic advancement. Thus, the results
of this study contain important policy implications for Canada
and potentially for other nations whose social welfare systems
underwent similar transformations.
Moreover, in this study we are aligned with Rose (2000),
who suggests that although theories of human and social
capital may differ in their emphasis, they are not contradictory. In other words, we propose the suitability of a composite
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theory which avoids the exclusivity of either the human capital
or social capital approach. Consequently, the specific research
questions we address in this study are the following:
Research Question 1: Does social capital in the form of
social networks and social support positively affect the
economic well-being of the Canadian population?
Research Question 2: Does human capital in the form
of educational attainment and positive health status
positively affect the economic well-being of the
Canadian population?
Research Question 3: Does social capital in the form of
social networks and social support have a larger effect
on the economic well-being of the Canadian population
than human capital in the form of educational
attainment and positive health status?
By addressing the above-articulated questions, this study
contributes to the existing literature in the following ways.
First, we expand the knowledge base pertaining to the influence of social capital on economic welfare. As noted above,
the findings of previous studies pertaining to the relationship
between social capital and economic well-being are mixed,
that is, some suggest social capital positively affects economic
welfare while others provide contradictory evidence. Second,
we build on previous studies in that we include ten social
network and social support dimensions. Also, to our knowledge, no other study has included telephone and internet communication when measuring frequency of contact with social
networks such as relatives and friends. Thus, our use of a wide
range of social networks and social support indicators allows
for a more comprehensive assessment of social capital by providing valuable information on what specific aspects of social
capital may promote economic advancement. Third, we incorporate standardized regression coefficients into our analyses.
This allows us to directly compare the magnitude of the effects
of social and human capital on economic well-being (Leroux
& Wright, 2010; Long & Freese, 2006). As discussed above, the
literature in this area also yields mixed findings, so this study
can provide a meaningful contribution to the scholarly conversation regarding how the influence that social capital may
have on wealth-building compares to the influence of human
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capital. Thus, the results of this study can inform policymakers
and program planners on how to design and implement interventions that can effectively promote economic well-being
and advancement. Fourth, our use of data from a nationally
representative survey allows us to generalize our findings to
the entire population inhabiting Canada's ten provinces. This
increases the likelihood that our findings can inform social
welfare observers both inside and outside of Canada.
Method
Data
The General Social Survey (GSS) was established in 1985
by Statistics Canada, the country's national statistical authority. The GSS is an annual cross-sectional multitopic nationallyrepresentative survey of the Canadian population. The GSS
is designed to gather information regarding living conditions
and the well-being of the Canadian population, as well as to
supply data to inform particular policy issues. Every year
Statistics Canada conducts a new cycle of the GSS. Every cycle
consists of a core questionnaire that includes basic socio-demographics such as age, sex, education and income levels. In
addition, every cycle has a specific focus such as quality of life
after retirement in cycle 9, education and work history in cycle
15, and fertility and family intentions in cycle 20. In this study,
we use cycle 22 of the GSS which specifically focuses on social
engagement and social networks (Statistics Canada, 2010).
The data for cycle 22 of the GSS were collected in 5 waves
from February to November 2008. Computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) was used to collect the data for this
cycle, as households were selected by using a random digit
dialing (RDD) method. The target population was residents
of all ten Canadian provinces and the sample size was 20,041.
Each of the ten provinces were divided into strata, that is,
distinct geographic regions, with Census Metropolitan Areas
(CMAs) such as Toronto and Montreal each being considered
separate strata. The non-CMAs of each province were grouped
to form ten strata, leading to 27 strata in all. Survey estimates
were weighted to represent all persons in the target population, including those without telephones. Consequently, the
GSS data set provides sampling weights which were used to
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make the results of our study representative of the total population of all ten Canadian provinces (Statistics Canada, 2010).
Dependent Variable
Economic well-being is the dependent variable in this
study. Economic well-being is represented by the respondent's
personal income. The GSS records the respondent's personal
income in the form of an ordinal-level scale with 12 categories
ranging from 1 = No income to 12 = $100,000 or more.
Independent Variables
Social networks and social support. In this study we based
our selection of social capital variables on the measurement of
social capital developed by the United Kingdom's Office for
National Statistics (ONS). The ONS established a Social Capital
Working Group in order to develop an operational measure of
social capital that could be adopted by the UK government. A
primary dimension of social capital as delineated by the ONS
Working Group is social networks andsocial support.This refers to
various indicators such as number of friends and relatives, frequency in seeing and speaking to friends and relatives, virtual
networks, and being able to identify reliable people who can
provide help when needed (Harper, 2002). It was these indicators of social networks and social support which informed our
selection of social capital variables for this study.
Given our above-mentioned focus on social networks and
social support, our variables pertained primarily to informal
ties, that is, friends and relatives. We utilized a total of ten
social capital variables in this study. These ten variables included two continuous variables, which were the number of
close relatives and the number of close friends the participants
had, and eight categorical variables. The categorical variables
consisted of frequency in seeing relatives and friends during
the past month (with once a week or more consideredfrequent),
and if participants often communicated with their relatives
and friends over the phone and over the internet (with once a
week or more considered often). Furthermore, the participants
were asked if they had plenty of people to rely on when they
had a problem and if they often felt rejected.
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Human Capital and Demographic.We also included several
human capital and demographic variables as independent
variables. The human capital variables we selected were
educational level and health status, while age and gender
were the demographic variables. To assess the effect of education, we created two dummy variables which indicated if respondents possessed a college diploma or Bachelor's level or
higher university degree. To assess health status, we created a
dummy variable which indicates if respondents reported their
health status to be good. In order to ascertain the effects of age,
we created dummy variables which represent the following
categories: ages 15-34, 35-54, and 55-74. Finally, as a means of
assessing the role of gender, we created a female dummy variable that represents female respondents.
The effect of the above-discussed variables on the economic well-being of the Canadian population is well-documented.
For instance, starting with 15 years of age, the average income
for residents of Canada rises steadily until the age range of
45-64 years. From age 65 years and onward the average income
declines (Statistics Canada, 2006). As far as gender and education level, the average earnings of men continue to outpace
women's earnings and education level is positively associated with income (Hick, 2007; Schiller, 2003; Seccombe, 2000).
Moreover, health status is linked with income in that persons
with health problems are more likely to have lower incomes
than persons with a more favorable health status (McIntosh,
Finds, Wilkins, & Wolfson, 2009; Raphael, 2007). Based on these
studies, we expected that a higher level of educational achievement, better health, and being a male would all be associated
with higher personal income, while income would grow with
age from 15-34 to 35-54 and then steadily decline.
Analytical Strategy
There were two primary steps in our analytical strategy.
First, we calculated descriptive statistics for the independent
variables. The discrete-level variables were reported in percentages while the continuous-level variables were reported using
means and standard deviations. Second, we used multivariate
analysis to estimate which independent variables were associated with an increase in the participants' personal income.
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This involved estimating a total of ten regression models,
with each model containing one of the ten social network
and support variables used in this study, along with all of the
selected human capital and demographic variables. Because
our dependent variable, the respondent's level of personal
income, is categorical and ordered, ordinal logistic regression
models were estimated. Since an ordinal logistic regression
model is non-linear in terms of outcome probabilities, we utilized several approaches to assess the relationships between
the independent and dependent variables (Long & Freese,
2006). As is customary, we commenced with an estimation of
the regression coefficients. The standard interpretation of regression coefficients in an ordered logistic model is that for a
one unit increase in the independent variable the dependent
variable level is expected to change by its respective regression coefficient in the ordered log-odds scale. Given that the
interpretation of regression coefficients within an ordered logistic model is not intuitive, we converted regression coefficients to odds ratios which can be more easily interpreted. The
interpretation pertains to how the odds for reporting a higher
income change as a result of a one unit increase or decrease
in the independent variable. In addition, we used the SPost
statistical add-on to the Stata software developed by Long and
Freese (2006) to convert regression coefficients to standardized
regression coefficients. Standardization of the coefficients was
done in order to determine which of the independent variables
had a greater effect on the dependent variable if the variables
differed in terms of level of measurement. In this study education and gender were measured as binary variables, number
of friends was measured as a continuous variable, while the
dependent variable, economic well-being, was measured as a
categorical ordered variable. Thus, using standardized coefficients allowed us to directly compare the effect of the various
independent variables on the participants' reported incomes,
regardless of their level of measurement (Leroux & Wright,
2010; Long & Freese, 2006).
In order to address multicollinearity, we utilized the
method employed by Habibov and Fan (2008) in which we
conducted ordinal logistic regression between each individual predictor that yielded significant results within the full
model and the outcome variable and then noted the sign of the
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Variables
Human capital
Age 15-34
Age 35-54
Age 55-74
Age 75 and older
Female
College diploma
University Degree
Good health
Married
Social network
Seen relatives frequently
Seen friends frequently
Often communicate to relatives over the
phone

Binary variables (%)
Yes
No
23.07
36.81
30.57
9.60
56.68
27.19
24.44
82.06
47.62

76.93
63.19
69.43
90.40
43.32
72.81
75.56
17.94
52.38

46.38
65.90

53.62
34.10

71.07

28.93

Often communicate to relatives over the
internet

31.82

68.18

Often communicate to friends over the
phone

64.62

35.38

Often communicate to friends over the
internet

41.25

58.75

Plenty people to rely on, when I have
problem

79.02

20.98

I often feel rejected

Social network (range 0-200)
Number of close relatives
Number of close friends

4.06
95.94
Continuous
variables
Mean
Std Dev
6.277022
10.0952
7.469239
10.6564

Note: Data are rounded up.

regression coefficient. Any predictor variable whose coefficient in the full model was in the opposite direction from its
coefficient in the one-by-one regression would be considered
multicollinear. There was no evidence of multicollinearity in
any of the regression models estimated in this study.
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Results
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample.
The greatest proportion (36.81%) of the participants was
between 35 and 54 years of age and nearly 57% were female.
Approximately 82% of the participants reported being in good
health and 24.44% had earned at least a Bachelor's degree. In
terms of their social capital, a very small proportion (4.06%)
of participants reported often feeling rejected and 79.02% reported they had plenty of people to rely on when they had
a problem. Nearly 66% of the participants saw their friends
frequently during the month prior to their responding to this
survey and 46.38% frequently saw their relatives during the
same time period. The majority of participants reported they
often communicated with their relatives and friends over the
phone, while a minority stated they often communicated with
the same social networks through the internet.
Let us now turn to the results of our logistic regression
analyses. Table 2 provides the results of Models 1 - 4, with each
model containing one social capital variable which pertained
to the number of close relatives and friends the participants
had and how frequently they saw them, along with all of the
human capital and demographic variables described above.
Beginning with Model 1, the results indicated that for each
additional close relative there was an increased likelihood for
participants to have a high income after holding constant the
other variables in the model. In Model 2, each additional close
friend increased the likelihood that participants would report
a high income after holding the other variables in the model
constant. The Model 3 results revealed that participants who reported seeing their relatives frequently demonstrated a higher
likelihood of having a high income after holding constant the
other variables in the model. As for Model 4, the social capital
variable of seeing friends frequently was not associated with
changes in the participants' income.
In all four models reported in Table 2, both the human
capital and the demographic variables were associated with
changes in the participants' income. Being younger (aged 15
- 34) and female predicted a lower income. On the contrary,
being 35 - 54 or 55 - 74, having a diploma/certificate or a
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Table 2. Number of Friends and Relatives and Frequency of Meeting
Them (table continues on next pag e)
Model 1
Std
Coeff

Coeff
Odds
Ratio
Human capital block of independent variables
-.1756
-.806***
.4466***
(.0623)
(.0278)
Age 15-34
.1482
.663***
1.940***
Age 35-54
(.0588)
(.1141)
.0278
.146"
1.157"*
(.0584)
(.0676)
Age 55-74
Variables

College diploma

.3306*
(.0116)

-1.107***
(.0352)

-.2539

2.652***
(.1057)

.976***
(.0391)

.2002

1.879***
6.545***
(.0494)
(.3231)
.553***
1.738***
(.0478)
(.0831)
Social network block of independent variables
.003*
1.003*
Number of close
(.0015)
(.0015)
relatives
Number of close
friends
Seen relatives
frequently
Seen friends
frequently
-36145.4
Log
pseudolikelihood
3562.7
Wald Chi
Squared
8
Degree of
freedom
0.0000
Prob > chi2
16,175
Number of cases
University
Degree
Good health

.3785
.0890

Odds
Ratio

Model 2
Coeff

Std
Coeff

.4520***
(.0279)
1.973***
(.1152)
1.168**
(.0676)
.3303***
(.0116)
2.663***
(.1059)
6.550***
(.3221)
1.736***
(.0824)

-.794***
(.0619)
.680***
(.0584)
.155**
(.0579)
-1.107***
(.0352)
.980***
(.0398)
1.880**
(.0492)
.552***
(.0475)

-.1727

1.006**
(.0019)

.006**
(.0019)

.0256

.1517
.0296
-.2539
.2008
.3786
.0890

-36308.9
3610.8
8
0.0000
16,254

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 . Std Coeff =
Standardized coefficients. The results of estimation are adjusted by using national
sampling weights.

university degree, and reporting good health all increased the
participants' likelihood of earning a high income.
Please refer to Table 3 for the results of the estimations in
Models 5 - 8. Each one of these models included one social
capital variable that focused on the type and intensity of
contact with either relatives or friends as well as all of the
human capital and demographic variables described above.
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Table 2. Number of Friends and Relatives and Frequency of Meeting
Them (continued from previous page)
Model 3
Coeff
Std
Odds
Coeff
Ratio
Human capital block of independent variables
-.1707
.4562***
-.
785***
(.0612)
(.0279)
Age 35-54
Age 55-74
Female
College diploma

1.978***
(.1142)
L166**
(.0665)
.3247***
(.0114)
2.642***
(.1051)

.682***
(.0577)
*154**
(.0571)
-1.125**
(.0351)
.972***
(.0398)

.1524
.0293
-.2580
.1993

.3779
1.876**
6.529***
(.3203)
(.0491)
.0890
.552***
1.736***
(.0472)
(.0819)
Social network block of independent variables
Number of close
relatives
Number of close
friends
0.0369
.162*
Seen relatives
1.176"
(.0400)
(.0341)
frequently
Seen friends
frequently
Log
-36621.7
pseudolikelihood
3640.1
Wald Chi
Squared
Degree of
8
freedom
2
0.0000
Prob > X
16,391
Number of cases

University
Degree

Odds
Ratio

Model 4
Coeff

Std
Coeff

.4527***
(.0277)
1.959***
(.1130)
1.1625"**
(.0663)
.3291***
(.0115)
2.648***
(.1052)
6.478***
(.3186)
1.745**
(.0823)

-,792**
(.0613)
0.673***
(.0577)
,151**
(.0570)
-1.11"**
(.0350)
.974***
(.0397)
1.868***
(.0492)
.557***
(.0472)

-0.1726

.9640
(.0344)

-.0366
(.0357)

-0.0079

0.1504
0.0287
-0.2550
0.1999
0.3767
0.0899

-36638.1
3595.1
8
0.0000
16,391

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 .Std Coeff =Standardized coefficients. The results of estimation are adjusted by using national
sampling weights.

The results of Model 5 indicated that participants who
often communicated with relatives over the phone exhibited a
greater likelihood for reporting a high income, ceteris paribus,
while Model 6 yielded a finding that often communicating
with relatives over the internet increased the likelihood of participants having a high income, again after holding constant
all of the other variables in the model. As evinced by Model
7, often communicating to friends over the phone did not
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influence the participants' income. In Model 8, however, often
communicating with friends over the internet was associated
with a greater likelihood of the participants having a higher
income after holding constant the other variables in the model.
Table 3. Intensity of Contacts with Relatives and Friends

(table continues on next page)
Model 5
Odds
Coeff
Ratio
Human capitalblock of independentvariables
Variables

Age 15-34

College diploma
University Degree

Model 6
Coeff

Std
Coeff

Std
Coeff

Odds
Ratio
.4187**
(.0259)
1.866***
(.1081)

-.870***
(.0620)
.624***
(.0579)

-.1891

.4562*.
(.0278)
1.942***
(.1122)

-.785*..
(.0611)
.664***
(.0578)

-.1702

1.159"*
(.0663)

.148*
(.0572)

.0280

1.121*
(.0639)

.114*
(.0571)

.0217

.3128***
(.0110)

-1.162**
(.0354)

-.2658

.3210***
(.0113)

-1.136***
(.0352)

-.2603

2.603***
(.1040)
6.359***
(.3124)
1.724***
(.0813)

.957***
(.0400)
1.850***
(.0491)
.545***
(.0472)

.1957

2.600***
(.1039)
6.208***
(.3084)
1.718***
(.0809)

.956***
(.0400)
1.826***
(.0497)
.541***
(.0471)

.1958

1.283***

.250***

.0542

(.0493)

(.0385)

Social network block of independent variables
Often communicate
1.406***
.341***
to relatives over the
(.0388)
(.0545)
phone
Often communicate
to relatives over the
internet

.1479

.3716
.0877

.1393

.3673
.0872

.0729

Often communicate
to friends over the
phone
Often communicate
to friends over the
internet
Log
pseudolikelihood

-36573.6

-36604.3

Wald Chi Squared

3681.8

3651.6

Degree of freedom

8

8

2

Prob > X

0.0000

0.0000

Number of cases

16,391

16,391

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 . Std Coeff =
Standardized coefficients. The results of estimation are adjusted by using national
sampling weights.
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Table 3. Intensity of Contacts with Relatives and Friends (continued)
Variables

Odds
Ratio

Model 7
Coeff

Human capital block of independent variables
.4449***
-.810***
.0275
(.6181)
1.949***
.1125

Odds
Ratio

-.1763

.3941"**
(.0256)
1.833**
(.1073)
1.120*
(.0639)
.3227***
(.0114)
2.632***
(.1049)
6.219***
(.3096)
1.711***
(.0808)

-.931***
(.0650)
.606***
(.0585)
.114*
(.0571)
-1.131***

1.248**

.222***

(.0485)

(.0389)

.668***
(0.057)

.1492
.0285

.0115

.150"*
(.0570)
-1.115"**
(.0352)

College diploma

2.650
.1053

.975***
(.0397)

.2000

University Degree

6.480***
.3188

1.869***
(.0492)

.3767

1.739***
.0819

.553***
(.0471)

.0894

Age55741.161"**
.0661
Femle.3280***

Model 8
Coeff

Std
Coeff

-.2559

(.0355)
.968***
(.0399)
1.828**
(.0498)
.537***
(.0472)

Std
Coeff
-.2024
.1354
.0217
-.2591
.1984
.3678
.0866

Social network block of independent variables
Often communicate
to relatives over the
phone
Often communicate
to relatives over the
internet
Often communicate
to friends over the
phone
Often communicate
to friends over the
internet
Log
pseudolikelihood

1.049

.0484

.0376

(.0358)

-36637.5

-36612.3

Wald Chi Squared

3596.7

3626.3

Degree of freedom

8

8

2

0.0000

0.0000

16,391

16,391

Prob > X

Number of cases

.0508

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 . Std Coeff
Standardized coefficients. The results of estimation are adjusted by using national
sampling weights.

In all four models reported in Table 3, both the human
capital and the demographic variables were again associated with changes in the participants' income. For example,
being aged 15 - 34 and a female increased the likelihood of
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participants having a lower income. By contrast, being aged
35 - 54 or 55 - 74, earning a college diploma or a university
degree, and being in good health were all associated with a
greater likelihood of their reporting a high income.
Table 4. Having People to Rely on or Having Been Often Rejected
Model 9
Coeff
Odds
Ratio
Human capitalblock of independent variables
.4458***
-.808***
(.0615)
(.0276)
Variables

Odds
Ratio

-.1757

.4510"**
(.0276)
1.966**
(.1136)
1.168"*
(.0668)
.3294***
(.0115)
2.638***
(.1049)
6.434***
(.3167)
1.680***
(.0808)

-.796***
(.0614)
.676***
(.0578)
.155**
(.0572)
-1.110***
(.0351)
.970***
(.0398)
1.862**
(.0492)
.519"**
(.0481)

-.1732

.6361"**

-.452***
(.0904)

-.0371

.681***
(.0581)

.1522

Age55-74

1.167***
(.0668)

.154**
(.0574)

.0294

Female

.3254***
(.0115)

-1.123***
(.0351)

-.2573

2.644***
(.1049)
6.529***
(.3167)

.972***
(.0397)
1.876"**
(.0491)

.1993

1.689***
(.0808)

.525***
(.0474)

.0846

Social network block of independent variables
.248***
1.281***
Plenty people to
rely on, when I have
(.0430)
(.0574)
problem

.0456

University Degree

I often feel rejected

.3777

(.0574)
-36613.0

-36621.5

Wald Chi Squared

3640.6

3605.8

Degree of freedom
2
Prob > X

8

8

0.0000

0.0000

Number of cases

16,391

16,391

Log pseudolikelihood

Std
Coeff

Std
Coeff

1.976**
(.1136)

College diploma

Model 10
Coeff

.1511
.0296
-.2546
.1989
.3750
.0837

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Std Coeff
= Standardized coefficients. The results of estimation are adjusted by using national
sampling weights.

Table 4 delineates the estimations for Models 9 and 10, both
of which included the same set of human capital and demographic variables found in the previous models and one specific social capital variable. Model 9 results indicate there was a
greater likelihood that participants would report having a high
income when, after holding constant all of the other variables
in the model, they indicated they had plenty of people to rely
on when they had a problem. Model 10 results indicate that

46

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

participants who reported they often felt rejected by others
exhibited a greater likelihood for reporting a lower income,
ceteris paribus. Also, the relationship between all of the human
capital and demographic variables and the participants' income
levels detected in Models 1 - 8 were the same in Models 9 and
10. Moreover, the direction of the relationships was equivalent,
as the lowest age category and being female were associated
with an increased likelihood of having a lower income. In comparison, the other age categories, educational attainment in the
form of a college diploma/university degree and good health
all increased the likelihood of reporting a high income.
Of the significant social capital variables in all of the estimated models, economic well-being was most profoundly
influenced by often communicating with relatives over the
phone (a standardized coefficient of .0729 in Model 5), followed by often communicating with relatives over the internet (a standardized coefficient of .0542 in Model 6), and often
communicating with friends over the internet (a standardized
coefficient of .0508 in Model 8).
We also considered the standardized coefficients for the
human capital and demographic variables and we observed
that in all 10 estimated models having a university degree had
a stronger effect on economic well-being than all of the variables, both social capital and demographic. Being female had
the second largest effect on economic well-being amongst all
of the independent variables in all models, but in the opposite direction-that is, female participants were more likely to
report lower incomes. Having a college diploma, which was
positively associated with earned income, had the third largest
effect on economic well-being amongst all of the independent
variables in all of the models.
Discussion and Conclusion
The analyses conducted in this study allowed us to answer
the three research questions listed above. In regards to the first
research question, we determined that in eight of the ten estimated models social capital in the form of social networks
and social support was positively associated with individual
income. This result is in accord with several previous studies
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(Brisson, 2009; Lvesque, 2005; Parisi et al., 2003) which suggested that the acquisition or presence of social capital was
associated with favorable economic outcomes. However, our
consideration of social networks and social support in a multidimensional manner demonstrated that the effect of social
capital on income varied by the type of social capital dimension. For instance, both the number of close relatives and close
friends were positively associated with income, but in terms
of frequency in seeing these respective network types, only
the frequency in seeing relatives was associated with income.
Likewise, frequency in communicating with relatives over the
phone was positively associated with income, but there was
no relationship between communicating with friends over the
phone and income. These findings suggest that while both
close relatives and close friends are important social networks,
a higher frequency in communicating with friends may denote
contact with a large number of casual acquaintances that have
little influence on one's economic well-being.
When it came to frequency in the participants' communicating with relatives and friends over the internet, however,
a positive association with income was detected for both
network types. Moreover, as indicated above, frequency in
communicating with relatives and friends over the internet
had the second and third largest effect on income, respectively,
out of all of the social capital variables utilized in this study.
This suggests that frequency of communicating over the internet is a determinant of income, regardless of the network type
or even if the person with whom one is communicating is not
considered a "close" relative or friend.
During the past decade, the internet has cemented its
status as a highly effective means of communication through a
variety of methods, including email, listservs, online chatting,
instant messaging, and blogging. These interpersonal interactive functions allow people to go online and communicate with
others at a relatively low cost, irrespective of physical distance.
Thus, the internet facilitates the creation of virtual networks of
people who may communicate with each other and yet differ
on a variety of characteristics, including ethnicity, socio-economic status, and political affiliation (Lee & Lee, 2010).
It is this potential of the internet to cultivate communicative relationships between people who have a wide range of
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backgrounds and experience that may help explain why we
found the positive relationship between frequency of communication over the internet and income. In other words, people
who communicate with others more frequently over the internet may be more apt to establish relationships with others who
have a wide range of backgrounds and experiences and who
are willing to exchange helpful information that can promote
social and economic mobility. On the other hand, it may be
the case that those who communicate over the internet on a
more regular basis have a higher level of aptitude for informational technology, which can translate into greater earnings
in the present-day knowledge economy (Dolton, Makepeace,
& Robinson, 2007). Clearly, more research in this area is
warranted.
As for our second research question, in all ten models
human capital in the form of educational attainment and positive health status were positively associated with income. As
was the case with our first research question, our findings for
the second research question are supported by the literature
(Pichler & Wallace, 2009; Schiller, 2003; Seo, 2005). As discussed
below, this strengthens the argument that a strong commitment to human capital investments is necessary for promoting
poverty reduction and economic advancement.
By addressing our third research question, which considers if social capital has a larger effect on economic well-being
than does human capital, our contrary finding provides a
meaningful contribution to the body of literature that considers the impact of both social and human capital. As highlighted above, previous studies have yielded mixed and inconsistent results about the relative effect of social and human capital
on economic well-being. Hence, we estimated ten multivariate
regression models with the same set of human capital and demographic variables and ten different social capital variables
in the form of social networks and social support. In all ten
models, our analyses of standardized coefficients indicated
that human capital in the form of educational attainment and
positive health status had a larger effect on income than any of
the social capital variables we selected.
This finding provides a noteworthy implication for social
policy in developed countries, including Canada, which are
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influenced by the idea of a so-called "social investment state,"
in which emphasis shifts from the traditional welfare state's
focus on social protection from market risks to the enhancement of human capital (Blair, 1998; Chappell, 2010; Giddens,
1998). As Giddens (1998) articulates, the main goal of this shift
is to ensure the "investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than direct provision of economic maintenance.
In place of the welfare state we should put the social investment state" (p. 117). Thus, from this perspective, social spending should be shifted from traditional social welfare programs
to programs aimed at increasing human capital through education, training, and work experience, and our finding of the
relatively larger effect of human capital on income tentatively
lends further credence to the notion of a social investment state
(Banting, 2005; Greenberg, 2011). It should be noted, however,
that this shift away from the traditional welfare state has increased economic inequality and poverty and impeded the
cultivation of social capital within local communities and families (Banting, 2005; Hammer, 2004; Roberts & Devine, 2003).
Against this backdrop, our findings shed an important
light on the present-day policy context. Recall that in our estimations both human and social capital variables were positively associated with income, as in eight of the ten models a
positive effect of social capital on income was detected, even
after the effect of the human capital and demographic variables were taken into account. This suggests that, alongside
a substantial commitment to human capital investments, the
policy community should incorporate social work and human
service interventions that can increase social capital (Pinto,
2006; Schneider, 2006) and thereby reduce poverty. In other
words, our findings imply that policymakers, in this era of
welfare state transformation, should not overlook the importance of social capital when designing programs that further
the knowledge and skill sets of the populace.
Limitations and FutureStudies
This study has important implications both for social policy
in general and social work practice in particular. It should be
noted, however, that the cross-sectional nature of this study
precludes us from making causal inferences between social
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and human capital and economic mobility-only associative
relationships may be established. Hence, further studies in this
area should include longitudinal designs that are more conducive to the establishment of causal inferences.
As noted above, further studies could also focus on better
understanding the relationship between internet communication and its potential for enhancing economic welfare. With the
steady growth of online populations and the expansion of the
internet's relatively inexpensive interactive applications, it is
crucial that we gather a more comprehensive understanding of
the role electronic communication can play in poverty reduction strategies.
Finally, this study considered social networks and social
support, but there are a variety of other social networks measures that could be incorporated into future studies which
assess the relationship between social capital and economic
welfare. For instance, the social network dimension of social
capital not only includes informal ties such as family and
friends, but also generalized relationships with civic groups
and associations as well as institutional relationships, which
are the associations people have with a variety of formal
representatives, including those from government, the legal
system, police services, unions, and universities (Yusuf, 2008).
Empirically testing the impact of the various social networks
outlined above on income could provide findings that make an
important contribution to the literature.

References
Abdul-Hakim, R., Abdul-Razak, N. A., & Ismail, R. (2010). Does
social capital reduce poverty? A case study of rural households
in Terengganu, Malaysia. EuropeanJournalof Social Sciences, 14(4),
556-566.
Adato, M., Carter, M. R., & May, J. (2006). Exploring poverty traps
and social exclusion in South Africa using qualitative and
quantitative data. Journalof Development Studies, 42(2), 226-247.
Banting, K. (2005). Do we know where we are going? The new social
policy in Canada. CanadianPublic Policy, 31(4), 421-429.
Blair, T. (1998). The third way: The new politics for the new century.
London: Fabian Society.

Social Capital,Human Capital, and Economic Well-being

51

Brisson, D. (2009). Testing the relationship of formal bonding, informal
bonding, and formal bridging social capital on key outcomes for
families in low-income neighborhoods. Journal of Sociology and
Social Welfare, 36(1), 167-183.
Chantarat, S., & Barrett, C. B. (2008). Social network capital, economic
mobility and poverty traps. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1151353.
Chappell. R. (2010). Social welfare in Canadiansociety (4th ed.). Toronto,
Ontario: Nelson Education Ltd.
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital.
American Journalof Sociology, 51, S95-S120.
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G., & Robinson, H. (2007). Use IT or
Lose IT? The impact of computers on earnings. Retrieved
February 3, 2011, from
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/
bitstream/10419/33735/1/527827657.pdf.
Fafchamps, M., & Minten, B. (2002). Returns to social network capital
among traders. Oxford Economic Papers, 54, 173-206.
George, U., & Chaze, F. (2009). Social capital and employment: South
Asian women's experiences. Affilia: Journal of Women and Social
Work, 24(4), 394-405.
Giddens, A. (1998). The third way: The renewal of social democracy.
Cambridge: Polity.
Greenberg, L. (2011, January 31). Ontario's welfare spending to rise
by 500 million. Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved January 31, 2011, from
http:/ /www.ottawacitizen.com/business/Ontario%2Bwelfare
%2Bspending%2Brise%2Bmillion/4194205 /story.html.
Habibov, N., & Fan, L. (2008). Comparison of inequality reduction
and income security in Canada from a mixed to neo-liberal
welfare regime: Micro-data simulations and policy implications.
Journalof ComparativeSocial Welfare, 24(1), 33-47.
Habibov, N., & Fan, L. (2010). Comparing and contrasting poverty
reduction performance of social welfare programs across
jurisdictions in Canada using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA):
An exploratory study of the era of devolution. ProgramEvaluation
and Planning,33(4), 457-467.
Hammer, S. (2004). Mark Latham's third way: Income support, civic
renewal and collectivism. AustralianJournal of Social Issues, 39(2),
143-153.
Harper, R. (2002). The measurement of social capital in the United
Kingdom. Retrieved November 18, 2010, from http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/22/52/2382339.pdf.
Harris, K. M. (1993). Work and welfare among single mothers in
poverty. American Journalof Sociology, 99(2), 317-352.
Henderson, D. A., & Tickamyer, A. R. (2008). Lost in Appalachia: The
unexpected impact of welfare reform on older women in rural
communities. Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare, 35(3), 153-171.

52

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Hick, S. (2007). Social welfare in Canada (2nd ed.). Toronto, Ontario:
Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc.
Lee, J., & Lee, H. (2010). The computer-mediated communication
network: Exploring the linkage between the online community
and social capital. New Media & Society, 12(5), 711-727.
Leroux, K., & Wright, N. S. (2010). Does performance measurement
improve strategic decision making? Findings from a national
survey of nonprofit social service agencies. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly,39(4), 571-587.
L~vesque, M. (2005). Social capital in action: Thematic policy studies.
Retrieved September 16, 2010, from http://www.policyresearch.
gc.ca/doclib/SCThematicE.pdf.
Li, P. (2004). Social capital and economic outcomes for immigrants
and ethnic minorities. Journal of International Migration and
Integration,5(2), 171-190.
Long, S., & Freese, J. (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent
variables using STATA. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Livermore, M., & Neustrom, A. (2003). Linking welfare clients to jobs:
Discretionary use of worker social capital. Journalof Sociology and
Social Welfare, 30(2), 87-103.
Manturuk, K., Lindblad, M., & Quercia, R. (2009). Friends and
neighbors:Homeownership and social capital among low-to moderateincome families. Retrieved August 22, 2010, from http: / /www.ccc.
unc.edu/documents/Friends.Neighbors.11.09.pdf.
McIntosh, C. N., Fines, P., Wilkins, R., & Wolfson, M. C. (2009). Income
disparitiesin health-adjustedlife expectancyfor Canadianadults, 1991
to 2001 (Health report # 82-003-X). Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and sociability: Household
income and social capital in rural Tanzania. Economic Development
and CulturalChange, 47, 871-897.
Parisi, D., McLaughlin, D. K., Grice, S. M., Taquino, M., & Gill, D.
A. (2003). TANF participation rates: Do community conditions
matter? Rural Sociology, 68(4), 491-512.
Pichler, F., & Wallace, C. (2009). Social capital and social class in
Europe: The role of social networks in social stratification.
European Sociological Review, 25(3), 319-332.
Pinto, R. M. (2006). Using social network interventions to improve
mentally ill clients' well-being. Clinical Social Work Journal, 34(1),
83-100.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social
capital. Journalof Democracy, 6(1), 65-78.
Raphael, D. (2007). Poverty and policy in Canada. Toronto: Canadian
Scholars' Press Inc.
Roberts, J. M., & Devine, F (2003). The hollowing out of the welfare
state and social capital. Social Policy & Society, 2(4), 309-318.
Rose, R. (2000). How much does social capital add to individual
health? A survey study of Russians. Social Science & Medicine, 51,
1421-1435.

Social Capital,Human Capital,and Economic Well-being

53

Rupasingha, A., & Goetz, S. J. (2007). Social and political forces as
determinants of poverty: A spatial analysis. The Journal of SocioEconomics, 36, 650-671.
Schiller, B. R. (2003). The economics of poverty and discrimination (9th
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc.
Schneider, J. (2002). Social capital and community supports for low
income families: Examples from Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
The Social Policy Journal,1(1), 35-55.
Schneider, J. (2006). Social capital and welfare reform. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Seccombe, K. (2000). Families in poverty in the 1990s: Trends, causes,
consequences, and lessons learned. Journal of Marriage and the
Family, 62, 1094-1113.
Seo, J. (2005). Overcoming economic hardship: The effects of human
capital and social capital (Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State
University). DissertationAbstracts International,66, 1978.
Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 census data products. Retrieved
October 29, 2010, from http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/censusrecensement/2006/dp-pd/index-eng.cfm.
Statistics Canada (2010). Generalsocial survey: Cycle 22: Social networks:
Public use microdatafile documentation and user's guide (Catalogue
no. 12M0022G). Ottawa: Social and Aboriginal Statistics Division,
Statistics Canada.
Weaver, R., Habibov, N., & Fan, L. (2010). Devolution and the poverty
reduction effectiveness of Canada's provincial social welfare
programs: Results from a time-series investigation of a Canadian
national survey. Journalof Policy Practice,9(2), 80-95.
Yusuf, S. A. (2008). Social capital and household welfare in Kwara
State, Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology, 23(3), 219-229.

Neoliberalism, Piven and Cloward's
Bargaining Theory, and Wages
in the United States, 1965-2006
THOMAS W. VOLSCHO

Department of Sociology, Anthropology,
and Social Work
City University of New York - College of Staten Island

The political economy of the United States during the last thirty
years has been described as neoliberal. Part of the neoliberal turn
involves reducing or eliminatingincome support programs such as
AFDC/TANF,waging war againstorganized labor,and increasingly conservative (i.e., neoliberal)public policies. Followingan analysis by Lewis (2001) which showed that wages increasedin response
to higher average monthly AFDC payments, I update and expand
this test of Piven and Cloward's bargainingpower theory of wages
by looking at other factors which may influence worker bargaining power: unions, interest rates, policy liberalism, and economic
growth. I use time-series data on the U.S. covering 1965-2006 and
find that AFDC/TANF benefits have a short-term positive effect
on private-sector wages while declining union membership, punitive interest rate shocks, and increasinglyconservative public policies have reduced the bargainingpower of private-sectorworkers.
Key words: Wages, neoliberalism, Piven and Cloward, bargaining theory

Neoliberalism is the institutional arrangement marking
the last thirty years of U.S. capitalism. While politicians and
mainstream analysts have presented "free market" neoliberal policies as a means to restoring economic growth,
economic data indicate the neoliberal era has not been marked
by exceptionally strong economic growth, but instead by the
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hyper-concentration of income streams among the richest
asset owners (Dum~nil & Lvy, 2004, 2011; Harvey, 2005,2010).
Part of this new economic regime includes politicians' attacks
on the welfare state-most notably during the first Reagan administration. Not only were attacks on the welfare state paramount in the early 1980s, but so were attacks on organized
labor and "liberal" (in the North American sense) public policies. The 1996 welfare reform bill that fundamentally restructured the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program into Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) was a
major event in North American neoliberalism.
Piven and Cloward, writing at the dawn of neoliberalism
(1982/1985) argued that social welfare benefit levels provide
workers with protection and bargaining power in the labor
market. More generous AFDC benefits compel employers
to pay higher wages and employees feel less intimidated in
bargaining situations when they have a more generous social
safety net upon which to fall back. Other analysts, such as
Schor and Bowles (1987) and Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf
(1990), argued that strong welfare state institutions allowed
workers' real wages to rise through the late 1970s by reducing
the "cost of job loss."
Lewis (2001) tested and found support for the hypothesis that private-sector wages increase in response to a rise in
average monthly AFDC benefits using annual time-series data
from 1960 through 1995. I build upon Lewis' test of Piven and
Cloward in several ways. First, I argue that reduced AFDC/
TANF payments are part of the broader neoliberal project to
diminish the wage-bargaining power of workers. Second, I
examine other variables that may influence workers' wagebargaining power: union membership, interest rates, economic
growth, and an overall index of the ideological tone of public
policy-policy liberalism (Kelly, 2009). Third, I use data on
inflation-corrected hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory workers and single-equation Error Correction Models
(ECMs) with data from 1964 through 2006 (the latest year for
which average monthly TANF benefits are available) to test
the Piven and Cloward hypothesis. This time-frame spans the
historical periods of the capital labor accord (which lasted until
the late 1970s) and neoliberalism (which approximately begins
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in 1979). One should note that it is not yet certain whether the
economic crisis of neoliberalism that began in 2008 signals a
transitional period or the end to this particular institutional
configuration of the American political economy.
Neoliberalism as Class Warfare
Neoliberalism is characterized by the state's repudiation
of the regulatory frameworks laid down in the wake of the
Great Depression and the expansion of the welfare state that
occurred during the War on Poverty in the 1960s. The core ideology espoused by neoliberals is that there exists a self-regulating free-market and they have used Adam Smith's "invisible
hand" metaphor to argue that markets without government
interference are the best of all possible worlds (Steger & Roy,
2010). Despite neoliberal ideologists' attempts to appropriate
ideas from Adam Smith's (1776/1828) Wealth of Nations, Smith
was not the pure "free marketer" he is often portrayed as by
neoliberals (Chomsky, 1993). For instance, in the Wealth of
Nations, Smith (1776/1828) stated,
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of
which the far greater part of the members are poor and
miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed,
clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should
have such a share of the produce of their own labour
as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and
lodged. (p. 131)
In the far-right political climate of the United States in 2011,
such a statement might be grounds for an accusation of
"socialism."
In a complex political economy like the United States, the
idea of free markets is at odds with reality. "A market looks
free only because we so unconditionally accept its underlying restrictions that we fail to see them," (Chang, 2011, p.
20). When free-market ideologues say they are courageously
trying to protect society from politically-motivated regulation
of markets by the state, they "... are as politically-motivated as
anyone," (Chang, 2011, p. 21). Instead, what has happened is
that government policy has been used to restructure markets
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to redistribute income to the richest asset owners (Baker, 2010),
in part by punishing wage earners (Galbraith, 1998; Palley,
1998). Other modem critiques of the ideology of free markets
have been offered by Baker (2006, 2009) and Brockway (1995).
One of the most interesting is Galbraith (2008), who describes
how many of the original monetarists and supply-siders from
the Reagan era have largely abandoned their own doctrines.
What remains then may be free market rhetoric designed to
obfuscate the use of government policies to advance capitalist
class interests.
Welfare Benefits as Labor Market Regulation
The Piven and Cloward hypothesis implies that income
maintenance programs serve as a form of regulation. That
is, more generous welfare benefits function to regulate labor
markets by protecting workers from employer attempts at
wage exploitation through compelling capitalists to pay better
wages. In the context of a "tight" labor market (low unemployment rate), higher wages would have to be paid to prevent
low-wage workers from withdrawing from the labor market
if income support programs are too generous. But even if the
labor market is not tight, generous income support programs
could still force employers to pay higher wages. Additionally,
one can argue that more generous AFDC/TANF benefits have
a less direct "primer-pump" effect by increasing the demand
for goods (and the labor used to produce those goods) that
people purchase with their public assistance benefits. Another
possibility is that higher benefits prevent some recipients
from partially entering some low-wage labor pools and competing with other workers (possibly working for pay "under
the table"). Neoliberalism has been about attacking incomemaintenance programs. The initial public assistance benefit
slashing pursued by the first Reagan administration included
Social Security, but that was quickly abandoned as the potential wrath of the public in the face of such action was quickly
realized (Greider, 1986).
Figure 1 is a plot of the average monthly AFDC/TANF
payment per family (adjusted for inflation in constant 2006
dollars). The estimates were reported in the 2008 Indicators of
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Welfare Dependency (the latest year of available benefits data
is 2006). Average monthly benefits move from $806 in 1962 and
peak at $950 in 1969. Surprisingly, the average benefit stayed
roughly constant through the 1980s. Most of the decline in
average monthly benefits came in the post-Reagan 1990s. In
1990, the average monthly benefit was $600, but by 2006 the
mean TANF benefit was $372. The decline in AFDC/TANF
benefit levels under neoliberalism suggests a reduction in the
bargaining power of workers.
Figure 1. Average Monthly AFDC/TANF Benefits, 1962-2006
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Decline of Unions Under Neoliberalism
Another institution that regulates the labor market is organized labor. During the neoliberal period, capital clearly
has dominated labor as unions have declined in power and
prevalence (Rosenberg, 2010). Union membership figures bear
this out. Looking at the private sector, union membership in
1973 was about 24.2 percent and 20 percent in 1980. By 2010,
union membership was estimated at about 7 percent (Hirsch &
Macpherson, 2010). The major exception to this is in the public
sector, where union membership has fluctuated between
35 and 37 percent since the early 1980s. What this tells us is
that the business community was very successful at fighting
unions in the private sector. Since there are no capitalists in the
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public sector, anti-union campaigns are less effective (but this
changes when capital runs out of investment opportunities
and desires to privatize segments of the public sector, and in
so doing, attacks municipal unions). Union membership data
(from Hirsch, 2008) is plotted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Private-Sector Union Membership, 1962-2006
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The Federal Reserve Bank and Interest Rates
A certain mystique surrounds the Federal Reserve Bank
in the minds of the public. The bank's chair from 1987-2006,
Alan Greenspan, was nicknamed "the maestro" due to a perception that his monetary policies contributed to strong economic growth and a booming stock market in the 1990s and
early 2000s (Canterbery, 2006; Shiller, 2005). But what does the
Federal Reserve Bank do? This is an important question, for
although the central reserve chair "... had risen to rock star
status by the end of his long reign ... it is unlikely that most
people had any clear idea of what he did," (Baker, 2006, p. 29).
The evasive and confusing public statements and testimonies
of reserve bank presidents are suggestive of this mystique.
The Federal Reserve Banks are a series of privatelyowned yet partially publicly-empowered financial institutions
which have the authority to regulate the U.S. money supply.
Essentially, the policy of the Federal Reserve Bank results in
the active manipulation of interest rates and exerts a major
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influence on U.S. economic activity (Canterbery, 2000; Greider,
1987). Even many Presidents have failed to grasp monetary
policy. Nixon is reported to have regretted not understanding
what goes on at the Federal Reserve Bank (Greider, 1987, p.
121), but other studies (looking at the newly released Nixon
tapes) indicate he pressured the Federal Reserve Chair, Arthur
Bums, to expand the money supply in time for the 1972 election (Abrams, 2006). Jimmy Carter dealt with the consequences of these actions as high inflation in wages and commodities
coupled with high unemployment (stagflation) characterized
the late 1970s. Carter appointed Paul Volcker to be the new
Chair in 1979 and Volcker's "practical monetarism" of restricting growth in the money supply (relative to economic growth)
put the United States through a recession in early 1980 (and
then again in 1981-1982) with the first "Cold Bath recession"
(Bowles et al., 1990) ultimately delivering the 1980 election to
Ronald Reagan.
Economists and Federal Reserve Bankers are well aware
that they can influence the unemployment rate. As Dean Baker
notes, "The Fed has a more direct effect on the state of the
economy than any other institution in the country," (2006, p.
29). In the dispassionate language of monetary economics, the
"costs of deflation" are referred to as "sacrifice ratios" (Francis
& Owyang, 2004). A related ideological obfuscation is the idea
of a NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment)
that suggests keeping the unemployment rate higher to keep
inflation lower.
The Federal Reserve Bank can influence the supply of
money in the economy, and by restricting the supply, it can
drive up interest rates. By doing so, there is a contagion effect
of slowing down economic activity that can raise unemployment rates (with the aim of restraining inflation). This means
that central bankers are effectively able to manage the "reserve
army of the unemployed" under the publicly stated aim of
reducing inflation. This might be interpreted by some as an
ideological obfuscation. An alternative perspective is that
moderate inflation is indicative of bargaining power shifting to workers that drives up prices and adversely impacts
wealthy asset holders (stock and bondholders). This is because
the Federal Reserve Bank's response to inflation (raising
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interest rates) reduces bond prices and adversely impacts the
income streams of the rich in the high volume bond market
(Canterbery, 2000, 2002). Therefore, in order to quell the first
sign of inflation, the Federal Reserve Bank raises the federal
funds rate to reduce workers' bargaining power and thereby
their wages. Low inflation then operates to sustain the economic position of wealthy asset holders at the expense of those
who sell their labor power.
For instance, the period between 1979 and 1982 is when a
radical shift in monetary policy ("practical monetarism," see
Axilrod, 2009) was imposed by the Federal Reserve to stamp
out inflation by causing two recessions and bringing the unemployment rate up to its highest level since the Great Depression.
Part of the problem faced by the Federal Reserve Bank was
that through the late 1970s, the disciplining effect of unemployment had lost its power due to the institutionalization
of the welfare state and proliferation of income-maintenance
programs (Bowles et al., 1990; Piven & Cloward, 1982/1985).
A crisis of stagflation (high unemployment and high inflation)
by the late 1970s adversely impacted the economic fortunes of
rich asset holders (Greider, 1987).
The rise of Wall Street is predicated on low inflation. At the
faintest hint of inflation, the Wall Street model suggests that the
Federal Reserve Bank should restrict monetary growth to raise
interest rates (Baker, 2006; Canterbery, 2000). How does this
work? An interest rate can slow the economy in many ways
(see Baker, 2006, Ch. 2). An interest rate hike, for someone purchasing a car, can change the cost of paying back the loan used
to purchase the car (say if the loan now had an interest rate of
7% instead of 6%) and reduce the demand for automobiles.
The same thing goes for home buyers who would then need
to come up with a higher monthly mortgage payment. This
can reduce demand for automobiles and homes and the people
who build and sell them. When the economy grows "too fast"
the Federal Reserve Bank "slams on the brakes" by imposing
rate hikes.
Figure 3 is a plot of the short-term interest rate: the ThreeMonth Treasury bill rate. Between 1962 and 1968 the rate
ranged from 2 to 5.3 percent. There is some volatility beginning in 1969 with rates ranging from 4 to 7 percent. The
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Volcker-shock that operated to discipline workers and usher in
neoliberalism occurs between 1979 and 1982 when the shortterm rates average between 10 and 14 percent. Dum~nil and
Levy (2011) refer to this as "the 1979 coup" and Bowles et al.
(1990) described the effect of these interest rate shocks as imposing a "cold bath" recession. After the Volcker shock, wages
never recovered to their 1970s levels.
Figure 3. Interest Rate on 3-Month Treasury Bills, 1962-2006
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The Ideological Tone of Public Policy
The political landscape of the United States has changed
drastically under neoliberalism. Consider MSNBC commentator Rachel Maddow's assessment of President Barack Obama's
2011 State of the Union Address on her January 26, 2011 broadcast. Maddow quoted Eisenhower:
Should any political party attempt to abolish Social
Security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate
labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of
that party again in our political history. There is a tiny
splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these
things ... but their number is negligible and they are
stupid. (also quoted in Lieberman, 2001, p. 115)
She then noted:
But the whole of American politics has shifted so far
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to the right in the last fifty years that what used to be
thought of as conservative, what used to be thought of
as a conservative position, is now considered to be offthe-charts lefty. (The Rachel Maddow Show, January
26, 2011)

Similarly, Richard Nixon quipped "We are all Keynesians now"
in the early 1970s, whereas equivalently, Bill Clinton or Tony
Blair could have easily stated, "We are all neoliberals now,"
(Harvey, 2005). Thus, there has been a major ideological shift
in the state's approach to public policy.
Recently, political science scholars have developed a
concept called "macro policy" (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson,
2002) including an index updated and implemented by Kelly
(2009) in his study of income inequality. Instead of looking
at any specific policy out of the dozens or potentially hundreds of domestic policies passed each year, we can look at
the ideological tone of all the significant domestic policies
passed within a year. Laws of national significance were originally coded by David Mayhew in his study Divided We Govern
(Mayhew, 2005). Mayhew uses year-end reviews of legislation
(from major news outlets) and determines whether bills were
significant or exceptionally significant. Erikson et al. (2002)
created their policy innovation or policy liberalism measure
using the laws identified by Mayhew (but focusing on domestic laws and policies) and then coding whether laws were generally viewed as liberal or conservative (Erikson et al., 2002, p.
330). More specifically, Erikson et al. (2002) coded for whether
laws and policies expanded government (liberal in the sense of
American politics) or were conservative (contracting government) with a +1 for liberal laws and -1 for conservative legislation, and highly important liberal laws as +2 or -2 if conservative, for each year since 1947, with the index score as a sum of
the liberal and conservative policies (Erikson et al., 2002; see
Kelly, 2009, p. 128). If the ideological tone of policy is becoming
increasingly liberal (increasing the size of government) then
the index will increase, whereas if policies are increasingly
shrinking the reach of government then the index will decline
(as conservative neoliberal policies become more prevalent).
The rise in the index in the 1960s and into the 1970s
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corresponds to the War on Poverty and expanded regulation
(e.g., EPA, Consumer Protection, OSHA). By the early 1980s,
we see the rapid fall, even if still in the liberal-expansive direction, but much lower index scores than in the 1960s and 1970s.
We see the effects of the 1994 Republican revolution (takeover
of Congress) and later into the 2000s as policy drops below
zero and is increasingly negative (indicating the increasingly
rapid rise of conservative and neoliberal policies) through
2006. I hypothesize that greater liberal (government expanding) legislation, in the aggregate, results in increased worker
bargaining power and, consequently, higher real wages.
Figure 4. Policy Liberalism Index, 1962-2006
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is real hourly private
sector earnings for non-supervisory/production workers. I
adjusted for inflation by deflating current-dollar private sector
hourly earnings (AHETPI, available from the Federal Reserve
Economic Database, 2011) using the Consumer Price Index for
Urban Consumers (CPI-U where is this from?). The natural log
transformation of this wage measure is plotted in Figure 5.
Wages peak in the late 1960s and 1970s. Looking at the unlogged series, wages were $18.80 in 1972 and hovered between
$17.60 and $18.79 until 1979. Between 1979 and 1995, there was
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a relatively permanent fall where wages stuck around $15 per
hour. By 1997, wages finally started recovering and maxed out
at $16 per hour until 2006. Thus, hourly private-sector wages
have not recovered to their historic levels of the 1970s.
Figure 5. Log of Real Hourly Wage in Private Sector, 1962-2006
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Time-Series Method
The estimation strategy used here is a single-equation (or
"one-step") error correction model (ECM). This method is
favored over the Engle-Granger two-step procedure because it
does not impose a cointegration assumption on the series analyzed (De Boef & Keele, 2008) and is preferable when analyzing small samples (see Kelly, 2009, pp. 104-106). Some readers
might note that this is simply an algebraic re-arrangement of
the familiar Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model. The
bivariate single-equation ECM can be represented as:
(1) AY t= a0 + otYt1

+ P 2AX, + 0 3Xtl +

t

The model allows us to estimate the short and long-term
impact of X on Y. P2 tells us how much of an initial change in
Y is due to a shock in X. 0, provides an estimate of the longterm impact of X on Y (if and how the impact of X on Y is
distributed over future time periods) dictated by a, the error
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correction rate. The error correction rate will be between 0 and
-1.0. The long-term impact of X on Y equals 03 3/o. The ECM
in this study was first estimated with OLS, but evidence of
residual autocorrelation in the initial model indicated that it
was best to proceed with the Prais-Winsten Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) estimator (Keele & Kelly, 2006). I also include a
control variable for GDP (economic growth). This variable was
deflated to real (2006$ using CPI-U) Gross Domestic Product
transformed by the natural log.

Analysis of Results
Model 1 in Table 1 estimates the effect of real average
monthly AFDC/TANF benefits on log real wages controlling
for GDP growth. The long-term effect of welfare benefits is
not significant, while the immediate effect is, and is in the predicted direction. A real $1 increase in average monthly welfare
benefits results in a 0.03% immediate increase in real hourly
earnings-a $50 increase in AFDC/TANF increases earnings
by 1.5%. The effect is immediate, and the non-significance of
the level of welfare benefits suggests there is not a long-term
effect.
Model 2 in Table 1 includes the other components of bargaining power: union density, short-term interest rates, and
the "liberalness" (in the American liberal sense) of policy. The
adjusted R2 increases substantially in Model 2 to 0.871 and
the BIC' model statistic declines, indicating a superior fit. The
effect of AFDC/TANF benefits is reduced such that a $1 increase in benefits is now associated with a 0.01% increase in
real earnings-a $50 increase in benefit produces a 0.5% increase in real hourly earnings. For someone earning $7 per
hour, a $50 increase in benefits would be expected to increase
their earnings by 0.035 cents per hour.
As predicted, union density increases the bargaining
power of workers in both the short-run as well as the long run.
A single percentage point increase in union density immediately increases real hourly earnings by 0.3% and by another
4.6% in future years. The error correction rate of 0.176 indicates
that disequilibriating errors are corrected at a rate of about
17.6% per year. Thus, a year after a percentage point shock to
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Table 1: Single-Equation Error-Correction Models of Log Real
Hourly Average Private-Sector Wages, 1965-2006.
68

Model 1

Model 2

AWelfare Benefits,

0.0003***
(3.21)

0.0001*
(2.17)

Welfare Benefits. 1

0.0001
(1.383)

-0.000
(0.039)

AUnion Density,

0.003*
(1.97)

Union Densityt.1

0.008***
(10.58)
-0.004***
(6.42)

A3-Month Treasury Bill Rate,

0.002

3-Month Treasury Bill Rate,-1

(2.93)
0.001*
(2.29)

APolicy Liberalism Index,

0.0009***
(4.63)

Policy Liberalism Indext1
ALog Real GDP t

0.320***
(5.27)

0.667***
(11.71)

Log Real GDPt.

0.043
(1.14)

0.210***
(8.82)

-0.218**
(2.21)

-0.176***
(6.56)

0.154

-1.553***

Adj. R

0.683

0.871

BIC'

-25.8

-41.2

Error Correction Rate (Yt-1 )
Constant
2

Notes: Prais-Winsten (GLS) estimates. Dependent variable is log real hourly wage for
non-supervisory/production workers. T-ratio in parentheses.
*p<.10; **p<05; ***p<.Ol (two-tailed tests).

union density, the average hourly wage is too low (relative to
its equilibrium relationship with union density) and subsequently increases by about 0.8% the next year, by 0.66% in year
2, 0.54% in year 3, and so on after the initial shock. The error
correction rate indicates that disequilibriating errors are corrected relatively slowly.
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The short-term interest rate, the rate on 3-month Treasury
bills, indicates that a shock to the interest rate produces an
immediate downward response in average wages of 0.4% for
each percentage point increment in short-term interest rates.
However, in subsequent years this penalty to wages will
be slowly corrected upwards, compensating for the initial
penalty after two years. Interest rate shocks can be used to put
the brakes on wage growth immediately, but the long-term
effect cancels out the initial loss, as wages subsequently grow
by 1.14% over future years-0.2% of which is in the first year
after the shock.
The Policy Liberalism Index also has statistically significant short- and long-run effects on real average hourly wages.
A shift of the index (increasing liberalism) by one law is associated with a 0.1% immediate increase in wages. But this increase is too low, and wages increase by another 0.5%, 0.0009%
of which is in the first year after the shock. A shift of 5 conservative laws (a net -5 law change in the index) immediately
reduces wages by 0.5% and another 2.5% distributed as 0.45%
the first year after the shock, 0.37% the second year, 0.31% the
third year, 0.25% at year four, and so on. This suggests that
wages have stagnated and declined as national policies have
become more conservative. Thus, an increasingly conservative
aggregate macro-policy seems to reduce the bargaining power
of labor.
Discussion
Thirty years of neoliberal economic policies that resulted
in reducing income maintenance programs, attacking unions,
minimizing inflation, and slowing economic growth have
resulted in the greatest economic collapse since the Great
Depression. The stagnation of wages since the early 1980s (and
rising inequality) are a contributing factor in the economic collapse. Low and stagnating wages resulted in unprecedented
borrowing by households via credit cards, auto loans, and
home mortgages, resulting from the housing bubble (Baker,
2009; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Konings, 2010) connected to
a long wave of speculative bubbles and their financial instability. The stagnation of wages is a product of several neoliberal trends identified in the analysis above: declining union
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membership, interest-rate policies designed to punish wageearners, and conservative macro-policies.
Piven and Cloward's (1982/1985) bargaining power argument suggests that welfare benefits (in the form of public assistance income programs like Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) impact the labor market. The reasoning is that when
benefits are higher, the cost of job loss decreases (Schor &
Bowles, 1987) and the bargaining power of workers increases.
In this analysis, I extended a previous study by Lewis (2001)
that tested Piven and Cloward's bargaining power hypothesis.
I argued that union membership, policy liberalism, interest
rates, and economic growth also impact the bargaining power
of workers. Higher real AFDC/TANF benefits do have an immediate and positive impact on wages-but there is no long
term effect. Annual increases in AFDC/TANF benefits, therefore, can help produce immediate increases in private-sector
wages (see also Vartanian & McNamara, 2000).
Union density, interest rates, economic growth, and policy
liberalism, however, have both short- and long-term effects
on wages. Short-term interest rate shocks can immediately restrain wage growth, but the effect of the shock will allow wages
to increase in subsequent years. Thus, if the Federal Reserve
Bank fears commodity and wage inflation, then they can raise
interest rates to reduce worker wage-bargaining power. This
causes wages to immediately fall, and the reduced wages from
the initial shock will take three years to be overturned.
The effect of union density on wages is positive. Wages
adjust immediately and in the long-run to an increase in the
percentage of private-sector workers in a labor union. Union
contracts and the the threat of unionization can compel employers, broadly speaking, to raise earnings (Kim & Sakamoto,
2010; see Leicht, 1989). The long term effect of unionization
is quite strong; this also implies that a downturn in unionization is felt as a wage-penalty for many years after it occurs.
Similarly, the neoliberalization or repudiation of American liberalism and turn to conservativism in macro-policies is also
responsible for the stagnation of wages. Much wage stagnation is due to the increasing conservative ideology of national
public policies. Therefore, the stagnation could be reversed
if there were a major shift in public policies away from the
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neoliberal direction. Workers' bargaining power is stronger
when the macro-policy is more liberal (in the American sense).
Additionally, strong economic growth also supports wagebargaining power. The Wall Street Capitalism model (see
Canterbery, 2000) implies keeping economic growth slower
by having the Federal Reserve bank raise interest rates at the
faintest sign of inflation. A reversal away from this model that
allows stronger economic growth (with less hostility toward
wage and commodities price increases) would go a long way
in supporting workers' bargaining power, along with stronger
pro-worker labor market regulations.
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We argue that sociologists interested in social capital theory and
social work scholars interested in child and family teams (CFTs)
can productively collaborate in studying at-risk youth. Social
capital theory suggests dimensions of CFTs that delineate both
family meeting intervention and implementation of the resulting plan. These dimensions reflect both bonding and bridging
social capital that strengthen and widen supportive networks for
students and their families. We develop a model to apply to both
academic and social outcomes, specifically to student grades, students' home environments, and overall family functioning. We
argue that our framework may be one of substantialgenerality,
and thus useful in studying multiple outcomes for at-risk youth.
Key words: Social capital; child and family teams;family group;
at-risk youth; academic outcomes; social adjustment

How students fare in their homes and schools greatly influences their development and later life opportunities. Scholars
in both sociology and social work have devoted considerable
attention to how families and schools promote youth well-being, or fail to do so. Sociologists have focused on analyzing
the impact of existing variation in social capital at home and
at school on child and adolescent outcomes (see Parcel, Dufur,
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 2
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& Zito, 2010, for a comprehensive review). Social work scholars are interested in how interventions with families can build
social capital that youth can use as key resources in furthering
their development over time (see Green & Haines, 2007).
In this article we argue that these two communities of
scholars have much to learn from one another; such intellectual collaboration may be especially important when we study
at-risk youth, and when we design research and practice to
promote their academic progress, social connections, and participation in decision making. We briefly review literature focusing on social capital and child and family teams (CFTs). We
then argue that CFTs in schools are one important mechanism
through which social capital can be built. School-based CFTs
are planning forums in which the students and their families, community supports, and school personnel take part in
decision making to resolve issues affecting students and their
families (Pennell, 2008). We develop a model that shows the
relationships between social capital and elements of CFTs. We
also identify what types of research are needed to demonstrate
the usefulness of the model for enhancing student and family
participation and student academic and social outcomes.
Conceptual Framework: Investment in Children
and Adolescents as Social Capital
Children grow and develop within the context of multiple
institutions. Although children's first major influences come
from the family, the wider world begins to exert more impact
as children mature. These ideas are derived from work by
Bronfenbrenner (1979, 1989) and Bronfenbrenner and Morris
(1998), who argue that children develop within multiple
spheres of influence, where these spheres are nested beginning with the family and moving outward towards the larger
culture.
The first context children experience is their home; investments that parents make have significant and long-term consequences for children. We take a particular interest in social
capital, because the last decade has witnessed an upsurge of
interest in the effects of social capital on children. Coleman
(1988, 1990) argued that social capital is a resource that is
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parallel to financial and human capital. Accordingly, we distinguish social capital from human capital and financial capital at
home (see also Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). By social capital we
understand resources that inhere in the relationships between
and among actors that facilitate a range of social outcomes.
Family social capital refers to the bonds between parents
or caregivers and children which are useful in promoting child
socialization. As such, this includes the time and attention caregivers spend in interaction with children and in monitoring
their activities and promoting child well-being (Dufur, Parcel,
& McKune, 2008; Hoffmann, 2002; Parcel & Dufur, 2001a,
2001b). Family social capital also encompasses the broader
family group, that is, kinship networks based on blood, law,
and informal arrangements. These familial connections are
especially crucial for students from low-income families and
neighborhoods, and for children of color, who are often most
at risk of academic failure (U.S. Department of Education,
2007). They are an important means of cultural preservation
and racial pride (Roberts, 2002).
Noting Putnam's (2000) distinction between bonding and
bridging social capital, these intra-family connections refer to
bonding social capital; these bonds are usually presumed to
facilitate the positive growth of children and adolescents. In
addition, there is considerable empirical evidence that children benefit from the social connections that parents or caregivers have with others such as neighbors, school personnel,
and work colleagues (Crosnoe, 2004; Dufur et al., 2008; Parcel
& Dufur, 2001a, 2001b). These connections illustrate bridging
social capital; the stronger these connections, the greater are
the resources to which children have access. The notion that
family connections with schools provide an important source
of bridging social capital is one that we rely upon heavily in
this article. In addition, such connections are an important
foundation for democratized decision making within the
larger context of restorative practices (Adams, 2004).
Despite this optimistic scenario, some have argued that
there is the potential for social capital to operate negatively in
social systems (Portes, 1998; Rankin & Quane, 2002; Somers,
2005). For example, Portes (1998, pp. 15-16) suggests that social
capital can have negative consequences through mechanisms
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such as exclusion of individuals not part of given networks.
In this case, social capital helps those within a given network,
while those excluded from the network will not have access
to the same resources. A case in point, students of color, as
compared with their white counterparts, are more likely to be
tracked into lower-level classes (VanderHart, 2006), thus limiting their peer models of academic achievement. Being African
American in high school, rather than White, is associated with
lower grades and higher rates of detentions and suspensions,
and these effects are mediated by a school's racial climate, that
is, perceived sense of racial fairness, experiences of racism,
and need for change (Mattison & Aber, 2007). A negative
racial climate is an indicator of exclusion from social capital.
In addition, Portes (1998, pp. 16-17) argues that group membership may carry onerous demands for conformity, and/or
promote norms inconsistent with academic achievement (see
also Ainsworth-Damell & Downey, 1998; Farkas, Llera, &
Maczuga, 2002; and Harris, 2006).
The issue of negative social capital has received relatively
little attention. For example, Coleman's (1990) work largely
ignores this possibility, with most of his arguments on behalf
of social capital phrased in positive terms. Although Putnam
(2000) acknowledges a dark side to social capital, his emphasis is on demonstrating that social capital is positively associated with tolerance, as well as economic and civic equality, all
positive outcomes. Others contend that social capital fails to
specify how families and individuals "generate, accumulate,
manage, and deploy" social capital (Furstenberg, 2005, p. 809;
Portes, 2000), a limitation that we believe CFTs can help to
address.
Furthermore, we posit CFTs as a means of making visible
their social capital to students, of helping them make better use
of it (Laser & Leibowitz, 2009) and changing how schools perceive their family groups. For instance, school personnel may
have assumed that an African American father living outside
of the home was absent from his children's lives and now can
better identify and align with his contributions to his children (see Coles & Green, 2010). Attitudes among school personnel, however, will need to be addressed. Interviews with
school and community participants after an introductory CFT
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training in a rural, predominately African American county
in North Carolina showed often conflicting perceptions about
whether families should be involved in their children's schools
(Taliaferro, DeCuir-Gunby, & Allen-Eckard, 2009). Some welcomed such involvement as enhancing student's achievement,
others voiced skepticism and stated that families should only
come to campus when requested, and yet others expressed
sympathy toward families for avoiding the often less than hospitable school environment.
Returning to Bronfenbrenner's framework suggesting the
importance of multiple spheres of social influence, we argue
that capital at school is also important for child and adolescent outcomes. School social capital refers to the bonds among
parents/caregivers, children, and schools that support educational attainment, and should also have implications for
social adjustment. These bonds can reflect community ties and
the relationships that parents and children form with teachers, and, as noted above, are an important form of bridging
social capital. That these common norms are suggested to
predict both academic achievement and social adjustment is
important because CFTs may be able to promote both positive
academic and social outcomes. This framework is especially
useful to analyses of at-risk youth, and can suggest theoretically framed vehicles for timely intervention to promote better
social and academic outcomes. There are compelling theoretical reasons to suggest that school social capital can be helpful
to children at-risk, and that involving schools in strengthening
social capital for children can have salutary outcomes on child
and adolescent development.
The sociological literature has less to say about how social
capital can be built, with many studies, such as those cited
above, using statistical techniques to assess the impact of naturally occurring variation in this capital on variation in child
outcomes. Adam Gamoran and his colleagues, a partial exception, are studying the role of after-school programs as a mechanism to build family and school social capital to promote child
well-being (Turley, Lopez, Gamoran, Turner, & Fish, 2010). At
the same time, practice in the field of social work has identified using CFTs as a strategy through which decisions can be
made in a participatory manner that generates social capital
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to promote child well-being (for examples, see Adams, 2004;
Morrison & Ahmed, 2006). We argue that parents, students,
teachers and community members can build social capital by
using CFTs to strengthen the school and home environments
for children and share insights regarding how changes in their
respective interaction patterns with children can promote
better child social behavior as well as academic achievement
and civic participation.
What is a Child and Family Team?
Child and family teams (CFTs) involve the student, family,
extended family, school, and community in making and carrying out plans to address concerns about student behaviors and
achievement and underlying issues affecting performance. The
leadership of the students and their families in making plans
is supported through respectful preparations (see Pennell &
Anderson, 2005). These are characterized by the CFT facilitator and other involved school personnel inviting the students
and their families rather than demanding their participation,
agreeing on the purpose of the meeting, determining with
them the list of attendees, and consulting on where and how to
hold the meeting so that it reflects the family group's culture
and promotes safe and effective deliberations. At the meeting,
the family leadership is fostered by the school staff clarifying
the purpose and process, ensuring that information is provided in a way that is comprehensible to the family group, supporting rather than leading the planning, and authorizing and
resourcing the family group's plan. These steps facilitate the
building of trust, an important form of social capital, among
group members.
The plans that school-based CFTs devise often include
mental health counseling for the student, additional parentteacher conferences, extra tutoring in academic subjects,
change of class setting for the student, and mentoring by
community members such as athletic coaches and religious
leaders (Pennell, 2008). Involving multiple organizations is
often necessary in order to address the wide spectrum of needs
of referred students and their families (Gifford et al., 2010).
CFTs have the potential to build social capital by fostering
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participatory decision making and joint implementation of
plans to assist at-risk students. Such engagement strengthens the linkages within the family (bonding) and among the
family, school, and other community organizations (bridging).
CFT is one of several terms that designate engaging families in
making and implementing service plans. Other terms include
family group conferencing, restorative conferencing, and team
decision-making. The names for family meetings reflect differing legal and local contexts and fields of practice.
Do Child and Family Teams Work?
System of Care Enhancing Child Mental Health
In the child mental health practice field, CFTs refer to a
team planning process supporting a system of care for children with severe and persistent emotional issues. The aim of
a system of care is to wrap a comprehensive and unified array
of services and supports around children and their families
(Burchard & Burchard, 2000). A review of 14 initiatives found
that system of care has the potential to help emotionally disturbed children and youths stay in the community, stabilize
placements, adjust better to school, and commit fewer delinquent acts (Burns & Goldman, 1999). An advantage of system
of care is that it offers a comprehensive approach to service; at
the same time, this makes it difficult to specify the effects of
CFTs themselves, because implementing CFTs is often accompanied by other interventions. Thus, competing explanations
for improved child behavior cannot be ruled out conclusively.
Family Meetings MaintainingFamily Ties
Several studies argue that family meetings held by child
welfare agencies keep children with or connected to their families and kin and reduce the disproportional placement of children of color into care outside their extended families (Sheets
et al., 2009). For example, in Washington, DC, where most children removed from their homes are African American, evaluators found that the 454 children for whom a family meeting was
held as compared to the 335 demographically similar controls
had significantly higher rates of placements with kin (rather
than non-relatives) and were reunified more quickly with their
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families (Pennell, Edwards, & Burford, 2010). Notably, in a
service setting where relations are often strained within families, and between them and service providers, research shows
improved relationships among family members and between
them and both child protection workers (Burford, Pennell, &
Edwards, 2011) and children's schools (Staples, 2007). These
findings indicate that CFTs, in highly stressed situations, can
strengthen bonding within families and bridging between
families and service providers. These studies do not explicitly
test the mechanisms through which social capital works but
point to avenues through which it operates.
Family Meetings Reducing Some Youth Crimes
In juvenile justice, family meetings focus on holding
youths accountable for their behaviors, making amends to the
victims, and preventing future delinquent acts (Liebmann,
2007). The aim is restorative justice, that is, to set things right
for all key stakeholders, rather than punishing offenders (Zehr,
2002). A systematic review of 36 restorative justice programs,
as compared with criminal justice measures such as prosecution and incarceration, reported reductions in repeat offending for some types of offenses, doubling or more than doubling of cases brought to justice, and decreases in victims'
post-traumatic symptoms and their fear and anger toward
offenders (Sherman & Strang, 2007). Youths for whom recidivism increased were often highly marginalized youths, such
as Australian Aboriginals and American Hispanics who had
committed property offenses. The exceptions are worrisome
because these populations are precisely those most likely to
require supports to remain in school.
Family Meetings in Schools
The results in these other child-serving systems are relevant to schools because children and youths do better at
school when they are not struggling with emotional disorders, dealing with trauma as a result of child maltreatment or
removal from their homes, or participating in delinquent activities. Moreover, the experiences in child mental health, child
welfare, and juvenile justice settings all suggest that family
meetings improve relationships and, thus, lend support to the
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social capital framework we have noted. Unlike these other
settings, however, schools serve much broader populations,
focus on academics, and, if they provide family or community
services, they offer these on an optional rather than mandated
basis. Additionally, the culture of many schools runs counter
to the adoption of family meetings. In particular, zero-tolerance policies for student misconduct lead to suspensions and
expulsions, outcomes that are inimical to building the social
capital that these children and youths need to achieve longterm school success.
In an effort to change their approach, most schools that
institute family meetings approximate those used in juvenile
justice settings by emphasizing responses that restore relationships rather than punish wrongdoers (Morrison, 2007)
and, thus, presumably increase social capital. Their intent is
to move away from disciplinary reactions, with family meetings primarily applied to school attendance, behavioral problems, bullying and violence, and reintegration into school
(Liebmann, 2007). As a consequence, these family meetings
focus more on reducing rule infractions and less on improving
academic achievement. Studies repeatedly indicate that students and their families prefer this approach, like the resulting
plans, and perceive the meetings as improving home-school
relationships (e.g., Baker, 2008; Crow, Marsh, & Holton, 2004).
Because some school personnel are resistant to restorative
processes, CFTs are more successful if they involve the school
leadership, provide needed training, and allocate sufficient
time for organizing and conducting the meetings (Drewery,
2007; Morrison, 2007). Conversely, if meetings focused on educational outcomes do not include school personnel, their effectiveness declines (Holton & Marsh, 2007).
To create a supportive climate for students, some schools
have adopted "whole school" approaches that include family
meetings along with other restorative interventions, such
as education on bullying and peer mediation (e.g., Buckley
& Maxwell, 2007). This appears to increase effectiveness of
the meetings but makes it difficult to separate the impact of
family meetings from other interventions. A case in point is a
2007-2008 study of largely Hispanic/Latino middle and high
schools in Denver, Colorado (Baker, 2008). This study found
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that among the 812 participating students, those who took
part in multiple restorative interventions were more likely to
make gains in attendance and following school rules.
Our Conceptual Model
Our conceptual model argues for the potential of CFTs
to increase home and school investments in at-risk students
and improve student performance, thus reducing the chance
of student dropout. Involving parents in schools has repeatedly been shown to significantly raise students' reading and
math achievement (Nye, Turner, & Schwartz, 2006). We move
beyond the sociological study of variation in existing social
capital to focus on building family and school social capital.
Building social capital is especially crucial for students from
socio-economic and cultural backgrounds that disadvantage
them in the school context.
Meeting Interventionand Plan Implementation
Figure 1 summarizes our model for how families and
schools can build social capital with and on behalf of at-risk
students; it diagrams the process that occurs after a child's
family agrees to participate in a CFT, where the hypotheses are combined into a causal model with unmeasured
constructs hypothesized to cause the variables we actually
measure (Bollen, 1989). This model assumes that social capital
is built both through Meeting Intervention at Time 1 and Plan
Implementation at Time 2. The Meeting Intervention has two
main phases. The first is the meeting preparation: preparing
the family, community, and school participants for taking part
in the meeting. The second phase is the meeting itself. Key
elements of the intervention include the length of preparation
for the meeting, number of participants, width of the circle,
and length of the meeting. These elements of intervention are
shown as X1-X4. We believe that each of the measured indicators reflects the concept of social capital such that more favorable values on respective measures should be associated with
building stronger social capital, and thus potentially better
student outcomes. For example, longer preparation should facilitate building social capital at the meeting. Larger numbers
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of participants suggests that when more involved parties are
willing to work with one another to help the at-risk students,
the bridging social capital will be stronger on behalf of the students. Width of the circle refers to the number of different contexts from which participants will be drawn. Having participants from community groups (e.g., church, scouting) beyond
the home and the school suggests the potential for creating additional bridging social capital on behalf of the child.
Figure 1. CFTs Building Social Capital
X5 = plan implemented
X6 = follow-up meeting
X7 = plan revised
X8 = revision successful
X9 = new resources added
XY1
~Y2

Xl =
X2 =
X3 =
X4 =

=
= HOME
grades

length of preparation
# of participants
width of circle
length of meeting

Plan Implementation occurs at Time 2. Dimensions of
implementation include whether the plan was actually implemented; whether there was a follow-up meeting; if the plan
was revised in response to the family's changing circumstances; whether the plan revision was successful, and whether
new resources were added to the plan (e.g., counseling for the
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parent). These indicators are shown as X5-X9. We hypothesize
that carrying out key elements of the plan increases social
capital; as we state above, just taking part in the meeting can
increase social capital. A follow-up meeting, plan revision,
successful plan revision, and new resources added to the plan
each reflect an opportunity to strengthen the plan, thus building social capital with and on behalf of the student.
Outcome Measures
We believe that building social capital via CFTs will promote
better school connections, academic achievement, and capacity for civic participation. All three are mutually supportive.
Schools often propose CFTs for students who are struggling
academically, but, at the same time, these academic difficulties
are often intertwined with problems of social adjustment that
are reflected in acting out at school, truancy, and other social
behaviors that interfere with learning. As noted above, implementing CFTs has shown promising results in promoting academic achievement as well as reducing some youth crimes and
promoting better student mental health.
In addition, we believe that CFTs can help parents to construct stronger home environments for their children, which
can be measured in terms of safety; intellectual stimulation,
and maternal warmth (see Parcel & Menaghan, 1994, regarding
the HOME scale). CFTs can also promote better family functioning more generally. Kirk, Kim, & Griffith (2005) have demonstrated that family functioning can be measured using the
North Carolina Family Assessment Scale for General Services
(NCFAS-G). This scale taps eight domains of family functioning including parental capabilities, family safety, family interaction, and child well-being. More conceptually, the stronger
bonds that parents and community members form on behalf of
the child frequently provide additional guidance for parents in
promoting positive interactions among family members, thus
contributing to stronger bonds within the family. These stronger bonds reflect one aspect of social capital that we believe
may be causally related to improved student outcomes.
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Future Empirical Work
As we have noted above, evidence that is supportive of
our model in a general way comes from mental health, child
welfare, juvenile justice, and, to a lesser extent, schools where
less research has been conducted. All these studies point to
the benefits of CFTs in strengthening relationships within
the family group and between them and service providers.
Because CFTs are built around the leadership and culture of
the family group, this approach is especially important for students of color in creating a school climate that is receptive to
their cultural backgrounds and encourages their development
and learning. Given the ambivalence that schools often have
toward family involvement, CFT training and ongoing technical assistance are important to successful implementation of
the program.
To evaluate the proposed research model would require
longitudinal data on both the CFTs and child and family outcomes we have identified. We would need to study sufficient
numbers of cases, each consisting of data on students and their
families, so that we could evaluate whether variation in the
form and functioning of CFTs was associated with student
academic success, stronger profiles of social adjustment, and
improved family functioning. Such data production would
require cooperation from both schools and families who would
be willing to work together on behalf of at-risk students. Only
with this investment of time and resources could we evaluate
whether the theoretical model we have sketched has empirical
support.
In conclusion, we believe that our model is a general one
that may be useful in the study of additional dependent variables. Academic outcomes, such as retention in school and
high school graduation, may also be a function of successful
family team meetings. Social outcomes, such as reduced acting
out and lower levels of juvenile delinquency, may also follow
the successful implementation of CFTs. We look forward to research that enables scholars to bring evidence to bear on these
additional hypotheses.
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Predictors of Time Volunteering, Religious
Giving, and Secular Giving:
Implications for Nonprofit Organizations
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Using data from the survey Midlife Development in the United
States, 2004-2006, the present study examined characteristics
associated with time volunteering, religious giving, and secular
giving. Multivariate analysis, guided by the theory of volunteering, showed that education and income predicted time volunteering and both religious and secular charitablegiving. Generative
qualities (e.g., confidence in one's skills, desire to assist others)
were significantpredictors of time spent volunteering and secular
giving, while religious identification was the strongest predictor
of religious giving. Perceived social integration was a significant
predictor of time volunteering and religiousgiving. Implications
for nonprofit organizations that need to recruit more volunteers
and donors, especially during economic downturns, are discussed,
includingpersonal invitations to volunteer based on knowledge of
an individual'sskills and talents, encouragingmeeting attendance
and promoting social embeddedness, and secular organizations'
appeals to religious donors based on their religious motivations.
Key words: time volunteering, religious giving, secular giving,
nonprofit organizations, social integration,social embeddedness,
religious identification
Many nonprofit organizations and groups depend on both
volunteers' time and charitable donations to accomplish their
missions (Independent Sector, 2001). The volunteer supplements to the Current Population Surveys, 2005-2009, found
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that each year more than 60 million volunteers provided a total
of 8 billion hours of volunteer service to religious organizations, educational or youth services, social or community services, hospitals and other healthcare services, and a variety of
other organizations, including civic, political, and professional,
as well as international causes (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
[USBLS], 2010). In 2009, among adults (25+ years) of different
age groups, rates of formal volunteering were generally consistent, ranging from 24% to 32%, while the median number
of volunteer hours ranged from 36 to 90, with volunteers aged
65 or older devoting more hours than their younger counterparts (USBLS, 2010). Volunteering rates tend to be higher
among women than men, among whites than nonwhites,
among those with at least a bachelor's degree than those with
less education, among home owners than renters, and among
those who belong to religious organizations than those who do
not belong to them (Corporation for National and Community
Service [CNCS], 2010; Independent Sector, 2001; USBLS, 2010).
In addition to volunteering their time, 70% of individuals
and households made monetary donations totaling more than
$227 billion in 2009. This represented almost 75% of the total of
$304 billion given to religious, educational, health, and human
services organizations and to organizations focused on arts,
culture, humanities, international affairs, the environment,
and animal welfare (GivingUSA, 2010). Religious giving was
estimated to be $107 billion, or 47%, of the total of $227 billion
donations made by individuals and households. The Chronicle
of Philanthropy (Anft & Lipman, 2003) reports that regardless
of their income, college graduates give at a rate two to three
times higher than those with less education. Other studies also
found that volunteering time and money often go hand-inhand, and the sociodemographic characteristics of donors are
similar to those of time volunteers (Apinunmahakul & Devlin,
2008; Bryant, Jeon-Slaughter, Kang, & Tax, 2003; Duncan, 1999;
Freeman, 1997).
Recent surveys and other studies have found that during
the current economic recession, nonprofit organizations have
responded to increased demand for services and decreased
funding from all sources (government, private foundations,
revenue from fees for services, and individual donors) by
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increasing the number of their volunteers (Accenture, 2009;
Bridgeland, McNaught, Reed, & Dunkelman, 2009; Salamon
& Spence, 2009; Urban Institute, 2010). Salamon and Spence
(2009), in their national survey of nonprofit organizations
between September 2008 and March 2009, found that almost
half (48%) predicted that they would increase their use of volunteers in the coming year. The same survey found that during
the current economic downturn, one of every three organizations reported increasing their reliance on volunteers, and nonprofit organizations can find some relief by using volunteers in
hard times.
While volunteer rates have seen some increase, charitable giving declined. For the first time in more than 20 years,
charitable giving decreased between 2007 and 2008. The dollar
amount of individual/household giving dropped by 6.3%,
and the amount of gifts (from all sources) to human service
organizations dropped by 15.9% after adjusting for inflation
(GivingUSA, 2009). However, contributions to religious congregations and other entities to support organized religious
practices increased slightly (5.5% in current dollars and 1.6%
adjusted for inflation) in the same time period. In fact, giving
to religious organizations tends to increase in recession years
(GivingUSA, 2009), while secular nonprofit organizations
are likely to experience a more difficult time raising funds.
Individual/household charitable giving in 2009 stayed the
same as in 2008 (GivingUSA, 2010).
During tough economic times, nonprofit organizations,
especially secular ones, may benefit from more strategically
identifying and targeting those likely to volunteer or make
charitable donations. Research attests to the importance of
individuals' physical and mental health, as well as the societal and economic benefits they expect to receive in deciding
to volunteer their time. Research also suggests that reasons
or motivations for charitable giving (e.g., altruism, social responsibility, and tax deductibility) may be both similar to
and different from those determining time volunteering, but
only a small number of studies have simultaneously examined factors associated with time volunteering and charitable giving (Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2008; Brown & Ferris,
2007; Bryant et al., 2003; Center on Philanthropy [COP], 2009;
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Duncan, 1999; Lee & Chang, 2007; Rossi, 2001, 2004; Wang &
Graddy, 2008). In addition, only Wang and Graddy (2008) distinguished between individual characteristics and motivations
of those who engage in religious giving and secular giving, but
they did not consider time volunteering. To better help nonprofit organizations target their efforts, this study simultaneously examined whether the same or different factors predict
time volunteering, religious giving, and secular giving.
Theory of Volunteering and the Study Hypotheses
In examining the correlates of time volunteering, secular
giving, and religious giving, this study was guided by an integrated theory of volunteering that is based on the following three premises: (1) Volunteer work is a productive activity
that requires human capital, and a market exists for volunteer labor, much like the market for paid labor; (2) volunteer
work is an ethically-guided work that requires cultural capital;
and (3) volunteer work, to a varying degree, involves collective action that requires social capital (Wilson, 2000; Wilson &
Musick, 1997a). Human capital refers to individuals' knowledge
and skills, health status, and other tangible resources such as
availability of the time, education, and income as perquisites
for volunteering. Cultural capital refers to people's internal
desires and motivations for volunteering, because the ultimate
motives for volunteering stem from moral incentives to self
and others. Social capital refers to individuals' trust in others
and in their own community as well as to their social embeddedness/connections, which are all likely to increase opportunities for volunteering through mutual trust, information
sharing, and pooled resources. Although originally developed
and employed to explain the determinants of time volunteering, the theory of volunteering has been used as a framework
for both time volunteering and charitable giving behaviors.
Human Capital
In the present study, education and income were chosen
of human capital. Higher education tends to
indicators
as
increase a person's knowledge, skills, earnings, and social
connections/networks. Income is also a proxy for certain
knowledge and skills as well as an indicator of social
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connections and economic status that can result in more opportunities or requests to volunteer. More important, type and
level of income represent economic capacity to make charitable and other kinds of donations (Hughes & Luksetich, 2008;
James & Sharpe, 2007; Lee & Chang, 2007). Tax deductibility
associated with high income is also an important determinant
of charitable giving (Brooks, 2007; Pitts & Skelly, 1984).
CulturalCapital
Generative qualities and religious identification were
chosen as indicators of cultural capital. Generative concern
and commitment are good measures of individuals' sense of
moral obligations, social responsibility, and self-interest that
motivates volunteering, especially during mid- and late life
(McAdams, 2001; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; Snyder &
Clary, 2004). When asked about their reasons or motivations
for time volunteering, middle-aged and older volunteers tend
to express their desire to give something back to society and
to benefit society and younger generations by sharing their
experience and skills (Black & Kovacs, 1999; Larkin, Sadler,
& Mahler, 2005; Narushima, 2005). An individual's sense of
moral obligations and social responsibility, altruistic values,
and empathy are also associated with charitable giving (Rossi,
2001, 2004; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007; Smith & McSweeney,
2007).
People also volunteer their time because of self-interest and
personal gain (Chappell & Prince, 1997; Okun, Barr, & Herzog,
1998; Omoto & Snyder, 2002; Omoto, Snyder, & Martino, 2000;
Wilson & Musick, 1997b). They recognize that personal benefits may accrue from self-development through understanding of and learning about social problems and people affected
by them. Getting to know other volunteers can advance career
goals by making business contacts or learning skills that may
be useful for paid employment. Self-interest may be a reason
for the increased number of volunteers during the current economic downturn. Older adults are less likely than younger
ones to be motivated by career goals, but many middle-aged
and older adults also volunteer because they want to remain
active and connected with other people, to feel useful and productive, to seek a sense of purpose or meaning in their lives
by doing good, and to escape negative feelings, such as guilt,
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anxiety, and loneliness (Bowen, Andersen, & Urban, 2000;
Krause, Herzog, & Baker, 1992; Okun et al., 1998; Omoto et al.,
2000; Wilson & Musick, 1997b). In the present study, we were
not able to separate self-interest from a sense of moral obligations and social responsibility as motivations for volunteering.
Religiosity and religious orientation are other aspects of
cultural capital that may influence both time and charitable
giving (Regnerus, Smith, & Sikkink, 1998; Wilson & Janoski,
1995). Level of religious service attendance, which varies by
age cohort, is another significant predictor of religious giving
(Wilhelm, Rooney, & Tempel, 2007). Theological belief also
affects the level and type of donations. Those with more conservative theological beliefs give more to religious groups,
while those with more liberal beliefs give more to secular organizations (Lunn, Klay, & Douglas, 2001). Religiosity and religious orientation appear to more directly influence religious
giving than secular giving and time volunteering. Anft and
Lipman (2003) found that after controlling for income, blacks
give more than whites, and 90% of the donations made by
blacks went to religious organizations.
Social Capital
Both time volunteering and charitable giving are influenced
by individuals' social capital, as represented by their trusting
relationships with others, and number of memberships in professional and voluntary organizations and attendance at meetings of those organizations (Brown & Ferris, 2007; Wilson &
Musick, 1997a). In the present study, individuals' perceived
social integration (Keyes, 1998) was chosen as a likely reflection of their level of trust in others and in their community. The
monthly number of meetings they attended was chosen as an
indicator of social embeddedness.
Studies have shown that educational attainment, education-linked personal resources and skills, and occupational
status, as well as political, economic, and cultural forces, shape
both generativity and social well-being (e.g., social integration) (de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004; Dillon & Wink,
2004; Keyes, 1998; Keyes & Ryff, 1998; Peterson & Duncan,
1999). These studies also show that individual differences in
generativity and social well-being are likely to predict degree
and range of social involvement.
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Hypotheses
Guided by the theory of volunteering and the review of
previous studies, study hypotheses were as follows: (Hi)
Education (human capital) will be positively associated with
both time volunteering and religious and secular giving; (H2)
household income (human capital) will be positively associated with religious and secular giving; (H3) both generative
qualities and religious identification (cultural capital) will be
positively associated with time volunteering; (H4) generative
qualities (cultural capital) will be positively associated with
secular giving, and religious identification would be positively
associated with religious giving; (H5) perceived social integration and the number of meetings attended (social capital) will
be positively associated with time volunteering and religious
and secular giving.
Methods
Data and Sample
Data for this study are from the general population sample
of the second wave of Midlife Development in the United
States (MIDUS2, 2004-2006; Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research [ICPSR], 2006). MIDUS1 (officially referred to as MIDUS), 1995-1996, assessed a number
of social and psychological constructs among a national probability sample of 7,189 noninstitutionalized, English-speaking
adults aged 25 to 74 residing in the 48 contiguous states, and
whose household had at least one telephone. Select metropolitan areas were oversampled. For details of the MIDUS
sampling design and methods and the interview formats (a
computer-assisted telephone interview followed by a mailed,
self-administered survey) see Brim, Ryff, and Kessler (2004).
Of the general population sample that responded to MIDUS1,
453 respondents completed only telephone interviews and
3,032 respondents completed both a telephone interview and
a self-administered survey. During MIDUS2, 1,805 individuals from MIDUS1 completed both a telephone interview and
a self-administered survey. The final sample size was 1,800,
because the data set did not provide any sampling weight for
five respondents. The age range of the sample was 30 through
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84. MIDUS provides extensive data regarding the respondents'
time volunteering and religious and secular giving activities
and human, cultural, and social capital characteristics.
Measures
Time volunteering (hours of formal volunteering). Each respondent was asked, "On average, about how many hours
per month do you spend doing formal volunteer work of any
of the following types: (1) hospital, nursing home, or other
healthcare-oriented work; (2) school or other youth-related
work; (3) political organizations or causes; and (4) any other
organization, cause, or charity?" The total number of hours
spent volunteering was used as the number of hours of time
volunteering.
Religious and secular giving (amount of donations). Each respondent was asked, "On average, about how many dollars
per month do you or your family living with you contribute to
each of the following people or organizations (if you contribute food, clothing, or other goods, include their dollar value):
(1) religious groups; (2) political organizations or causes; and
(3) any other organization, cause, or charity (including donations made through monthly payroll deductions)?" Donations
to "religious groups" were counted as religious giving.
Donations to "political organizations or causes" and "any
other organization, cause, or charity" were counted as secular
giving. Because the donor unit could be an individual respondent or his or her family, we compared the amount of giving
by living arrangement (i.e., living alone or with spouse, living
with adult children, living with parents). We found no significant difference in the amount of giving by living arrangement. Given the age of the sample (30+), it is most likely that
the respondents themselves or their spouses, not other family
members, were the donors.
Level of education. This was measured by an ordinal scale
containing 12 gradations: no school or finished grades 1-6;
finished grades 7-8; some high school; GED; high school graduate; 1-2 years of college; 3 or more years of college; degree from
2-year college; degree from 4- or 5-year college; some graduate
school; master's degree; and PhD or other professional degree.
Income. This was the respondent's total household income
in $5,000 units.
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Generativity.This was measured by 6 items, slightly modified from the corresponding items in the Loyola Generativity
Scale (LGS) (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992), on a 4-point
scale (1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = some; and 4 = a lot): (1)
Others would say that you have made unique contributions
to society; (2) you have important skills you can pass along to
others; (3) many people come to you for advice; (4) you feel
that other people need you; (5) you have had a good influence
on the lives of many people; and (6) you like to teach things
to people. The maximum possible score is 24, and high scores
reflect a greater self-conception of contributions to the welfare
and well-being of others (Cronbach's alpha = .92). As a selfreport scale of generative concern, the LGS exhibited good
retest reliability and showed strong positive association with
reports of actual generative acts and themes of generativity
in narrative accounts of important autobiographical episodes
(McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992).
Religious identification. This was measured by the sum of
the scores of 7 items which were measured on a 4-point scale (1
= not at all; 2 = not very; 3 = somewhat; and 4 = very): (1) How
religious are you? (2) how important is religion in your life? (3)
how important is it for you-or would it be if you had children
now-to send your children for religious or spiritual services
or instruction? (4) how closely do you identify with being a
member of your religious group? (5) how much do you prefer
to be with other people who are the same religion as you? (6)
how important do you think it is for people of your religion to
marry other people who are of the same religion? and (7) how
important is it for you to celebrate or practice religious holidays with your family, friends, or members of your religious
community (Garfield, Ryff, & Singer, 2001)? The maximum
possible score is 28, and higher scores reflected stronger religious identification (Cronbach's alpha = .91).
Social integration. This was measured by the sum of the
scores from 3 items which were measured on a 7-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree): (1) I do not feel I
belong to anything that I'd call a community (reverse-coded);
(2) I feel close to other people in my community; and (3) my
community is a source of support. Social integration is the
evaluation of the quality of one's relationship to others and to
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one's community (Keyes, 1998). The maximum possible score
is 21, and higher scores reflected greater social integration
(Cronbach's alpha = .73).
Number of monthly meetings attended. First, the total number
of meetings of union/professional groups, sports/social
groups, and all other groups was calculated. Second, in order
to include respondents (n = 76) who refused to provide information on meeting attendance, a categorical variable, the
number of monthly meetings attended (1-10 times = 1; 11 or
more times = 2; refused = 3; and no meeting attendance = 4reference category), was created.
Demographic characteristics.These included (1) age groups
(30-44; 45-54; 55-64; 65-74; and 75-84-reference category); (2)
gender (male = 0; female = 1); (3) race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic
White = 0; all others = 1); and (4) marital status (widowed; divorced/separated; never married; and married-reference category). Tables la and lb present sample characteristics for all
variables included in the study.
Analysis Methods
Univariate and bivariate analyses were conducted to
examine sample characteristics and correlations among key
study variables. Pearson correlation coefficients show that
multicollinearity among the covariates was not a problem. We
employed negative binomial regression analyses to test the hypothesized influence of the human, cultural, and social capital
on time volunteering, religious giving, and secular giving,
given the right-skewed dispersion of volunteer hours and gift
amounts. Ninety-nine cases were excluded from the multivariate regression models-88 cases with any missing value
in predictor variables, and 11 extreme outliers who reported
$5,000 or more in monthly religious or secular giving. The resulting final sample size for the hypothesis testing was 1,701.
The MIDUS2 poststratification weight correcting for region,
age, and education distribution was used for all analyses.
Since a small proportion of respondents refused to provide
volunteer hours or gift amounts (see Table 2), a series of bivariate analyses were conducted to compare those who refused
(the missing data group) to those who provided data with
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Variables
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1,800)
Percentage

Age
30-44

24.6

45-54

29.2

55-64

22.5

65-74

14.1

75-84

9.6

Gender
Male

43.9

Female

56.1

Race/Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White

87.6

African American or Black

5.5

Hispanic

4.2

Asian/Pacific Islander

0.8

Indian/Native American

1.5

Unknown

0.5

Marital status
Married/cohabiting
Widowed
Divorced/ separated
Never married

70.4
8.1
14.5
6.9

regard to their demographic and other characteristics. The
refused group did not significantly differ in key predictors
(education, income) from those who reported no volunteer
hours, but they differed significantly from those who reported any volunteer hours. Based on the bivariate results, 0 was
substituted for missing data on volunteering hours or gift
amounts in multivariate analyses. Comparison of the regression results, excluding the missing volunteering/donation
data, with the regression results from zero-substituted volunteering/donation data, showed no significant difference. Thus,
the regression results that included the zero-substituted volunteering/donation cases are reported.
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Table lb. Sample Characteristics (n = 1,800)
Variables
Education (percentage)
No school or grades 1-6

0.7

Grades 7-8

2.4

Some high school

9.8

GED

1.8

High school graduate

31.4

1-2 years of college

14.7

3 or more years of college
Degree from 2-year college
Degree from 4-5 year college

3.5
6.9
15.0

Some graduate school

2.3

Master's degree

7.9

PhD or other professional degree

3.5

Median household total income
Generative qualities
Religious identification

$63,250
16.81
(3.92)a
19.45
(5.57)a

Social integration

14.08
(4.05)a

No. of meetings attended (monthly)

(2.63)

13.82

Note: a = Standard deviation of the mean (n = 1,800)

Individuals who are older may have more time for volunteering or more funds to give to charity. Because the sample includes respondents at different life stages, results for the entire
sample, controlling for age groups, were compared with results
for the 55+ age group only. No differences in significant predictors for volunteering and for charitable giving were found.
Thus, the results based on the entire sample are reported.
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Table 2. Volunteering and Giving Status
Variables

Percentage

Volunteering/givingstatus
Both time and money
Time only

38.5
6.1

Money only

30.0

Neither time nor money

25.4

Hours of time volunteering (monthly)
1-10

24.3

11 or more

17.1

Unknown hours

3.2

No volunteering

55.4

Median no. of volunteering hours
among all volunteers

10.0

Charitablegiving
Religious giving only

16.1

Secular giving only

17.5

Religious and secular giving

27.7

Unknown
No charitable donation

7.8
30.9

Amount of religiousgiving (monthly)
$1-$100

31.5

$101 or more

13.2

Unknown amount
No donation

6.9
48.4

Amount of seculargiving (monthly)
$1-$100

38.5

$101 or more

7.5

Unknown amount

6.4

No donation

47.6

Median amount of donor's gift to groups (monthly)
Religious

$200

Secular

$ 29

Note. n = 1,800.
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Results
Sample Characteristics
As Tables la and lb show, the study sample was predominantly white. The sample's median household income was
substantially higher than the national median incomes in 2005
($50,100) and 2006 ($50,700) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), indicating that this group was more affluent than Americans in
general. Table 2 shows that 38.5% engaged in both time volunteering and charitable giving, 6.1% engaged in time volunteering only, and 30.0% made charitable donations only, while
25.4% of the sample did not engage in time volunteering or
charitable giving. Of the 44.6% of the sample who reported
time volunteering, 41.4% provided data on their monthly
number of volunteering hours (median total hours: 10; range:
1-205). Please note that this rate of volunteering is higher than
the rate shown in most UCBLS statistics (e.g., 24-32% in 2009,
USBLS, 2010). The overall higher human capital status (i.e.,
income and education) of the MIDUS sample, as compared to
Americans in general, may have been a factor for their higher
volunteer rate.
Of the 68.5% of the sample who reported making charitable donations, 16.1% donated to religious groups only, 17.5%
to secular causes only, 27.7% to both religious groups and
secular causes, and 7.2% did not specify. Monthly amount of
donation to religious groups (median monthly amount: $200;
range: $1-$24,000) were higher than monthly amount of donation to secular groups/causes (median amount: $29; range:
$1-$30,000). Table 3 shows that the correlations between the
number of hours of time volunteering and the amount of religious giving (r = 0.14, p < .001) and between the number of
hours of time volunteering and the amount of secular giving
(r = 0.12, p < .001) were weak, albeit significant. The correlation between religious donation amount and secular donation
amount was moderately strong (r = 0.35, p < .001).
Hypothesis Testing: MultivariateNegative Binomial Regression
Results
Time volunteering. As the second column of Table 4 shows,
with respect to the demographic variables, age group and race/
ethnicity were not significantly associated with the number of
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volunteering hours. Females were more likely to volunteer a
greater number of hours, and divorced/separated (as opposed
to married) respondents volunteered significantly fewer hours.
When age group and other demographic variables were controlled, human capital indicators (education and household
income), generative qualities (but not religious identification),
and social capital indicators (perceived social integration and
number of meetings attended) were significantly associated
with the number of hours of time volunteering. Household
income was significantly negatively associated with the
number of volunteer hours, indicating that higher-income individuals were less likely than those with lower-incomes to
engage in time volunteering. While the number of meetings
attended was a significant predictor of volunteer hours, those
who refused to provide this information did not significantly
differ from those who reported no meeting attendance in their
volunteer hours. The Wald Chi-square test results show that
the number of meetings attended, followed by perceived social
integration and generative qualities, had the largest positive
effect on number of volunteer hours.
Religious giving. Data in the third column of Table 4 show
that of the demographic variables, being in the 30-44 age
group, as opposed to the 75-84 group; being female; having
racial/ethnic minority status; and having any nonmarried
status were significantly negatively associated with religious
giving. When age group and other demographic variables
were controlled, the human capital indicators (education and
income) and the social capital indicators (social integration
and meeting attendance) were also significantly positively associated with the amount of religious giving. Cultural capital
indicators were also significantly related to religious giving.
Religious identification had by far the most positive influence
on religious giving (according to the Wald Chi-square test),
while generative qualities were significantly negatively associated with religious giving.
Secular giving. The final column in Table 4 shows that age
was the only demographic variable significantly associated
with secular giving. Being in the three younger age groups, as
opposed to the 75-84 age group, was significantly negatively
associated with secular giving. After controlling for the demographic variables, the human capital indicators (education and
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Table 4. Correlates of Time Volunteering, Religious Giving, and
Secular Giving: Negative Binomial Regression Results
Time
volunteering

Religious
giving

Secular giving

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

30-44

-0.41 (0.26)

-0.64 (0.24)**

-1.23 (0.32)***

45-54

-0.16 (0.26)

-0.07 (0.22)

-1.09 (0.32)***

55-64

-0.17 (0.26)

-0.20 (0.21)

-1.04 (0.32)***

65-74

-0.30 (0.25)

0.24 (0.26)

-0.42 (0.36)

0.31 (0.12)**

-0.51 (0.12)**

-0.00 (0.14)

Variable
Age (75-84)

Gender (Male)
Female

Race/ethnicity (Non-Hispanic White)
All others

-0.21 (0.23)

-0.40 (0.17)*

0.16 (0.22)

-0.90 (0.23)***

-0.59 (0.34)

-0.51 (0.17)**

0.03 (0.21)

-0.94 (0.26)***

-0.17 (0.21)

0.15 (0.02)***

0.18 (0.03)***

0.02 (0.01)***

0.04 (0.01)**

-0.07 (0.02)***

0.06 (0.02)**

0.26 (0.01)***

-0.02 (0.01)

0.04 (0.02)***

-0.01 (0.02)

Marital status (Married/cohabiting)
Widowed

-0.08 (0.24)

Divorced/
separated

-0.54 (0.20)**

Never married

0.04 (0.24)

Level of
education

0.07 (0.02)***

Income (in
$5,000)

-0.01 (0.00).*

Generative
qualities

0.08 (0.02)***

Religious
identification

0.00 (0.01)

Social integration

0.08 (0.01)***

No. of meetings attended (0)
1-10

1.65 (0.14)***

0.68 (0.15)***

0.76 (0.15)***

11+

2.07 (0.16)***

0.86 (0.20)***

1.01 (0.30)***

0.29 (0.43)

-0.18 (0.68)

-0.80 (0.40)*

Refused
2

Note. Likelihood ratio X : 1,811.57 (df = 17), p < 0.001 for time volunteering; 3,849.57
(df= 17), p < 0.001 for religious giving; and 2,134.25 (df= 17), p < 0.001 for secular
giving. n = 1,701 for all three columns, ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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income) were significantly positively associated with the
amount of secular giving. Of the cultural capital variables,
generative qualities, but not religious identification, were significantly associated with secular giving. Of the social capital
indicators, only the number of meetings attended was a significant predictor. As opposed to no meeting attendance, any
amount of meeting attendance was positively associated with
secular giving, but being in the "refused" group was negatively associated with secular donation amounts.
Discussion and Implications for Nonprofit
Organizations
Summary of Findings
This study found that an individual's level of education
was a consistent predictor of time volunteering, religious
giving, and secular giving, supporting H1. Household income
was also a consistent predictor of time volunteering and both
types of charitable giving, supporting H2, although it was
inversely correlated with the number of hours of time volunteering. The latter finding suggests that substitution may
have been a factor, with high-wage/-income persons volunteering more money and less time than low-wage/-income
persons (see Duncan, 1999; Freeman, 1997). In support of H3
and H4, self-reported generative qualities were significantly
positively associated with the extent of time volunteering and
secular giving, while religious identification was positively associated with religious giving only. Interestingly, self-reported
generative qualities were significantly negatively associated
with religious giving. The finding that religious identification
was significantly associated only with the amount of religious
giving appears to provide support for there being different
motivations for religious versus secular giving. The lack of relationship between religious identification and time volunteering and secular giving also confirms the previous study finding
that theological belief affects the level and type of donations
and that those with more conservative theological beliefs give
more to religious groups (Lunn et al., 2001). Although religiosity and religious orientation are considered cultural capital, it
appears that those who identify with narrowly focused and
overly strict religious values are more open to helping those
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within their religious circles than those who may not subscribe
to the same religious values. Controlling for all other variables,
the number of meetings attended was a significant correlate
of all three volunteering activities. Perceived social integration
was also a significant predictor of time volunteering and religious giving, but not secular giving, partially supporting H5.
Implicationsfor Nonprofit Organizations
The findings of the present study have important implications for nonprofit organizations in terms of identifying and
targeting those most likely to volunteer their time and/or
money as well as encouraging new pools of volunteers and
donors to volunteer and/or give. Volunteer/donor recruitment and retention is an important strategy to continue service
provision and capacity building, especially for those nonprofit
organizations facing reduced funding but increased demand
for services (Brudney, 2000; Hager & Brudney, 2004).
Human capital approach. Across the board, individuals with
higher levels of education volunteered more time and gave
more money to religious and secular organizations. Although
the implications of this finding may be obvious for charitable
organizations seeking to increase donations by targeting potential donors who are well-educated, and maintaining relationships with those who have already contributed, it has important implications for those seeking more volunteers. While
those with higher education are likely to have exposure to volunteering opportunities through their jobs and professional/
social networks, a targeted approach is necessary to recruit
those who may lack exposure to volunteering opportunities.
Given that only 45% of the study's sample volunteered their
time, there is a vast potential pool of individuals who might
be prompted to volunteer if their awareness of volunteer opportunities was expanded. While general appeals for volunteers through the media may be useful, staff and volunteers
(including board members) of nonprofit organizations should
personally contact potential volunteers, especially those who
may not have previously participated in volunteer activities,
and invite them to attend organization functions and meetings
of volunteers as well as clients in need of volunteer services
(when possible).
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Household income also predicted time volunteering and
charitable giving, although not in a consistent way. Higher
income was positively correlated with both religious and
secular giving, but it was inversely correlated with the number
of volunteer hours. These finding suggest that substitution may
have occurred, with higher-income persons volunteering more
money and less time than lower-income persons (see Duncan,
1999; Freeman, 1997). Perhaps more important for volunteer
recruitment, it suggests that organizations' focus should not be
solely devoted to recruiting higher income individuals as volunteers. In fact, charitable organizations that have not done so
before may benefit from reaching out to previously untapped
communities that differ widely in socioeconomic status and
other characteristics in order to recruit volunteers who more
closely resemble the clients served and who may better understand the situations an agency's client may be facing.
Cultural capital approach. Our findings also show that selfreported generativity as cultural capital is significantly positively associated with the extent of time volunteering and
secular giving. While items on the LGS used in this study
generally measure people's confidence in their abilities, this
finding suggests that nonprofit organizations can ask potential volunteers to engage in volunteer activities based on their
specific skills. For example, having raised well-adjusted children, sewing, making home repairs, and being a good listener
are skills that people may take for granted in their everyday
lives and may not recognize as the skills they can contribute
in volunteer capacities. Asking people to volunteer was found
to increase the likelihood of their doing so (Bryant, et al. 2003;
Freeman, 1997; Independent Sector, 2001), but recruiting volunteers based on knowledge of their individual abilities to
perform specific tasks may be more successful than general
appeals for volunteers.
Though generative qualities increased the likelihood of
volunteering and secular giving, they were negatively associated with religious giving. The inverse association between
generative qualities and religious giving suggests that the motivations for the latter may not always be overall communal
and self-agentic desires and commitment. In this study, higher
religious identification scores (i.e., on these questions: How
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much do you prefer to be with other people who are the same
religion as you? how important do you think it is for people
of your religion to marry other people who are the same religion?) suggest a more conservative, closed, and exclusionary
rather than communal, open, and inclusionary religious orientation. Lunn et al. (2001) found that theologically conservative Presbyterians gave more to their local church and other
religious groups than did theologically liberal Presbyterians,
while liberal Presbyterians gave more to secular charities than
did conservative Presbyterians. Wang and Graddy (2008) also
found that religiosity was a significant factor for religious
giving but not for secular giving. A little more than one-third of
Americans volunteer primarily through their religious group
(CNCS, 2006).
Connecting religious motivations for giving or volunteering to the missions of secular agencies may be one way to
encourage secular giving among those who have previously
given only or predominately to religious organizations. Secular
organizations that provide food, clothing, shelter, protection,
education, counseling, and other services may appeal to volunteers on religious grounds. Another way to facilitate secular
giving among those who tend to contribute only to religious
organizations is for secular organizations to partner with faithbased organizations for the common good. Secular nonprofits
that partnered with faith-based organizations reported greater
benefits in terms of volunteer use and retention (CNCS, 2009).
Such partnerships are likely to expose volunteers/donors with
religious groups to secular agency missions and may encourage those individuals to also volunteer for and/or donate to
secular organizations.
Social capital approach. Social capital variables are also important for volunteering and giving. Perceived social integration significantly predicted time volunteering and religious
giving, but not secular giving. Both time volunteering and
charitable giving activities are indicators of social involvement. The extent of such involvement is likely to depend on
individuals' social embeddedness and trust in others and their
community. The significant positive relationship between the
number of meetings individuals attended and the amount
of their secular giving shows that those who gave to secular
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groups/causes were socially embedded. However, it appears
that the level of trust in others and community may not be
an important factor for secular giving. We speculate on two
possible reasons for why this relationship was not significant.
First, community means different things to different people.
Most people consider their community as the geographic area
where they live. However, perceived community or neighborhood integration may have little to do with people's secular
giving behaviors, especially when donations can be made
through the mail or online (COP, 2007), while most volunteering is done close to home. Second, in this study secular giving
included contributions to many different types of organizations and causes. Donors to different groups/causes may have
varying levels of trust in others and their community, as different value orientations determine individuals' donations to
different types of organizations (Bennett, 2000). For example,
a sense of alienation and indignation rather than social integration can be a motivation for making contributions to a
groups or causes that advocates for social or political change.
Nonprofit organizations seeking volunteers may need to find
innovative ways to identify individuals who wish to increase
their social embeddedness or have generative motives. They
should also be mindful that community and social embeddedness may be defined based on shared interests and values
rather than geography.
The number of meetings attended was one of the strongest
predictors of time volunteering, religious giving, and secular
giving. This finding provide further support for our earlier
statement that to attract more volunteers and/or donors, nonprofit organizations should provide an increasing array of
opportunities for potential and current volunteers and donors
to come together and build a sense of connection to the organization and other volunteers/donors and prospective volunteers/donors. For example, public recognition of volunteers
and donors, especially in the form of communal events, may go
a long way in retaining volunteers and in making them enthusiastic recruiters of potential volunteers (e.g., family members,
friends, neighbors, and coworkers). Cultivating social capital
resources by promoting the sense of connection and building
social networks among potential volunteers/donors is also
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likely to help increase self-perceived generative qualities in
people.
Study Limitations
The study had several limitations. First, because it relied
on cross-sectional data, correlational, rather than causal, relationships were analyzed. Some "predictors," such as perceived social integration and the number of meetings attended, may in fact have been outcomes of volunteering or these
variables may have reciprocal effects. Second, secular giving
was the total amount of money contributed to many different
groups/causes. Although we could have separated contributions to political organizations and causes from those to other
organizations and causes, the small sample size for political
donors did not make this feasible. Further research is needed
to examine the determinants of donations to different types of
organizations and causes if a more accurate picture is to be
drawn. Third, the MIDUS data does not separate out religious
from other types of time volunteering, although, as mentioned,
more than one-third of volunteers donate their time primarily
through religious organizations. To develop a more accurate
picture of volunteering and giving, further research is needed
to examine the determinants of donations to different types
of organizations and causes. Fourth, the sample is predominately white and more affluent than the U.S. population in
general. Since racial/ethnic minorities are underrepresented in
the MIDUS data, and because the sample size for each racial/
ethnic minority group is so small, all minorities were grouped
together in the analyses. Given differences that studies have
found in volunteering and giving by racial and ethnic groups,
future research that allows examination of specific racial or
ethnic groups is needed. Fifth, since the MIDUS data were
collected using self-reported surveys, recall and social desirability biases related to helping behaviors may have affected
the data on volunteer hours and gift amounts. Sixth, giving by
gender could not be thoroughly analyzed because in married
couple households it was not clear whether the husband, wife,
or both jointly made decisions about donations.
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Conclusions
Despite these limitations, some interesting study implications emerged that nonprofit organizations may wish to consider, especially those facing reduced funding but increased
demand for services. Gifts of time and money constitute important resources for nonprofit organizations during economic
recessions when demand for services increases. Effective strategies for targeting, recruiting, and retaining volunteers and
donors are especially important for nonprofit social service
agencies that tend to experience shortages of financial resources and human resources (staff and staff time). This paper
offered some practical approaches for recruiting and retaining
volunteers and donors who aid nonprofit organizations in realizing their missions.
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The moralitypolicyframeworkis a lensfor understandingthe unique
characteristicsof policies that attempt to regulate personal morals
and behaviors. Needle exchange, a controversial interventionfor
reducing the transmission of HIV in injection drug users, shares
many of the hallmark characteristicsof morality policies. Analyzing needle exchange from a morality policy perspective, focusing
on the 21-year ban on federalfundingfor needle exchange, reveals
how value-based arguments have been used in the needle exchange
debate and explains why the issue is likely to remain controversialin
the United States. This analysis adds to the understandingof moral
and politicalaspectsof U.S. HIV/AIDS prevention and carepolicies.
Key words: HIV prevention, injection drug use, morality policy,
needle exchange

Injection drug use is one of the main HIV transmission
routes in the United States, contributing directly or indirectly
to more than a third of new HIV infections since the beginning
of the epidemic. It has been a key factor in the rising HIV prevalence in women, with 58% of HIV positive women contracting
the disease through injection drug use or sexual intercourse
with drug users (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2005). Early in the epidemic, needle exchange emerged as a
solution for reducing the spread of AIDS and other diseases in
injection drug users, based on the simple concept of providing
participants with free, clean needles to use for every injection.
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Needle exchange quickly became key in the HIV prevention
strategies of several European countries, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, and the first legal and comprehensive
needle exchange in the United States opened in Tacoma,
Washington in 1988 (Gay Men's Health Crisis, 2009). The effectiveness of needle exchange has been studied extensively, with
meta-analyses such as Cross, Saunders, and Bartelli (1998) and
Ksobiech (2003) indicating that needle exchange effectively
reduces needle sharing and other HIV risk behaviors.
Despite international acceptance of the needle exchange
model and its well-documented efficacy, needle exchange
remains controversial in the United States. In 1988, the same
year the Tacoma needle exchange opened with financial
support from county government, Congress passed a provision in the Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988 to
prohibit federal funding for needle exchange (Gross, 1989; U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1993). The ban remained intact
until 2009. All the while, needle exchange programs-supported by private, state, and local funding-proliferated across the
United States, and a considerable body of research developed,
examining and documenting their effectiveness.
A rational model of policymaking does not explain the
federal government's inaction on needle exchange policy.
Meier (1994) has argued that on the whole, U.S. drug policy is
irrational, and needle exchange is no exception. It is a charged
issue, largely driven by values and morals, instead of logic,
economics, or principles of public health. Morality policy analysis is an alternative model for understanding policy issues
such as needle exchange, which are not rooted in a rational,
problem-solving approach. In order to understand the evolution of the issue in federal policy and predict its further development, this article provides an overview of the morality
policy framework and applies it to needle exchange, with a
focus on the federal funding ban.
Morality Policy: A Framework for Analysis
The morality policy framework is a lens that can be used
to gain insight into the creation, implementation, and effects of
policies that attempt to regulate personal and moral behavior.
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The framework assumes that there are distinctive aspects of
morality policies and the politics that drive them, which differ
significantly from more economically based policies (Mooney
& Schuldt, 2008). Though analysis of the role of values in policymaking dates back much earlier (for example, Gusfield,
1963), the morality policy framework has roots in Gormley's
(1986) seminal work on regulatory politics. The definition of
morality policies in Gormley's conceptualization hinges on
two key concepts: salience and complexity.
Defining Morality Policies:Salience and Complexity
Gormley's (1986) analysis is based on the classification
of policy issues on the basis of their salience and complexity.
Issues that are highly salient affect, or are perceived as affecting, a wide range of people in some meaningful way. Typical
salient issues include policies relating to health, the environment, and public safety. Highly complex issues and policies
are those that require technical expertise to understand and
implement, such as transportation regulation. Based on their
level of salience and complexity, Gormley placed policy issues
into one of four typologies and subsequently generalized
about their characteristics. Figure 1 shows Gormley's saliencecomplexity matrix, including some of his issue examples in
each of the four typologies.
Using Gormley's (1986) matrix, needle exchange can be
understood as an issue of high salience and low complexity.
Needle exchange is salient because it addresses two extremely
visible and provocative social problems: drug use and HIV/
AIDS. Illicit drug use is widely prevalent in the United States;
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates
that there are approximately 21.8 million current illicit drug
users over the age of 12 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, 2010). Thus, a sizeable portion of
the population has been personally affected by drug use.
Furthermore, the treatment, control, and criminality of drug
use have remained controversial and well-publicized issues in
the United States for decades.
HIV/AIDS is also a highly salient social problem. Despite
ongoing prevention efforts and the investment of billions of
dollars, the continuing spread of HIV/AIDS in the United
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States and countries around the globe means that the issue
is never far from the public's attention. However, HTV/AIDS
differs from many other public health concerns in that it is
so closely associated with two behaviors deemed by many
groups and cultures to be immoral: sex between men, and injection drug use (Fernando, 1993). By addressing HIV/AIDS
risk due to injection drug use, needle exchange is situated at
the intersection of two of the most publicized, highly salient
social issues in our society.
Complexity
Low

High

High

Abortion;
Illicit drug regulation;
Nlct d
ehaon
Needle exchange

Air and water quality
regulation;
Occupational safety
regulation;
Prescription drug
licensing

Low

Liquor licensing;
Motor vehicle
inspections;
Nursing home
inspections

Banking regulation;
Patent regulation;
Transportation
regulation

Figure 1. Examples of policy issues in the salience-complexity
matrix. Morality policies constitute the shaded upper left
quadrangle of high salience and low complexity. Adapted with
permission from "Regulatory issue networks in a federal system,"
by W. T. Gormley, 1986, Polity, 18(4), p. 600.
In terms of complexity, needle exchange can be regarded
as a low complexity issue because of the simplicity of its strategy and objectives. AIDS and other diseases are spread when
injection drug users share needles. Needle exchange seeks to
reduce this by offering drug users new, clean needles for free
or at a very low cost. Most needle exchanges also offer other
services, such as referrals to medical care and drug treatment,
and often serve as a first point of contact for engaging drug
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users in a range of services (Des Jarlais, McKnight, Goldblatt,
& Purchase, 2009). However, the debate about needle exchange
rarely addresses these secondary aspects of exchange programs. The crux of needle exchange is providing drug users
with free clean needles, a simple concept around which the
needle exchange debate has centered.
Characteristicsand Applications of the Morality Policy Framework
In Gormley's (1986) typology issues such as needle exchange that are of high salience and low complexity, are classified under a category titled "hearing room politics" (p. 607).
This designation has implications for how such policies are
debated and implemented, as well as for which members of
the policy community have a role in this process. A diverse
range of policy players, including journalists, politicians,
and citizen activists, is drawn to these issues, which are perceived as important, controversial, and readily understood by
the general public. In hearing room politics, important decisions are usually made through legislation, rather than settled
through the courts or determined by bureaucrats involved in
policy implementation and regulation. In debates about such
issues, the role of experts and scientific data is diminished and
a greater emphasis on values and emotions emerges, prompting Gormley to conclude, "in fact one sees an amazing amount
of mudslinging, vilification and hyperbole in this issue area"
(p. 617).
Researchers and policy analysts have since refined these
concepts. Meier (1994) referred to the highly salient, low complexity issues in the hearing room politics typology as morality
policies or "the politics of sin" (p. 247). The terms "morality
policies" and "morality politics" were further popularized by
Mooney, who has published extensively on various aspects and
applications of the subject (see Mooney & Lee, 1995; Mooney,
1999, 2001; Mooney & Schuldt, 2008). Mooney's 2001 edited
volume The Public Clash of Private Values explored nuanced
aspects of morality policy analysis, such as the temporal diffusion of morality policies across the states and the role of compromise in morality policy implementation.
Morality policy analysis has been used with a diverse
range of issues, from abortion (Patton, 2007) to the death
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penalty (Mooney & Lee, 1999) to public funding for the arts
(Lewis, 2006). The prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS,
characterized by moral as well as medical elements since the
start of the epidemic, is clearly appropriate for study through
a morality policy lens. One aspect of HIV prevention that has
garnered considerable attention from morality policy analysts
is the debate over abstinence-only versus comprehensive sex
education in schools (Arsneault, 2001; Doan & Williams, 2008;
Vergari, 2001).
In her historical analysis of the politics of abstinence-only
sex education, Arsneault (2001) identifies four characteristics of
morality policies. Arsneault's framework synthesizes the work
of Tatalovich and Daynes (1998), Mooney (2001), and others,
providing a structure that can be readily applied to other
policy areas. The four key characteristics of morality policies
as outlined by Arsneault are: (a) controversy and an inability
to arrive at solutions by looking at empirical data alone; (b)
legislation that is symbolic in nature, rather than instrumental
or focused on concrete policy outcomes; (c) the involvement of
diverse sectors of the policy community, including legislators,
the media, bureaucrats, and citizens; and (d) ongoing debate
surrounding the issue, even after legislation has passed. This
framework can be used to analyze needle exchange policy,
supplementing previous analyses to yield a richer understanding of the political and moral aspects of HIV prevention policy
in the United States.
Analysis: Needle Exchange as Morality Policy
The ban on federal funding for needle exchange endured
from 1988 to 2009, touching five presidential administrations
and withstanding countless changes in congressional composition and leadership. The ban also surmounted an escalating
body of research demonstrating that participation in needle
exchange reduced HIV transmission and did not increase drug
use-the perpetual main objection of needle exchange opponents. An analysis of needle exchange as a morality policy
helps to explain the intractability of the federal funding ban
over 21 years. Using Arsneault's (2001) four characteristics of
morality policies, this analysis describes the history of needle
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exchange policy in the United States, focusing on the development and durability of the federal funding ban. In addition,
analysis of the four characteristics points to predictions for the
future of needle exchange, following the lifting of the federal
ban in December 2009.
While this analysis incorporates the perspectives of proponents and opponents of needle exchange, it is reflective of
the author's position in support of needle exchange. Like most
proponents, I take the view that considerable research evidence
substantiates needle exchange as an effective HIV prevention
strategy (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2011). Accordingly, this analysis highlights instances in which
value-based arguments have conflicted with evidence-based
ones, and promotes the role of research in policy making.
Furthermore, this analysis takes a high-level perspective by focusing on legislative decision-making at the federal level, with
limited attention to the role that grassroots and community
politics have played in the debate. The latter is discussed as an
important area for further research and analysis.
The ContrastingRoles of Values and Evidence
The first characteristic of morality policies in Arsneault's
(2001) framework is that they are marked by controversy; in
debates about morality policies, rigorous research and scientific evidence are deemphasized in favor of value-based arguments. This characteristic is evident in the history of needle
exchange policy in the United States. In 1987, facing the escalating spread of AIDS in injection drug users and their sexual
partners, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) convened national and international experts to address needle
sharing. NIDA promptly issued a research monograph with
the findings of the convention (Battjes & Pickens, 1988). The
monograph contains several studies documenting needlesharing behaviors among drug users in different parts of the
United States as well as the impact of newly implemented
needle exchange programs in Europe. In their conclusion, the
report editors offer tentative support for needle exchange,
noting that lack of access to clean needles, due to cost and
state drug paraphernalia laws, was a prime factor in needle
sharing, and stating that needle exchange was a promising HIV
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prevention approach that needed to be further studied in the
United States (Battjes & Pickens, 1988).
The first comprehensive AIDS funding legislation, passed
in 1988, similarly echoed a need for further research about
needle exchange, while also establishing needle exchange as
a politically controversial issue. Responding to a more conservative amendment offered by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) to
unqualifiedly prohibit federal funding for needle exchange,
Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
offered a less restrictive amendment to the legislation, stipulating a ban on federal funding until research could demonstrate
that needle exchange would reduce drug use and HIV transmission in the United States (Molotsky, 1988). The amendment
passed and this language was maintained in the 1988 Health
Omnibus Programs Extension, which ultimately incorporated
the AIDS funding legislation.
Such research was quickly forthcoming. Responding to
a request by the House of Representatives Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, in 1993 the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report examining the safety
and efficacy of needle exchange (GAO, 1993). The report,
which reviewed studies of needle exchange programs in the
United States, Europe, Australia, and Canada, contains several
findings in support of needle exchange. Acknowledging
policy makers' concern that needle exchange could increase
drug use, the report states unambiguously that all of the reviewed studies meeting evaluation criteria demonstrated no
increase in drug use among needle exchange attendees, and
one study documented that drug users injected less often after
they started participating in a needle exchange program. The
GAO report also confirmed the credibility of a model developed by Yale University researchers (Kaplan & Heimer, 1992)
that predicted a 33% reduction in new HIV infections over the
course of a year for needle exchange participants.
While proponents have long referenced the GAO report
and subsequent studies as supporting needle exchange, this
body of research has not been without controversy and ambiguities. Schechter's (2002) account of his personal involvement
in needle exchange research and policy development offers
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insight into one well-known research-related controversy. In
1997, Schechter and his colleagues published a report evaluating the effectiveness of a Vancouver needle exchange, the
largest in North America (Strathdee et al., 1997). One of the
study's many findings became particularly widely publicized:
Frequent attendees of the needle exchange program had an HIV
prevalence rate of 32%, versus 14% for less frequent attendees.
Schechter describes how several conservative American legislators concluded from this that needle exchange participation
increased HIV transmission and drug use. Schechter and his
colleagues uncovered evidence for an alternate explanation:
that the frequent attendees exhibited more risk behaviors (such
as involvement in prostitution or injecting with other users in
shooting galleries) than the less frequent attendees, resulting
in higher HIV prevalence. They attempted to explain this directly to legislators as well as to the general public in a New
York Times editorial (Bruneau & Schechter, 1998). Nonetheless,
facing opposition by conservative legislators emboldened by
their interpretation of the Vancouver findings, the Clinton administration announced on April 20, 1998 that it would continue the ban on federal needle exchange funding. This account
demonstrates some of the varying ways in which research
evidence can be used and interpreted in value-charged policy
debates.
The Symbolic Nature of Morality Policy Legislation
A related characteristic of morality policies is that their
legislation often has symbolic rather than instrumental goals.
Such legislation typically does not carry meaningful budget
implications; in fact, morality policy legislation is sometimes
used by politicians to distract from divisive budgetary debates
(Meier, 1994). An example of symbolically-rooted needle exchange policy can be found in a spate of proposed legislation
following President Bill Clinton's decision to uphold the needle
exchange federal funding ban in 1998. Prompted by this close
call, conservative legislators in the House and Senate rushed to
introduce new legislation to permanently ban federal funding
for needle exchange. The push for legislation was symbolic in
itself, since Clinton had just announced that he would retain
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the ban. The proposed legislation was little more than a perpetuation of the status quo. The goals of the legislation were
also symbolic, focused on the removal of a controversial intervention from the policy menu of options, rather than offering alternate solutions to reducing HIV and other infections in
drug users.
The debate in the House over H.R. 409, the proposed legislation to permanently prohibit federal funding for needle
exchange, is rich in examples of emblematic language from
both its proponents and opponents. At the start of the debate,
Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon (R-NY) tied the issue to
a topic that often raises emotions and concerns about morality: children and youth. In his introduction to the legislation,
Solomon stated that the proposed bill "affects every child in
this country and every future child in the next generations
to come" and went on to say that "the Clinton administration's endorsement of needle exchange programs is part of
an intolerable message to our Nation's children sent by the
White House that drug use is a way of life" (Solomon, 1998, p.
H2445). Shifting the debate from injection drug users, the population targeted by needle exchange, to the speculated effects
of needle exchange on children and youth is indicative of the
symbolic rather than instrumental nature of the legislation.
Solomon also focused on the urgency of the matter. Referring
not to the lives of drug users lost to HIV but to the risk of youth
becoming addicted to drugs due to needle exchange normalizing drug use, he stated that "what is even more important
is that the bill must be on the floor today because tomorrow
another life might be lost" (Solomon, 1998, p. H2447).
In the debate, proponents of needle exchange referenced
the scientific evidence in support of needle exchange and the
high cost of treating AIDS, but also made symbolic arguments.
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) cited statistics indicating
that the majority of HTV infections in women of childbearing
age were due of injection drug use or sex with drug users, and
stated that "when we fail to fund needle exchange, we are foregoing a proven intervention that can save the lives of women
and children" (Pelosi, 1998, p. H2454). This may have been a
response to Solomon's focusing of the debate on the issue of
youth drug abuse, and again shifts focus from the target of the
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intervention-injection drug users, most of whom are maleto a comparably innocent population of their female partners
and children. As Dr. Elizabeth Pisani, an AIDS epidemiologist
and former journalist, writes, such an argument has often been
used to advocate for funding for needle exchange, condoms,
and other HIV prevention measures:
HIV prevention is relatively cheap. For the price
of a condom or a sterile needle today, you can save
yourself several thousand dollars in health systems
costs caring for an AIDS patient ten years from now...
[but] the money argument often isn't enough to make
politicians do nice things for junkies. How about the
babies argument then? Politicians are always happy to
do nice things for innocent women and babies. (Pisani,
2008, p. 27)
Activists, Researchers, and Politicians:Policy Community Roles
The third characteristic of morality policies is that they
attract diverse sectors of the policy community. Politicians
make it a point to maintain a position on morality policy
issues, particularly during campaigns; citizen groups advocate various positions; researchers and academics contribute
their findings on the subject; and journalists cover all of this
action extensively. In its nearly 25-year history, needle exchange has proved to be no exception, with a variety of policy
actors seeking different forms of influence and involvement
in the issue. Along with the media, which has covered the
needle exchange debate since near its inception (e.g., Marriott,
1988; Altman, 1989), community activists, researchers, and
politicians have all played unique roles in the development of
needle exchange policy and programs.
Community organizations and AIDS advocacy groups
have been critical in the establishment and growth of needle
exchange programs. Early in the AIDS epidemic, when needle
exchange was illegal in many areas due to state and local drug
paraphernalia laws, community groups pushed the policy
forward by illegally operating small needle exchange programs. Two examples are the Bronx-Harlem Needle Exchange
Program and the Lower East Side Needle Exchange Program,
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which distributed needles to drug users illegally for two
years before becoming partners in New York City's first legal
needle exchange in 1992 (Hevesi, 1992). In addition to directly
running programs, national organizations such as AIDS Action
and the Harm Reduction Coalition, as well as many local organizations, directly challenged the ban on federal funding
and advocated to change state and local drug paraphernalia
laws to promote needle access. For example, Moseley, Melton,
and Francisco (2008) describe a state-level advocacy effort by
the North Carolina Harm Reduction Coalition to secure state
funding and legal permission for the two needle exchanges
operating in the state. In the absence of federal funding or a
national strategy on needle exchange, such efforts were critical
in the diffusion of needle exchanges across states and regions.
Community organizations have also mobilized to oppose
needle exchange. Religious groups, clergy, and neighborhood
business associations have historically spoken out against
needle exchange in some communities (Tempalski et al., 2007).
For example, at the start of the needle exchange debate, many
African American churches and other groups opposed needle
exchange. Such groups articulated that needle exchange was at
best a misguided effort that would not address the roots of addiction, and at worst, was a risky and potentially devastating
experiment that could increase drug use, already rampant in
many African American urban communities in the late 1980s
(Marriott, 1988). These concerns must be considered in light of
the history of deceptive and racist scientific experimentation in
African American communities, exemplified by the Tuskegee
syphilis study (Thomas & Quinn, 1993). Over time, as the disproportionate prevalence of HIV in African Americans became
clear and evidence grew in support of needle exchange,
many groups changed course. On National Black HTV/AIDS
Awareness Day in 2008, the NAACP, National Urban League,
and other black advocacy groups issued a statement in support
of needle exchange and asked Congress to overturn the federal
funding ban (Crary, 2008).
Researchers and academics have also involved themselves
in the development of needle exchange policy. Since one of
the characteristics of morality policy is an emphasis on values
over facts, the role of experts and professionals in policymaking tends to be diminished (Arsneault, 2001; Mooney, 2001).
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Nonetheless, academics and medical professionals have staked
a position in the needle exchange debate, primarily as proponents but occasionally as opponents to the policy.
A prime example of academic advocacy for needle exchange can be found in Schechter (2002). A physician and professor at the University of British Columbia, Schechter became
embroiled in public controversy when the results of his team's
study of a large Vancouver needle exchange program indicated
that frequent attendees of the program had higher HIV prevalence than less frequent attendees, as described above. The situation culminated in Schechter meeting in Vancouver with representatives of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy
to explain that the study results did not indicate that needle
exchange attendance increased HIV prevalence. In addition
to advocacy efforts by individual researchers, professional
organizations, including the American Medical Association
and American Public Health Association, came out in support
of needle exchange (Svalavitz, 2009), lending credence to the
demands of grassroots activists. Though less common, there
are also instances of academics and health professionals speaking out against needle exchange, such as psychiatrist Dr. James
L. Curtis, an outspoken critic who authored a New York Times
editorial on the topic (Curtis, 1998).
Politicians are key players in morality policy development.
Since morality policies are low-complexity issues, they provide
politicians with the opportunity to take a decisive stance on
matters that are both salient and understandable to the voting
public, and often widely covered by the media. Meier (1994) establishes that drug-related morality policies in particular "are
good politics" since "drug abuse is a universal bad" (p. 251).
Therefore, while politicians are generally attracted to morality policies, for issues such as needle exchange-both a drugrelated policy and a public health intervention-politicians are
wary of adopting a stance that may make them appear soft on
crime or encouraging of drug addiction.
This issue emerged during the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries. Candidate Barack Obama stated he would overturn the ban on federal funding, while his opponent Hillary
Clinton, perhaps more aware of the political circumstances
surrounding her husband's decision not to overturn the ban
in 1998, gave an ambivalent response regarding her stance on
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needle exchange (Svalavitz, 2009). But in spite of his campaign
promises, and much to the consternation of advocates, Obama's
initial 2010 budget proposal retained the funding ban. In addition to the fear of appearing soft on crime, politicians are aware
that injection drug use is an issue that lacks a strong lobby or
an empowered electoral base. For injection drug and other
issues such as homelessness, there is typically little promise
of personal gain to prompt politicians' support (Arnold, 1989).
Nonetheless, politicians have taken a stand on both sides of
the issue, as is evidenced by the 1998 Congressional debates
described above, and by the Obama administration's eventual
overturning of the ban and inclusion of needle exchange in the
National HIV/AIDS Strategy (White House Office of National
AIDS Policy, 2010).
EnduringControversy and Debate
The final characteristic of morality policies is that they
remain controversial; even the passage of important legislation
does not end the debate (Arsneault, 2001). For needle exchange,
the key legislation is the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act,
passed in December 2009, which overturned the 21-year ban
on federal funding for needle exchange. Despite a Democratic
Congress and a president who offered at least tentative
support to needle exchange, the repeal of the ban was not a
foregone conclusion. After the ban was left intact in Obama's
initial budget proposal, the House narrowly voted to eliminate
it in July 2009 (Egelko, 2009). At this point, the bill contained
a Republican-sponsored amendment that would have prohibited funding for programs located within 1,000 feet of schools,
day care centers, playgrounds, parks, and youth centers-essentially eliminating all viable needle exchange sites in urban
areas. The amendment was removed by a House-Senate committee before the final bill was passed.
Even with the lifting of the ban, the fate of appropriations
for needle exchange remains uncertain. In July 2010, the White
House Office of National AIDS Policy released the National
HIV/AIDS Strategy, which endorsed needle exchange as a
prevention approach on the grounds that "several studies have
found that providing sterilized equipment to injection drug
users substantially reduces risk of HIV infection ...
and does
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not increase drug use" (pp. 16-17). Coupled with the overturning of the funding ban, this represents a significant shift at
the executive level from the ambivalence of previous administrations toward needle exchange. While as of April 2011 no
federal money had yet been allocated specifically for needle
exchange, Department of Health and Human Services grantees were permitted to use remaining FY 2010 HIV prevention
funds for needle exchange, following departmental guidelines
released in July 2010 (U. S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2010). In March 2011 the Surgeon General endorsed
needle exchange, a necessary prerequisite for enabling states
to use Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grant
funds for needle exchange programs (Knopf, 2011).
Despite these landmark policy events, needle exchange, its
funding, and its legality in jurisdictions where strict drug paraphernalia laws still apply are likely to remain controversial. In
the absence of substantial federal funding, state funding and
support remains a critical issue. For example, in New Jersey,
a state with tens of thousands of injection drug users, pilot
needle exchange programs were granted legal status only in
2006, and are still constrained by extremely limited state and
local funding (Mulvihill, 2008). The morality policy framework
informs us that the repeal of the federal funding ban will not
eliminate local concerns or state funding controversies about
needle exchange; furthermore, when, how, and how much
federal money will be allocated to needle exchange remain unanswered questions.
Discussion
Analysis of needle exchange as a morality policy provides
an explanation for the endurance of the 21-year-long ban on
federal funding for needle exchange. Throughout its span, the
ban was a rallying point for AIDS activists, some of whom
began their own needle exchanges, despite lacking both government funding and legal permission (Fernando, 1993; Gross,
1989). The ban was also a source of consternation for researchers and academics who believed that their decades of scholarship provided rigorous evidence supporting the safety and
efficacy of needle exchange (Schechter, 2002). Morality policy
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analysis demonstrates that policy issues that can be framed in
moral terms-and in particular, issues related to "sinning,"
such as drug abuse (Meier, 1994)-are not ultimately driven
by the quality of research evidence or the testimony of experts.
Instead, and in contrast to other Western countries that view
drug use in less moralistic terms, the needle exchange debate
in the United States has been marked by value-based arguments, symbolic legislation, and controversy that is likely to
endure well past the 2009 repeal of the federal funding ban.
This analysis focused on one aspect of needle exchange
policy, the ban on federal funding. Further research on needle
exchange should explore other aspects, such as changes in
state and local drug paraphernalia laws that affect the legality of needle exchange and state funding trends. Mooney and
Lee (2001) suggest that the diffusion of morality policies across
states may differ significantly from the diffusion patterns of
other types of policies. Further analysis should explore the diffusion of needle exchange and the factors contributing to the
spread of needle exchanges from one state in 1988 to 31 states
in 2007 (Des Jarlais et al., 2009). Grassroots and community
politics are key in the development and diffusion of morality policies, and a more detailed exploration of the roles that
grassroots groups and coalitions have played in supporting
and opposing needle exchanges in different locations also warrants further attention.
Additionally, future research should also address aspects
of implementation, since, as Meier (1994) writes, "policy
implementation is the real policy" (p. 247). Though compromise is not typically associated with the polarizing issues that
morality policies address, Vergari (2001) describes the role of
compromise in states' implementation of abstinence-only sex
education policy. Research should determine if elements of
compromise are present in future funding and allocation decisions. The inclusion of needle exchange in the National HIV/
AIDS Strategy also provokes a question: will the federal government issue any challenge to the states and localities where
needle exchange is still illegal due to drug paraphernalia laws?
2011 marked the 30 h anniversary of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's reporting of the first AIDS cases in
the United States. Since the beginning of the epidemic, the
politics underlying the policies that distribute prevention and
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care services to people affected by HIV/AIDs in the United
States and abroad have been the subject of intense analysis and
debate (e.g. Barney et al., 2010). Issues ranging from the cost of
AIDS drugs to the role of harm reduction-based interventions
in HIV prevention have been discussed and debated by politicians and ordinary citizens alike and covered extensively in the
media (Levitt & Rosenthal, 1999). Analyzing needle exchange
from a morality policy perspective yields a better understanding of the role that values and morals have played, alongside
scientific knowledge and budgetary concerns, in this area of
U.S. HIV prevention policy. As policy makers and practitioners
alike enter a new decade in the struggle to effectively prevent
and treat HIV/AIDS, values and morals will likely continue to
play important roles in finding solutions.
Author's Note: After this article was accepted but prior to publication, the ban on federal funding for needle exchange was reinstated
by Congress, in December 2011. While this recent development is
not included in this analysis, the return of the funding ban after its
elimination in 2009 is consistent with the article's conclusion, that
needle exchange-like all morality policies-is likely to remain controversial and engender many shifts in policy in a context of ongoing
debate.
Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge Alice K.
Butterfield, PhD, for her comments on an earlier version of this
manuscript.
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Microcreditprograms have been applauded as the magic bullet for
the poor, especially women with limitedfinancial resources. Building on previous research,this study examines effects of a microcredit
self-help group (SHG) program on perceptions of social exclusion
among widowed and abandonedwomen who participatedin groups
established after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Tamil Nadu,
India (N=109). Data were collected on key aspects of the program
such as loan amount and investment patterns, group experience,
demographics, and perceived barriers to inclusion. Results indicate that investment patterns and group experience impacted the
women's perception of barriers to social inclusion. In addition,
older or abandoned women were more likely to perceive barriers
to inclusion. Implicationsfor designing and developing self-help
groups to empower women who are challenged by barriers to full
participationin activities that are key to functioningare discussed.
Key words: South Asia, India, rural,microcredit,self-help groups,
women, inclusion, exclusion, widows

Marginalization and social exclusion have considerably
increased among vulnerable groups world-wide. Women continue to make up the majority of people with limited financial
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resources and opportunities, constraining their life chances
and placing them at risk for exclusion. Indian society has not
been untouched by this phenomenon. Indeed, Indian women,
especially from marginalized groups such as Dalits, continue
to experience greater risks for marginalization and exclusion
(Deshpande, 2002). Their plight was made more visible in the
aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Existing evidence indicates that many people in the state of Tamil Nadu,
in southern India-one of the regions severely affected by the
tsunami-lost their livelihoods and had to rely on aid to meet
their daily necessities. Efforts to provide relief failed to adequately meet the needs of many vulnerable groups, especially
women, due to discrimination based on caste, gender, marital
status, and/or age.
A survey conducted by the Asia Pacific Forum on Women
Law & Development (APWLD) (2006) in Tamil Nadu, South
India and other areas in Asia affected by the tsunami, found
that women experienced more vulnerability than men during
the disaster. Their marginalized and disempowered status
placed them at even higher risk for deprivation because they
lacked financial and other resources to cushion the impact of
the disaster. Evidence compiled by APWLD (2005) and Human
Rights Watch (HRW, 2005) found that following the tsunami,
widows were at risk for abuse within relief camps and experienced discrimination when attempting to access relief. In addition, a needs assessment conducted by a local nongovernmental organization, Kalangarai (which was originally named the
South Asian People's Initiative), after the tsunami, revealed
that there were 1,700 widowed and/or abandoned women
in the coastal areas of Tamil Nadu who were particularly at
risk of deprivation due to lack of access to resources, extreme
poverty before the tsunami, and the discrimination they experienced in their communities. Kalangarai also found that these
women were not adequately supported by relief efforts, and
that they faced progressively worse economic conditions due
to loss of their livelihoods.
In response, Kalangarai developed self-help groups for
widows throughout the area and provided microcredit loans.
As part of this initiative, seven hundred widows received
between 3,000 to 10,000 rupees ($73-$242) each to establish or
reestablish small businesses, including food stalls, fish shops,
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and milk vending, as well as cultivation of vegetables and
raising livestock (see Kayser, Lombe, Newransky, Tower, &
Raj, 2010, for a detailed description of the program).
Focusing specifically on widowed and/or abandoned
women who participated in the self-help microcredit groups
implemented by Kalangarai (N = 109), this study explores
perceived effects, if any, of participating in the microcredit
program on social inclusion. Specifically, we assess whether
or not the amount of the loan each woman received, use of
the loan, and length of participation in the self-help groups
influenced the women's perception of barriers to social inclusion. We also examine whether or not demographic characteristics were related to a woman's perception of barriers to social
inclusion. Insight gained from this study may have implications for creating meaningful and successful programs that adequately meet the needs and goals of vulnerable women and
their households.
Background Literature
The Concept of Social Inclusion/Exclusion
The modem discussion of social exclusion/inclusion
is strongest in Europe, apparently originating in French
Republican rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s. During that period,
social exclusion referred to the shameful and visible condition of people living on the fringe of economic advancement
(Lenoir, 1974). This group consisted of traditional marginal
groups, e.g., persons with a disability or mental handicap,
the aged, the suicidal and single parents. The concept gained
prominence in policy and political debates as well as in academia during the 1990s with the emergence of the "new poor,"
referring to persons previously well integrated into mainstream society who slipped to the margins due to social disadvantage as a result of precarious jobs, unemployment, cultural
alienation, immigration, weakening of familial networks and
loss of status.
Broadly defined, social exclusion is a multidimensional
concept delineating a process through which individuals
and groups are partially or wholly excluded from participation in their society (Democratic Dialogue, 1995). Social exclusion often results from the failure of one or more of four
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institutions that can integrate individuals and groups into the
societal community. These include: democratic institutions,
which promote civic integration; the labor market, which facilitates economic integration; the welfare state, which promotes
social integration; and the family and other social networks,
which foster integration into the local community (Bhalla &
Lapeyre, 1999; Littlewood & Herkommer, 1999; Rodgers, 1995).
For this study, we focus only on the economic dimension. Our
rationale is that economic participation forms the basis of livelihood and hence has potential to positively impact a woman's
life chances, opening up possibilities for social participation.
It is important to acknowledge the fact that tension may
exist between the agenda for inclusion and the choice of "self
exclusion." Some groups, e.g., ethnic minorities, may choose,
for a variety of reasons, to remain outside the mainstream economic, social and political institutions. Also, arguments exist
suggesting that both the language and agenda for inclusion,
as currently articulated, may not be accessible and relevant to
marginalized groups in countries of the global south (Lombe
& Sherraden, 2008b; Rodgers, 1995). Thoughtfully structured,
however, social inclusion suggests an agenda for ensuring that
all people, including the marginalized, participate as valued
members of society. Moreover, the concept of inclusion is
linked to an ideal of-"ubuntu"/"convivencia"-personhood
that defines humans, regardless of status, as creative agents
endowed with the capacity to influence their life circumstances. Based on this principle, it is fundamentally unjust and contradictory for vulnerable individuals to be left out of aspects of
citizenship enjoyed by others.
The Situation of Widows in South India
Data from the 2001 census indicate that there were 13.2
million households in India headed by widowed women, compared to about 6.7 million households headed by widowed men
(Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India, 2001). In
Tamil Nadu alone, the number of widowed female heads of
households was three times greater than male widowed heads
of households (1.5 million versus 420 thousand) (Registrar
General & Census Commissioner of India, 2001).
There is some evidence suggesting that Indian women, especially from rural areas and lower castes, have lower levels
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of literacy, limited access to financial resources and opportunities, experience poor health, and have lower rates of participation in the formal economy (Deshpande, 2002; Lahiri-Dutt &
Samanta, 2006; Mohindra, 2008). Evidence also suggests that
women, who become widowed or deserted by their husbands,
often experience higher levels of marginalization due to cultural and religious practices (e.g., ceremonies that symbolized
passage into widowhood, prohibition of wearing jewelry and
other adornments, and exclusion from wedding ceremonies).
Moreover, widows' inheritance rights, especially in relation to
land, are not well defined and recognized, further heightening
vulnerability (Chen, 1998; World Public Opinion, 2008).
In a recent poll that compared 17 countries on discrimination against widows, a significant number of the Indian sample,
42%, reported that widowed women were treated somewhat or
a great deal worse than other women (World Public Opinion,
2008). A considerable number (46%) of the Indian sample indicated that divorced women were treated worse than other
women. Furthermore, in their study of widows in rural South
India, Dreze and Srinivasan (1998) found that widows experienced the highest rate of poverty followed by women who had
never been married, widowers, and men who had never been
married. Further, Mari Bhat (1994) found that mortality rates
among Indian widows were nearly twice as high as mortality
rates of married women of the same age.
Evidence also suggests that the plight of women in Tamil
Nadu, particularly widows, degenerated following the Indian
Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Indeed, studies have shown that
widows were vulnerable to abuse within relief camps and
experienced discrimination (see e.g., APWLD, 2006). In addition, Human Rights Watch (2005) reported that humanitarian
assistance often did not reach women because the distribution of relief and compensation was carried out through male
heads of households. The situation of widows was further confounded by illiteracy, a common factor among poor women,
forcing many of them to rely on family members, often males,
for assistance with accessing relief (HRW, 2005). The limited
evidence that exists on the situation of widows and/or abandoned women in India is revealing. It suggests that this group
of women is particularly at-risk for social exclusion and various
forms of gender-based discrimination.
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Self-Help Microcreditand the Welfare of Women
Microcredit has been acclaimed worldwide as a mechanism for the economic empowerment of women with limited
financial resources and opportunities (Goetz & Gupta, 1996).
Several recent studies have reported a generally positive
impact of microcredit programs on women's poverty, assets
and household income. For example, an evaluation of microcredit programs in Bangladesh reported that microcredit had
reduced the severity of poverty and helped increase the total
income per household (United Nations, 2000). A World Bank
study of rural Bangladesh reported a decline in poverty rates
in the villages sampled (Khandker, 2005). In India, microcredit
studies with women involved in dairy farming have noted
positive profit levels and short payback periods for loans (Kay,
2003).
Microcredit programs have also been linked to emotional
well-being among vulnerable women. Ahmed, Chowdhury
and Bhuiya (2001), in a study assessing the effects of a creditbased, income-generating program on participants' emotional
well-being in Bangladesh, found that contributing to household income and holding land were positively related to emotional well-being. Nazli (2007) found a positive association
between a woman's status and participation in a microcredit
program. In a recent study of micro-credit self-help groups
for rural Indian women utilizing the same data as the current
study, Kayser, Lombe, Newransky, Tower, and Raj (2010)
learned that participation in the loan program enhanced the
women's psychosocial and economic well-being.
Recently, there has been a remarkable growth in rural development initiatives aimed at promoting self-sufficiency and
raising the socio-economic status of women through self-help
microcredit programs in India (Sinha & Patole, 2003; Swain &
Wallentin, 2007). Sinha & Patole (2003) suggest that about 8001,000 non-governmental organizations are engaged in implementing savings and microfinance programs for low income
people. These programs often serve individuals who would
not qualify for loans using the traditional criteria of collateral
(e.g., land or capital) and have enhanced the resource-base of
vulnerable individuals and households.
Despite the positive impact of microcredit programs on
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the welfare of vulnerable women, researchers continue to
question whether or not these programs can empower vulnerable women and promote their participation in social endeavors. Indeed, research evidence on the effectiveness of
microcredit programs for women in poor countries of the
global south is somewhat obscure, indicating both positive
and negative effects (see e.g., Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta, 2006;
Leach & Sitaram, 2002; Swain & Wallentin, 2007). Moreover, in
a social context where women experience multiple discrimination based on gender, caste, and marital status, the impacts of
these programs may be weaker. In fact, a recurring theme in
the literature on the economic empowerment of poor women
in countries of the global south has been the need to focus
beyond the individual and propose programs that collectively
empower women and ensure their inclusion in the life of their
community.
Empowerment Theory
A number of theories may be used to understand the inclusion of women in a resource-poor environment. For this
study we use the empowerment framework to guide our understanding of the role self-help microcredit groups may play
in influencing the perception of barriers to inclusion among
widowed and abandoned women. Empowerment theory is
based on the assumption that the marginalized have the potential and capacity to positively influence outcomes in their
favor (Karlekar, 2004). Within this framework, a self-help
group may be viewed as a force that can promote inclusion by
enabling marginalized women to come together and overcome
what they perceive as barriers to their participation in the lives
of their communities. This study posits that key characteristics
of the self-help microcredit program--e.g., the loan amount,
loan use, and group experience-will affect a woman's awareness of barriers to social inclusion. To this end, we ask the following questions: (1) What aspects of the self-help microcredit
program affect a woman's perception of barriers to inclusion?
(a) Does the amount of loan; (b) type of loan use; and/or (c) the
group experience influence a woman's perceptions of barriers to social inclusion? (2) Among the women in the program,
are there variations in perceptions of barriers to inclusion by
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sociodemographic characteristics, namely, age, geographic
region, household composition, education, and number of
children?
Description of the Widows' Project
Kalangarai, a local nongovernmental organization, provided 3,000 to 10,000 rupees (which is $73-$242, using the 2007
average U.S. to rupee exchange rate of 41.3 per the Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2008) to 750 widowed and/or abandoned
women over the period from December 2005 to October
2006. The amount of the microcredit loan was contingent on
the expressed needs of each woman. The women could use
their loan to start a small business or raise cows and goats.
Two women from each self-help microcredit group were appointed as group leaders. Savings accounts in local banks were
opened in the names of group leaders, so that as the women
repaid their loans, the leaders would deposit the money into
the group's account. When all the loans within the group were
fully repaid, group members were eligible to receive a second
loan.
The self-help microcredit groups were established in four
taluks (a subdivision of a district) which had a high concentration of Dalits ("untouchables" or outcasts) and experience
poor socio-economic conditions, as well as limited political
participation (revenue districts) within Nagapattinam: (1)
Vedaranyan, (2) Nagapattinam, (3) Tharangambadi, and (4)
Sirkali. Since Sirkali had a large number of widows' groups, it
was further divided into two clusters called Poombuhar and
Koolidam (see Kayser et al., 2010, for a detailed description
of the program). Table 1 provides a description of program
characteristics.
Method
Study Sample
The sample was recruited from approximately 750
widowed and/or abandoned women participating in a
self-help microcredit program along the southeast coast of
Tamil Nadu. The women were organized into self-help groups
of about 12 persons. In total, there were 71 groups from five
geographic zones: Nagapatinam, Tharangapadi, Vetharanyan,
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Kollidam, and Boombuhar. To obtain the sample for this study,
115 women were randomly selected from twenty-five groups
across participating geographic zones. All of the women except
six agreed to participate. The six women who refused to participate in the study indicated conflict in work schedule as the
reason for their refusal.
Table 1. Characteristics of Self-Help Groups (N=109)
Percent/Mean (SD)

Missing

Individual loan amounts
3000 Rs.

50%

5000 Rs.

38%

10000 Rs.
Primary loan use

13%

Invested in business

40%

Bought animals

39%

Other use
Length of time in groups
Average (months)
Range (months)
Frequency of group meetings)

21%
9%
14.5 (2.5)
8-17
6%

Less than once a month

1%

Once a month

20%

Twice a month

39%

Weekly

21%

Daily

14%

Average earnings
Pre-loan (Rs.)

43.4 (31.8)

6%

Post-loan (Rs.)

46.0 (31.2)

1%

Note: Table 1 is based on data used in an earlier study (Kayser et al., 2010)

Data Collection Procedure
Data were collected by the investigators with help from five
graduate students from the Madras School of Social Work. The
interviewers were trained in the research protocol by one of
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the principal investigators. In addition, all of the interviewers
completed the NIH Human Participants Protection Education
for Research Teams online course before data collection. The
study protocol was reviewed and approved by Kalangarai, the
host institution, as well as the Institutional Review Board at
Boston College.
The survey instrument consisted of 25 items asking respondents about their demographic characteristics (age, residence, education, who they live with, children, etc.), experience with the loan (loan use, decision making, benefits), lives
before the loan (type of work, earnings), experience in their
self-help group, perception of inclusion, and suggestions for
improving the program. Most of the items on the survey were
measured at the nominal and ordinal levels. Prior to data collection, the survey instrument was pilot-tested on a small
group of program participants and revised, where necessary,
to ensure appropriateness and cultural sensitivity.
Measures
Drawing from previous research (see e.g., Kayser et al.,
2010; Lombe & Sherraden, 2008a), we developed measures of
key study variables: loan amount; how the loans were used;
experience of participation in the self-help microcredit group;
perceived barriers to social inclusion; and demographic characteristics. These variables are provided in summary form in
the sub-sections that follow.
Socio-demographicvariables.Socio-demographic characteristics consist of age, education, marital status, children, current
work and geographic location in which the women lived. Age,
education and children, in this study, are ratio level variables
capturing the age of the respondent at the time of the interview, years of education, and the number of children. Marital
status is a three level categorical variable reflecting whether
the respondent was widowed, abandoned, or had never been
married. Preliminary analyses revealed that only 2% of respondent indicated they had never been married. These were
recorded as missing. Hence, marital status, for this study, is
assessed at two levels (0 = widowed, 1 = abandoned group).
Current work included the following: selling things; working
in the fishing industry; farming; construction; raising animals;
and domestic household work. Geographic location is a
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five-level categorical variable reflecting the region of each participant: Nagapatinam; Tharangapadi; Vetharanyan; Kollidam;
and Boombuhar.
Investment-based measures. Loan amount, loan use, and
group experience were our main independent variables indicating the loan monies given to a program participant, pattern
of investment, and the experience of participation in the selfhelp microcredit group. Measured in Indian rupees, the loan
amount ranged between 3,000 to 10,000 rupees (U.S. $73 to
$242). The amount given was determined by the participant's
intended use of the loan. For example, a woman who planned
to purchase livestock requested and received a higher loan
amount, usually of 10,000 rupees (U.S. $242). To measure loan
use, we utilize a three-level categorical variable denoting the
purchase of livestock such as a cow or goat; investment in a
small business (e.g., selling prepared food, renting dishes and
utensils, selling fuel or firewood); or spending for non-income
generating use (e.g., child's school fees, house repairs, medical
expenses, and the repayment of debts). Group experience is
measured by a single item capturing the duration of time the
self-help microcredit group has been in existence.
Perceived barriers to social inclusion. This is conceptualized
in terms of the women's perception of factors that hinder the
participation of widowed or abandoned women in mainstream society. This measure is created by summing-up four
variables: experiences of discrimination; exclusion from social
family events; exclusion from ceremonies and rituals (e.g.,
weddings); and staying in the background (theoretical range
of 0 - 4). Higher scores on this measure denote higher rates of
perceived barriers to inclusion. The measure demonstrated accepted internal consistency with the current sample (ot = 0.80).
Caveat
A number of limitations are acknowledged. First is the
study's exploratory nature and the use of proxy measures to
assess barriers to inclusion. This calls for caution in interpreting
results of this study. Second, the nature of the self-help group
and other characteristics specific to Kalangarai may have an
impact on perceived outcomes. Third, participants were program-selected because of eligibility criteria they were required
to satisfy, e.g., being widowed or abandoned. Furthermore, the
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accuracy of the data is limited by the precision with which respondents recalled and self-reported their perceptions of their
situations. The study's cross-sectional design restricts its ability
to establish causality. Despite its exploratory nature, this study
has substantial merit and may help reveal factors that are associated with the social inclusion of vulnerable persons.
Data Analyses Procedures
A series of univariate statistical procedures were performed
to describe and summarize certain aspects of the data, e.g. age,
number of children in the household, geographic region of the
widows' group, amount of loan, loan use and the women's
perception of their situation. Following this, nonparametric
bivariate correlations were obtained for demographic characteristics and the women's perception of barriers to inclusion. To understand the overall effect of participating in the
microfinance program on the women's perception of barriers
to inclusion, a multiple regression procedure was conducted. Specifically, investment-related variables, including loan
amount, loan use and group experience, were entered in the
model with socio-demographic variables as controls. Prior to
the analysis of main effects, a series of preliminary multivariate analyses were performed to assess the extent to which the
assumptions of regression were met. These tests indicated that
linearity, normality, and homoscedasticity can be assumed.
Results
Sample DemographicCharacteristics
An overview of the socio-demographic characteristics of
the sample reveals that the age of participants ranges from 22
- 75, with an average age of 45 and a standard deviation of
11 years. Eighty-three percent of the women identified their
marital status. The majority of these were widowed (66%).
Respondents were evenly distributed in terms of region of residence (about 18 to 23 percent per geographic zone). Most of the
respondents reported having at least one child in their household (93%). Study participants were engaged in a wide range
of enterprises. These ranged from selling food items to domestic household work. The majority of the respondents (68%) had
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no formal schooling. Most of the women in this sample indicated that they had experienced alienation. Specifically, 71%
reported being excluded from social functions, 69% reported
experiencing discrimination, and 91% reported feeling hopeless about their situation.
A considerable number of women (40%) indicated that cultural practices that have negative effects on widows should be
stopped (e.g., ceremonies that symbolize passage into widowhood). The data also revealed that about half of the women in
this sample (47%) reported that people should not speak ill of
widows. Despite these perceptions, only 24% of the women
would like to tell people that widows are not bad luck. Thirty
one percent report that widows should publicly speak-out
about their perceived discrimination and stand up for their
rights (see Table 2).
Table 2. The Women's Perception of their Situation (N=109)
Percentage Missing
Variable
76%
Experience alienation
69%
2%
Experience discrimination
71%
4%
Feel excluded from social functions
4%
40%
Want negative cultural practices
stopped
24%
4%
Want to tell people that widows are
not bad luck
47%
4%
Want speaking ill of widows stopped
4%
91%
Feel hopeless about situation
31%
Want to stand up for own rights
BivariateCorrelations
Table 3 presents bivariate correlations of the sample's socio-demographic characteristics and the women's perception
of barriers to inclusion. We noted that older and abandoned
respondents were more likely to perceive barriers to inclusion.
Respondents with more years of schooling reported feeling less
excluded. Other demographic characteristics were not related
to a woman's perception of barriers to inclusion. Further, use
of the loan and group experience were positively related to
perceptions of inclusion.
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Self-help Microfinance Group Participationand Perceived Barriers
to Inclusion
Table 4 presents findings from the model examining the
relationship between participation in the self-help microcredit
group and perceived barriers to inclusion. These are significant [F (8,71) = 4.31, p = 0.00] and explain 25% of the variance
in the dependent variable. Specifically, the age of a respondent-being older (b = 1.57, t = 3.62, p = 0.00) and marital
status-abandonment (b = 0.05, t = 2.82, p = 0.01) are related to
an increase in perceived barriers to inclusion. We also note that
group experience (b = -0.95, t = -2.42, p = 0.02) and use of the
loan (b = -0.14, t = -3.00, p = 0.00) are significantly related to a
reduction in perceived barriers to inclusion. Level of education
(b = -0.10, t = -1.86, p = 0.07) approaches significance.
Table 3. Correlations of Perceived Barriers to Inclusion by
Socio-demographic Characteristics (N=109)
Variable

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Perceived
barriers (A)
Age (B)

0.23

Marital
status (C)
(ref=widowed)

0.27*

-0.46 **

Number of

0.06

0.27 *

Years of
education (E)

-0.19*

-0.08

0.02

0.10

Loan amount
(F)

0.09

-0.12

0.02

-0.12

Use of loan (G)

-0.20*

-0.12

0.12

-0.18

0.18

-0.13

Group experience (H)

-0.22*

0.09

-0.02

0.04

0.23*

-0.09

-0.06

Current work
(i)

0.01

0.08

0.01

-0.14

0.02

0.09

0.23*

0.24*

Geographic
zone J)

0.01

-0.08

0.08

-0.02

-0.22*

0.05

0.37*

-0.14

-0.28

**

children (D)

0.13

*p<0.0 5 ; **p<0.01

Discussion
Overall, results of this study suggest that participation in
the self-help microcredit groups may play an important role

-0.15
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Table 4. Regression Analyses of Perceived Barriers to Inclusion
(N=109)
Variable

b

se

t

p-value

Constant

4.34

0.76

5.08

0.00**

Age of Respondent
Marital
MrfidStatus
Sau1.57
d
(ref=widowed)

0.05

0.02

2.82

0.01**

0.43

3.62

0.00**

Years of Education

0.10

0.12

-1.86

0.07

9.62E-5

0.00

1.30

0.19

Use of Loan

-0.14

0.05

-3.00

0.00"*

Group Experience

-0.95

0.39

-2.42

0.02

Type of Current
Work

0.07

0.05

1.34

0.19

Amount of 1st
Loan

R

0.25

F

4.31

df

8,71

Note: b = Unstandardized Regressions, *p<0.05; **p<0.01
in influencing the perceptions of social inclusion by poor
widowed and/or abandoned women. In particular, socio-demographic characteristics such as age (being older) and marital
status (being an abandoned woman) were related to an increase
in barriers to inclusion. Previous research has noted that age is a
factor that places women at risk of poverty and social exclusion
(Lombe, Yu, & Nebbitt, 2009; Yin, 2008). Since older women are
likely to experience barriers to inclusion despite participation
in the self-help group, it may be important to explore in depth
the barriers that older women face and how these might differ
from barriers faced by younger women. Overcoming such
barriers may require a targeted approach, focusing specifically
on the needs of older women and their households.
Further, compared to widowed women, abandoned
women perceive more barriers to inclusion due to social stigma
attached to their status. This observation is notable and points
to the fact that abandoned women might need more support
to overcome social stigma and other factors associated with
their situations. Our results also suggest that women with
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lower levels of education are likely to experience more barriers
to inclusion. This finding has special relevancy to this study
given the fact that 68 percent of the women in this sample had
no formal schooling. Consideration could be given to incorporating an educational component into income-generating
programs. Indeed, scholars have observed that while greater
income can do much even in the short run, it cannot guarantee
a sustainable escape from poverty if individuals and households in poverty have limited or no human capital to negotiate and influence policies in their favor (Lombe & Sherraden,
2008b; Smith, 2005).
In relation to investment characteristics, the use of the
loan-e.g., investment in a small business, paying debt, and
children's education-as well as duration of time the self-help
group has existed were significant predictors of barriers to inclusion. More specifically, these variables were associated with
feeling less excluded. This observation is in line with previous
research, suggesting a link between inclusion and economic
participation (Lombe & Sherraden, 2008a).
In terms of the observed inverse relationship between
group experience and barriers to inclusion, it could be that the
interconnectedness the women experience through the group
may have empowered them to collectively face their situations
positively. This, in fact, is in line with the basic underpinning
of the empowerment perspective that postulates that the development of collective empowerment is necessary for sustainable outcomes. Indeed, the social connection among poor
women in self-help groups has long been an important feature
of microcredit programs (Menon, 2007; Swain & Wallentin,
2007). It may be important to further explore the specific characteristics of 'group experience' that affect inclusion/exclusion
and how this experience could be maximized to enhance outcomes for this group of vulnerable women.
Study Implications
A conservative interpretation of our results would signify
that, in general, self-help microcredit programs are important
in promoting inclusion. However, for older women, women
with lower levels of education, as well as women who face additional barriers such as abandonment and widowhood, there
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may be a gap between what these programs can provide and
their specific needs. An approach with greater potential to
reduce this gap for women who face prohibitive barriers and
are at higher risk for social exclusion may be a multifaceted
initiative taking into account household needs, as well as the
unfair and inequitable treatment such groups experience. The
women themselves may need to be empowered to learn about
their rights and channels of redress that are open to them.
In this study we learned that two aspects of a microcredit program were important for inclusion: use of the loan and
group experience. It would be important to further explore
characteristics of a self-help group that were not examined in
the current study to assess how they may be related to social inclusion. Similar studies may offer some guidance in this regard
(Lombe, Huang & Putnam, 2008). Group experience, in this
study, was measured broadly by length of group membership.
A comprehensive assessment of the nature of group experience and the value program participants attach to the group
and interaction with members of their group may be useful. In
addition, a more refined understanding of a participant's socioeconomic status, caste, and religion would enable rigorous
comparison of within- and between-group differences. Finally,
further research into the relationship between self-help microcredit programs and social inclusion in relation to vulnerable
groups, e.g., women of modest means, is warranted and may
uncover more precise explanations and hypotheses than we
are able to offer here.
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Public Attitudes and Gender Policy Regimes:
Coherence and Stability in Hard Times
JING Guo
University of Hawaii at Manoa

NEIL GILBERT

University of California, Berkeley

Drawing upon data from the European Social Survey on public
attitudes and social welfare, this paper analyzes the extent to

which attitudes toward gender equality in work and family
life vary among 13 countries which represent different welfare regimes. The analysis also examines how these attitudes
have changed with the onset of the economic recession in 2007.
The findings suggest that public attitudes toward gender issues
are largely consistent with welfare regimes, and most notably, reveal a clear direction of moving away from traditional
views of gender,family and work issues in economic hard times.
Key words: Public attitudes, welfare regimes, gender equality,
work, family life
Although Gosta Esping-Andersen's (1990) path-breaking
analysis of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism provided a
useful typology for comparing and explaining welfare state differences and identified three distinct welfare regimes-liberal,
conservative, and social democratic-its operational measures
were soon seen as focusing too narrowly on income transfer programs for male breadwinners, which failed to capture
how different welfare regimes affect women and family life
(O'Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993, 1996; Sainsbury, 1994, 2001).
Over the last decade, gender-related issues have moved to the
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 2
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forefront of comparative research on welfare state policies and
regimes. Broadening the analytic scope, Sainsbury (1994,2001)
introduced gender-related welfare states issues which brought
a feminist perspective to bear on mainstream welfare state
studies. This perspective contributed to welfare state research
by documenting the inequalities between men and women
embedded in work and social welfare policies, illuminating
implicit ideologies of familial and gender roles, and focusing
attention on policies designed to harmonize work and care
(Gustafsson, 1994; Sainsbury, 1994; Siaroff, 1994).
Welfare state policy analysis from a gender perspective
reveals considerable variation in social policies to mitigate the
tensions and conflicts between work and family life among
different countries (Daly & Lewis, 1998; Gornick, Meyers, &
Ross, 1997; O'Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999). For example, in
Scandinavian countries the extensive provision of childcare is
part of an explicit policy designed to create a dual-breadwinner model and full employment. In contrast, public childcare
provisions in Britain have been primarily for children who are
in poverty or at risk, and in the U.S. childcare has remained
essentially in the private sphere with limited public support,
which has been increasing in recent years. Knijn and Kremer's
(1997) comparative analysis of Britain, Denmark and The
Netherlands reveals different patterns of organizing care in
welfare states. Examining maternity leave policies and institutional childcare, they found that, due to the focus on care as
a right of citizenship, the Danish welfare state came closest to
creating a system of gender equality.
Gender Policy Typologies:
Alternative Measures and Regimes
The gender perspective on social policy has given rise
to alternative conceptualizations of welfare state typologies
based, for example, on the extent to which they allow women
to form autonomous households, provide support for either
a single-earner nuclear family or a dual-earner family, and
reduce households' welfare and caring responsibilities. Lewis'
(1992) exploratory analysis distinguishes among strong malebreadwinner states, modified male-breadwinner states and
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the dual-breadwinner model. Britain is given as an example of
the strong male-breadwinner model, which is marked by parttime labor force participation of women, limited child care services, and historically unequal treatment of wives in regard to
social security. France is described as an example of a modified male-breadwinner state in which women have a higher
full-time labor force participation rate than Britain and are afforded social provisions, such as maternity leave for mothers
and public day care. Sweden is seen as a dual-breadwinner
model which provides social entitlements to both men and
women based on their participation in the labor market, generous parental leave benefits, and extensive childcare services.
Sainbury's (1994) model of the male breadwinner, based on
the traditional gender division of labor with men given employment priority, and the individual earner-carer, based on
the shared division of labor and employment equality between
men and women, is akin to Lewis's strong breadwinner and
dual breadwinner classifications.
As gender-related issues have moved to the forefront of
comparative welfare state research, the question arose as to
what extent the prevailing typology of welfare state regimesliberal, conservative, and social democratic-which was based
in large part on an operationally defined index of the de-cornmodification of labor, might also reflect important differences
in gender-related policies. Addressing this question, EspingAndersen (1999) re-examined the welfare regimes through the
analytical lens of de-familialisation--defined as "the degree
to which households' welfare and caring responsibilities are
relaxed either via welfare state provision or via market provision." This concept is operationally defined with several
empirical measures of social policies that promote shifting responsibility for family care to the state, as reflected in the levels
of public expenditure on family services and the percentage
of children under three in public child care. In comparison to
policies that de-commodify labor by reducing workers' dependence on the market, the policies that promote de-familialisation reduce the individual's dependence on kinship, seek to
reconcile work and family life and afford women more individual choices.
Employing these measures in a cross-sectional analysis
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of data on family policy, Esping-Andersen finds a general
consistency among the three standard welfare regimes and the
degree of de-familialisation. That is, social democratic regimes
exhibit the highest degree of de-familialisation, through generous family policies that advance gender equality and child
well-being. The conservative welfare regimes in continental
European countries show a modest level of de-familialisation,
with family policies stressing the traditional role of family and
underlying assumptions of the male breadwinner model. The
liberal model, marked by the Anglo-American approach to
family policy, has the lowest level de-familialisation through
public welfare intervention among the standard welfarestate regimes originally delineated in Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism. In addition to these three regimes identified in
the 1990 study, Esping-Andersen (1999) introduces a fourth
regime-Southern Europe-in his analysis of the relationship
between family policy and welfare regimes. According to measures of public spending on family services as a percent of GDP,
the Southern European regime has a level of de-familialisation
below that of the liberal regimes. Beyond the general parallel between welfare state regimes and family policy efforts,
Esping-Andersen suggests that the level of de-familialisation
based on public provisions showed such a huge gap between
the social democratic regimes and all the others, as to form a
bimodal distribution.
In a similar vein, Walter Korpi (2000) distinguishes three
models of gendered welfare states: (a) "dual-earner support"
under which social rights are vested in policies that support
women's labor force participation and the dual-earner family
model of gender relations; (b) "general family support" under
which social rights are vested in policies that support the
nuclear family and the traditional gendered division of labor;
and (c) "market-oriented policies" under which market forces
dominate the shaping of gender relations, with limited social
rights and policies designed to support either the dual-earner
or the traditional gendered division of labor. Various social
policies-such as cash child allowances, family tax benefits,
public day care for children of different ages, paid maternity
leave, and home help to the elderly-are used to operationally
define these models.
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The typologies noted above use various labels to classify
gender policy from Lewis' (1992) strong, modified and weakbreadwinner models, to Esping-Andersen's (1999) degrees of
de-familialisation among social democratic, liberal, continental, and Southern European regimes, to Korpi's (2000) dualearner, general family support and market-oriented gender
policy institutions. As indicated in Table 1, despite the linguistic
differences and varying operational measures, there is a very
high degree of correspondence in the classification of these
three schemes along a continuum of gender equality. Indeed,
when these models are applied to a number of countries, they
yield very similar groupings. Thus, those countries that cluster
into each of Korpi's three types match the examples given by
Lewis and almost exactly parallel Esping-Andersen's liberal,
social democratic, and conservative regimes. Although the different typologies include a range of (overlapping) policies as
operational measures, as Korpi (2000, p. 144) points out, the
touchstone for the selection and categorization of indicators
is whether the policies under consideration contribute to the
Table 1. Typological Continuum of Gender- Policy Regimes
Right
Continuum Left
of
Political
Tendency
Shared family
Traditional gender
& Gender
obligations &
relations & Male
Equality
Lewis

Employment
equality
Weak male
breadwinner
(Dl
brearner
(Dual earner)

Korpi

Dual-earner

EspingAndersen

Social
Democratic

Modified male
breadwinner
General
family
support
Continental

employment
privileged
Strong male
breadwinner
Market-oriented
Liberal
(Southern European)

support of the traditional division of labor in the single-earner
nuclear family or whether they promote women's paid work, a
dual-earner family and the redistribution of caring obligations
within the family and society.
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Gender Equality in Different Policy Regimes During a
Period of Financial Crisis
Since the early 1990s, the main body of research on models
of gender-related policy in welfare states has involved descriptive analysis of how social policies-such as child care,
parental leave, maternity leave, family-related tax expenditures, children allowances, household services, payments for
caregivers, and social security-promoted equality in gender
relations in the family and the labor force (Anttonen & Sipila,
1996; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Korpi,
2000; Lewis, 1992; Montanari, 2000; Sainsbury, 1999). Studies
have also examined the degree of gender policy convergence among models associated with different welfare states
(Avdeyeva, 2006; Guo & Gilbert, 2007; Kautto, 2002). Most of
the research on these issues draws upon data regarding dimensions of policy such as expenditures, benefits, and eligibility
criteria. And nearly all of these studies were conducted within
the context of an expanding economy and sustained economic

growth-prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007.
The socio-economic context within which most genderrelated policy analyses to date have been conducted bears
consideration. Between 1994 and 2007, the total real growth
of GDP for the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and
Development (OECD) countries increased by an average of
2.6% annually. Although the average level of public social
welfare spending remained relatively flat from 1993 to 2005,
the actual amount of social expenditures continued to rise
rather substantially, from $2946 in 1990 to $6294 in 2005-as
seen when the measure of spending shifts from the percent
of GDP to per capita expenditures controlled for purchasing
power parity (PPP). The OECD total growth rates are averages

for the individual countries weighted by size and converted
to dollars using PPP (OECD, 2009b). It is well recognized that
these levels of spending change when the "gross public social
expenditure" measure is adjusted for taxes, tax expenditures,
mandate and voluntary private benefits. A critical assessment
of these measures is offered in Gilbert (2010).
At the same time, the rate of unemployment in the EU
peaked around 1993 and then started to decline through 2007.
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Not only did the unemployment rates in Europe fall after the
mid-1990s, but the proportion of the working-age population
in the labor force increased among the OECD countries from
63.9% in 1993 to 66% in 2006.
All this has changed with the rise in unemployment and
the contraction of economic growth that began at the end of
2007. New data from EU show that by January 2010 the unemployment rate for the euro area (EU 16 countries that have
adopted the Euro) was 9.9%, up from 8.5% in 2009 and from
7.2% a year earlier, although these averages mask a wide range
of variance (OECD, 2009a). For example, Spain had one of the
highest levels of unemployment at 18.8% and Denmark had
among the lowest with 4.2% unemployed. In 2009, the GDP in
OECD countries declined by an average of 3.4%, ranging from
5% in Germany to 2.2% in France.
Public Attitudes Toward Gender Equality and Policy
Regimes: Analyses of Coherence and Stability
Although the focus on gender-related aspects of social policies since the 1990s provides quantitative measures of government actions in support of gender equality, which can be tied
to various policy regimes, these measures do not necessarily
gauge the degree to which citizens in the different gender-related welfare regimes support the objectives of gender equality in family life and employment. When citizen views on the
employment rights and family obligations of women are considered along with the changing socio-economic context after
2007, several interesting questions emerge about the coherence
and stability of relationships between public attitudes towards
gender equality and types of gender-related welfare regimes in
different countries. Specifically:
In comparing different countries, to what extent do
their public attitudes regarding preferences for gender
equality in family life and employment coincide
with their gender-related welfare regimes defined by
quantitative policy measures?
Do men and women express similar attitudes regarding
preferences for gender equality in the different genderrelated regimes?
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To what extent and in what direction have these public
attitudes toward gender equality changed after the
onset of the financial crisis?

These questions are addressed in this paper through a
comparative analysis of data collected in Rounds 2 (2004-05)
and 4 (2008-09) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS
Round 2 includes 26 European countries and Round 4 includes
30 countries. Covering residential populations, the country
surveys have a minimum sample size of 1,500 (or 800 where
population is under 2 million). In this paper, we analyze the
data available on the same survey questions from rounds 2
and 4 about attitudes toward gender equality in family life
and employment. The sample includes responses from thirteen countries (on which data were available) which represent four regimes under Esping-Andersens's (1999) typology: Social democratic regimes (Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden), Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, and Netherlands), Liberal regimes (Ireland and UK),
and Southern Europe (Portugal and Spain). As noted earlier,
this grouping of countries closely coincides with their classification under other gender policy regimes.
The unemployment rate has been increasing since some
time in 2008 across these European countries. It is considered
a "lagging indicator," since during an economic downturn it
usually takes several months before the unemployment rate
begins to rise. But the economic downturn and decline in
growth was widely signaled by the end of 2007. As the stock
market tumbled in 2008, individuals started to feel the impending sense of economic hardship before the increase in the
official unemployment rate. Hence, the economic recession
and the sense of job opportunities growing scarce were palpable when the ESS Round 4 was conducted between late 2008
and early 2009.
The survey questions used to reflect public attitudes
toward gender equality in family life and employment involve
the statements: "Women should be prepared to cut down on
paid work for the sake of family" and "Men should have more
right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce." On each statement, respondents were asked whether they "agree strongly,
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agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly."
On these items we measure the overall disagreement and
agreement with the traditional views that women should sacrifice employment to meet their responsibilities for family life
and that men should be privileged over women in access to
employment. Disagreement was gauged by combining the
percentage of respondents in each country who answered
strongly disagree and disagree; similarly, overall agreement
was calculated by combining those who strongly agreed and
agreed with these views. For each welfare regime, the overall
agreement with these statements was calculated by averaging the percentage of agreements for countries in the welfare
regime after adjusting for the design weight and population
weight.
Coherence Between PublicAttitudes Toward Gender Equality and
Gender-policy Regimes
To what extent do public attitudes related to gender equality in family life and employment vary among the sample
countries and between different gender-policy regimes?
The findings illustrated in Figure 1 show each country's response in 2004 to the statement that "Women should
be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family;"
the countries are ordered by their percentage of agreement.
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the degrees of agreement and disagreement with the statement "Men should have more right to
jobs than women when jobs are scarce." In both cases, the findings reveal an observable, though not exact, parallel between
public attitudes toward gender equality in different countries
and the gender-policy regimes associated with these countries. Thus, for example, countries associated with the social
democratic regime (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway)
have the lowest levels of agreement with traditional views
that uphold gender inequality in work and family life. Less
than 30% of respondents in these countries agree that women
should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sakes of
families and less than 15% show any agreement with the view
that men should have more right to work than women when
jobs are scarce. At the other end of the typological continuum
(illustrated in Table 1) public attitudes in the Southern
European regimes (Portugal and Spain) express the highest
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degree of agreement with the statements supporting the traditional perspective. By and large, the countries representing
Continental European regimes and Liberal policy regimes fall
respectively in between these two extremes.
Figure 1. Public Attitudes in 2004 to the First Statement
Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work
for sake of family (2004)
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Figure 2. Public Attitudes in 2004 to the Second Statement
Men should have more right to jobs than women
when jobs are scarce (2004)
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The findings suggest a degree of coherence between public
attitudes and gender-related policy regimes. The rank order
in levels of agreement with traditional perspectives on gender
relations among different countries generally corresponds as

Public Attitudes and Gender Policy Regimes

expected to the type of gender-policy regime with which the
countries are associated. However, the correspondence is not
exact, since France, a Continental regime, ranks somewhat
higher than the Liberal regimes in agreement with the view
that women should be prepared to cut down on employment
for the sake of the family, and the Continental regimes, both
France and Belgium, rank higher than the Liberal regimes in
agreement with the traditional view that men should have
more right to jobs than women.
Moreover, when the responses are examined in terms of
magnitude rather than rank order, the results show that in
seven countries associated with the Southern European (Spain
and Portugal), Liberal (UK and Ireland) and more than half
of the Continental regimes (Germany, Austria, France), more
people agreed than disagreed that women should be prepared
to cut down on employment for the sake of the family. It was
only in the Social Democratic regimes plus the Netherlands
and Belgium that the preponderance of respondents disagreed
with this traditional view. In contrast to the public attitudes
expressing preference for women's traditional obligation to
family life over employment, respondents in all 13 countries
disagreed by a substantial margin with the view that men
should have more right to jobs than women when jobs are
scarce. The differences here may indicate an authentic preference for gender equality in relation to opportunities for employment over concerns for gender equality in family life.
However, they might have been influenced by the way the two
statements on gender equality were phrased; employment
was cast in terms of men and women having equal "right" to a
job; the role of gender in family life, the question about "being
prepared" to cut down on paid work for the sake of family
was a bit ambiguous. It could be interpreted to mean that in
response to family emergency women should be prepared to
leave work. Without asking whether men should be equally
prepared to cut down, the issue of gender equality in this statement is not as explicit as in the one on equal right to a job.
As shown in Table 2, there are significant differences
among the composite scores for welfare regime types (based on
weighted averages of member countries) on attitudes toward
gender equality in work and family life. What stands out most
sharply among these differences is that, in Social Democratic
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regimes, the observed levels of agreement on both attitude
statements were substantially lower than in the other regimes.
This huge difference in the extent to which public attitudes
support gender equality in Social Democratic regimes compared to the other three types of welfare regimes corresponds
to what Esping-Andersen suggested was a bimodal distribution between the Social Democratic and other regimes in the
level of de-familialisation based on public provisions.
Table 2. Difference of Public Attitudes across Welfare Regimes
Percentage
Neither
Agree agree nor Disagree
disagree
Women should be prepared to cut down
on paid work for sake of family
Regime type
52
22.8
25.3
Social-democratic
29.5
48.2
22.3
Continental Europe
28.2
26.3
45.5
Liberal regimes
18.9
23.1
58.1
Southern Europe

X2 = 32.8, p < .001
Men should have more right to jobs
than women when jobs are scarce
Regime type
Social-democratic
Continental Europe
Liberal regimes
Southern Europe

9.4
24.8
25.2
32.1

12.7
19.7
22.2
15.2

77
55.5
52.6
52.7

X2= 22.4; p = .001
Note: ESS2-2004, ed.3.1, Weight: Design weight combined with Population size
weight

Additionally, we analyzed whether women are more likely
than men to hold gender egalitarian attitudes. As shown in
Table 3 and Table 4, there are several differences between men
and women's patterns of response on the attitudinal statements toward gender equality in the 13 countries.
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In response to the statement that "women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of family," the
data show that generally in Social Democratic regimes and
continental European countries, proportionately more women
tended to disagree than men, while the pattern reversed in
Liberal regimes and Southern European countries. The differences were statistically significant in five countries-Finland,
Norway, Germany, Austria and U.K..
Table 3. Gender Difference on Responses to the Statement: "Women
should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of
family"
% Agree

% Neutral

% Disagree

Country

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Phi &
Cramer's V

Denmark

19.1

20.4

19.5

17.9

61.4

61.7

.024

Finland

25.8

23.2

29.6

24.5

44.6

52.3

.078**

Sweden

19.7

23.6

28.6

25.3

51.7

51.1

.052

Norway

26.1

27.2

30.8

24.6

43.1

48.2

.071*

Netherlands

39.6

35.5

15.7

18

44.6

46.5

.045

Belgium

36.9

38.2

19.7

16.5

43.4

45.3

.041

Germany

50.3

48.7

26.8

21.6

22.8

29.7

.086**

Austria

48.5

45.6

29.7

27.3

21.8

27.1

.062*

France

50.6

52

22.6

19.9

26.8

28.1

.033

UK

42.2

48.4

31.7

25.9

26.1

25.7

.071**

Ireland

45.2

49.2

22.5

18.7

32.3

32.1

.051

Spain

53.6

58.1

18.9

18.9

27.6

23.1

.054

Portugal

66.7

68.5

19.5

18.1

13.8

13.4

.021

Note: ESS round 2 data. Phi & Cramer's V coefficient values are shown in the table. *
indicates p<.05, and ** indicates p<.01. Numbers in bold mark the higher % for either
male or female in each response category.

Regarding the second statement, "men should have more
right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce," results revealed statistically significant differences by gender in responses in 11 of the 13 countries. Clearly, women were more
likely to disagree with the statement than men across the
various welfare regimes, who were more likely to agree with
the statement. Interestingly, on both statements the patterns of
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response showed that men were more likely than women to
equivocate--choosing "neither agree nor disagree."
Table 4. Gender Difference on Response to the Statement: "Men
should have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce"
% Agree

% Neutral

% Disagree

Phi &

Country

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Cramer's V

Denmark

9

7.7

12

5.3

79

87.1

.125*

Finland

13.5

11.4

21.1

13.5

65.5

75

.111"*

Sweden

7.7

9.8

16.4

10.1

75.9

80.2

.097**

Norway

8.6

8.2

13.4

9.1

78

82.7

.069*

Netherlands

22.2

21.8

14.4

12.6

63.4

65.7

.029

Belgium

29.2

32.2

19.2

12.3

51.5

55.4

.095**

Germany

23.5

20.9

28.2

19.7

48.3

59.4

.119**

Austria

25

18.8

31.6

24.9

43.4

56.3

.129**

France

27.3

30

16.7

14.1

56

55.8

.041

UK

23.4

27.1

27.6

17.4

49

55.5

.122"*

Ireland

25.9

22

23.2

16.7

50.9

61.3

.106**

Spain

29.4

31.5

16.2

11.1

54.3

57.4

.074*

Portugal

39.1

38.7

26.1

18

34.8

43.3

.108**

Note: ESS round 2 data. Phi & Cramer's V coefficient values are showed in the table.
* indicates p<.05, and **indicates p<.01

Attitudes Toward Gender Equality and Policy Regimes in Hard
Times: A Return to Traditional Values?
There are competing hypotheses about the impact of economic hard times on public values toward family life and
gender roles. Will the economic crisis rejuvenate attitudes
in support of traditional perspectives on the role of women
in work and family life or accelerate the regard for egalitarian relations in the home and workplace? Will the intensity
and direction of the impact vary in countries with different
gender-related policy regimes? One hypothesis suggests that
hard times may increase the acceptance of women as equal
breadwinners and of men as parents and homemakers as
a functional response to the need for flexible labor to insure
the odds of economic survival. A competing view is that the
scarcity of jobs in hard times may reinforce traditional roles of
the male breadwinner model, under which women engage in
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household production and men receive preference for paid
employment, which satisfies their emotional (or socialized)
needs to be the primary provider. There is initial evidence that
in recent times divorce rates in the U.S. have declined from
17.5 per 1000 in 2007 to 16.5 per 1000 in 2008. In some cases,
this decline may simply reflect couples who postponed their
divorce until they could sell their house or find new jobs. But
another view is that some spouses are developing a renewed
appreciation for the traditional virtues of family life-financial, social and emotional support (Wilcox, 2009).
To assess the impact of the recession that began in late 2007
on public attitudes toward gender equality in family life and
work and the extent to which it varied under different genderpolicy regimes, we compare the percentage of agreement on
the ESS questions concerning gender equality in 2004 with responses to the same questions in 2008 for all the countries on
which the data were available on both periods. Since survey
data on Austria and Ireland were not available in 2008, only 11
or the initial 13 countries are included in this section's analysis.
As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the overall trend of pre-topost-recession comparisons in attitudes toward gender equality in the realms of family life and employment is highly consistent. On both issues and across all the policy regimes, public
attitudes moved away from support of traditional gender roles
toward more egalitarian relations. In all but one country (Spain),
there was a substantial decline in agreement with the view that
women should be prepared to leave paid work for the sake of
the family. Regarding the overall magnitude of agreement in
each country, in 2004 more people agreed than disagreed with
this traditional view in a majority of countries, including U.K.,
Germany, France, Portugal and Spain, as well as Austria and
Ireland (shown in Figure 1). By 2008, only the two Southern
Europe countries (Portugal and Spain) have more people agree
than disagree with the traditional view. Similarly, agreement
with the view that men should have more right to jobs than
women when jobs are scarce declined and disagreement with
this position increased substantially in all countries after the
onset of the recession. The rank order of the agreement and
disagreement with the view is consistent with the one in 2004,
but the changes of magnitude indicated a further move away
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from the traditional view on gender roles in family and work
life.
Figure 3. Pre-to-post Recession Comparisons on Public Attitudes to
the First Statement
Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work
for sake of family (2004 & 2008)
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Figure 4. Pre-to-post Recession Comparisons on Public Attitudes to
the Second Statement
Men should have more right to jobs than women
when jobs are scarce (2004 & 2008)
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Conclusions
In sum, our findings show a degree of coherence between
the attitudes of citizens toward gender equality in work and
family life and the political tendencies and objectives of the
gender-related policy regimes in their countries. Although this
suggests that policy makers may be indeed sensitive to public
opinion on these issues, cause and effect are difficult to untangle. Just as public opinion may influence the course of gender
policy, the establishment of policies that promote gender equality may come to influence public attitudes on these issues.
Although the data reveal a general relationship between
rank order of agreement on questions of gender equality and
different types of gender policy regimes, there were statistically significant differences in public attitudes toward gender
equality among alternative gender-related policy regimes.
Social Democratic regimes appear significantly different from
other types of regimes in the extent to which public attitudes
reject the traditional view on gender roles and accept gender
equality.
Interestingly, while a competing hypothesis suggests that
the economic recessions may encourage a return to traditional
values, our findings show that in the current period of economic hardship, public attitudes toward gender and work
issues have moved further away from the traditional perspective. To the extent that understanding public attitudes toward
gender and work can help inform public officials about the
development of gender-related policies, the consistency and
direction of change in public attitudes toward gender issues
in the current recession might help justify policy that advances
measures to harmonize work and family life and the sharing of
domestic responsibilities.
Countries such as Norway, Sweden and Finland, which
register among the most positive attitudes toward gender
equality, also have the most highly developed array of policies
designed to facilitate child-rearing in two-earner households.
These countries have generous policies of parental leave, which
range from 263 days in Finland (with an additional optional
"father's month") to up to 280 days in Norway to 480 days
(anytime during the first eight years) in Sweden. Parental leave
is then augmented by highly subsidized daycare programs. The
publicly subsidized day care in Sweden, for example, amounts
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to about 10,500 euros (approximately $15,500 ) per year. As an
alternative measure, these countries have developed cash-forcare programs, which provide cash payments to families who
do not use public daycare services. (In Sweden about one third
of the municipalities have initiated cash-for-care payments.)
These programs have generated controversy in regard to their
impact on gender equality-some see them as an incentive
to return to traditional roles with women staying home and
caring for children, while others suggest that they represent a
sign of cultural change which recognizes the real market value
of care work performed at home (Sipila, Repo, & Rissanen,
2010). These programs are of particular interest in times of
high unemployment, since they can be seen as an alternative
form of paid work when jobs are scarce in the marketplace.
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Book Reviews
Paul Osterman & Beth Shulman, Good JobsAmerica:Making Work
Better for Everyone (2011). NY: Russell Sage Foundation,
$24.95 (paperback).
With persistently high unemployment rates, we are well
aware of the individual and social costs of joblessness. Far less
attention has been paid to the issue of job quality-the proliferation of jobs that pay low wages, lack benefits, and offer
little chance for advancement. Good Jobs America focuses on the
individual and social costs of poor quality jobs and the need
to convert them into better ones. The authors calculate that
among adults aged 25 - 64, nearly a quarter earn less than 2/3
of the median wage and nearly a fifth earn wages below the
poverty level for a four-person household. The risk is higher
for women, minorities, and those with no more than a high
school diploma.
Is this growth in low-wage jobs an inevitable result of increased competition, globalization of markets, and increased
immigration? Are efforts to improve job quality as futile as
King Canute's efforts to control the tides? The authors say
no, and they offer strategies for converting bad jobs into good
ones.
Current labor market policies focus on improving worker
quality through improving educational attainment. A more
educated worker is more productive and can therefore earn
a higher wage. For less educated workers, there is the Earned
Income Tax Credit to augment low wages and preserve work
incentives. Both of these policies focus on the supply side of
the labor market-the workers themselves. While necessary,
they are not sufficient. The authors argue that we need also
to address the demand side of the labor market-employers
and the nature of their jobs. In the same way that the federal
government established standards for minimum wages
and maximum hours, for occupational health and safety, for
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 2
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pension rights, and for antidiscrimination and equal opportunity in the workplace, it has the capacity to establish standards
for job quality. Whether the political climate will allow for the
use of this capacity is, of course, the underlying question.
To make their case, the authors first need to counteract the
misinformation surrounding low-wage work. Faulty assumptions include: that workers are only temporarily in low-wage
jobs; that low-wage work will decline as general economic conditions improve; that low-wage jobs are mainly a product of
lax immigration policy; that any attempt to reduce low-wage
jobs will necessarily impede economic growth; and that regulatory policy is inherently counterproductive. Having shown
that the evidence does not support any of these assumptions,
the authors explain why some firms choose the "high road,"
offering good jobs, while others choose the "low road," offering bad ones. Some firms benefit from offering good jobs. For
them, improvements in worker motivation, along with reductions in turnover and hiring costs, will more than offset higher
wages. Others, especially those that operate in a highly competitive environment, are not likely to survive if they act unilaterally. In these cases, changes must be industry-wide so that
all firms compete on a level playing field.
How will these changes be accomplished? The authors
identify three possibilities: (1) Unions need to organize workers
in low-wage jobs. In the past, unions have often ignored these
workers, but with declining employment in traditional unionized sectors, it becomes a matter of survival for unions to
recruit new members in these heretofore ignored industries. (2)
Pressure must be put on Congress to reform labor law. Current
legislation and the implementation thereof has favored employers and made it much more difficult for workers to gain
union recognition, despite the fact that in the absence of employer interference, a majority of workers would choose union
representation. (3) Although unions and community groups
have sometimes found themselves in opposition, there are
many areas of common ground and stronger efforts should be
made to form coalitions.
The authors say that through these three approaches combined, firms can be pressured to create good jobs. To those
who say that improving job quality will lead to higher prices
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for consumers, they respond that as a society, we are already
paying those higher prices indirectly, as a result of the social
cost of low-wage jobs-including poor health outcomes for
workers and their children, and the loss of human potential
when children are raised in impoverished households.
In the current political context, improving job quality will
be an uphill struggle and the authors are well aware of the
obstacles that will need to be surmounted. It is not so much
that their prescriptions will automatically lead to success, but
that the alternative, which is to donothing at all to improve the
prospects of the working poor, is totally unacceptable.
Mary Huff Stevenson, Emerita,Economics Department,
University of Massachusetts Boston

Michael Kazin, American Dreamers:How the Left Changed a Nation
(2011). Knopf, $27.95 (hardcover), $16.00 (paperback).
For many books about the history of the American left, the
implicit questions are always about the reasons for its failure.
Why are Americans so conservative? Why are traditions of
social reform so much weaker in America than elsewhere?
Why has the left been so frail? Scholars have addressed these
questions by looking at the strength of business, the limits of
the state, and most of all, the myriad strategic and intellectual
blunders of leftists themselves. Michael Kazin, in American
Dreamers, turns the question itself upside down. The American
left, he suggests, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. True, it has
never held state power, or even managed to build a stable political party. It has been reviled and demonized, and it has never
claimed the faith of more than a small minority. Yet Kazinwho clearly identifies, albeit in an ambivalent way, with those
dreamers he chronicles-remains hopeful, for he argues that
the real strength of the left has been its ability to shift the horizons of the American cultural imagination. Radicals may
not have drawn people to their political parties, but they were
able to create a "culture of rebellion," which could "articulate
outrage about the state of the world and the longing for a different one" (p. xiv). This, in turn, helped to change political
life, as it shifted the mainstream of national opinion. American
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political history, Kazin argues, could not have been the same
without the left.
The argument begs the question: What is the left? Kazin
suggests that, properly understood, the "left" consists of those
who believe in a "radically egalitarian" reordering of society
(p. xiv). For Kazin, these include abolitionists, anarchists, socialists, bohemians, the Communist Party (especially in the
1930s), and the New Left, including feminists, gay and lesbian
activists, and environmentalists. All these, he suggests, were
able to exert influence on American culture that wildly outstripped their political support. Even for people who would
never become activists or even identify with these movements,
they were able to reshape the very way that the ideals of the
nation were perceived. For example, the abolitionist movement of antebellum America was never able to gain political
power, but it was able to force not only the abolition of slavery
but a host of questions about personal liberty into political
debate. The Communist Party never had a mass membership,
but the left in the 1930s was able to "advance a new common
sense about larger social and moral questions: Who were the
people? How did they want the nation to change?" (p. 178).
The utopian commitments of the left and its willingness to
leap into an unknown future and to imagine profound social
change, accounts for its cultural influence, even as this radicalism limited the abilities of leftists to make alliances or to
achieve political success. In a sense, the cultural influence of
the left is intimately connected to the difficulties they faced
building political organizations. As Kazin says of American
Communists in the 1930s in a somewhat different context,
"Their success was also their failure" (p. 208).
American Dreamers is intended to bring the history of
these figures and movements to a broad popular audience, to
readers who may wonder why anyone would ever care about
people who seem at first glance to lie so far outside the political mainstream. As such, it is a narrative that may at times
frustrate scholars, even those who are sympathetic to its political project. It is hard to bring all these different characters
together into a single overarching thesis, while doing justice to
the subtleties of the various different movements to which they
belonged. The book focuses primarily on individual radical
leaders-Frederick Douglass, Eugene Debs, Woody Guthrie,
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Paul Robeson-rather than on the less famous activists and
participants. In addition, those who are interested primarily
in the study of social welfare policy may feel that Kazin's emphasis on culture is misplaced. Finally, Kazin does not say too
much about the obstacles, resistance and repression that have
also been major parts of the history of the left. At the end of
the book, he suggests that those who seek social change need
to reclaim the "utopian impulse"--even for the sake of achieving moderate reform. But it is not clear that one can embrace
a belief in radical change simply in order to achieve more
limited goals. Nor is it evident that the real problem of the left
today--especially in the wake of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street
mobilization-is a lack of big dreams. Still, by advancing an
interpretation of American history that places political radicalism at the center of the story, Kazin does a real service to those
thinking about the history of social change.
Kim Phillips-Fein, Gallatin School of Individualized Study,
New York University

Catherine Corrigall-Brown, Patterns of Protest: Trajectories of
Participationin Social Movements (2012). Stanford University
Press, $45.00 (hardcover).
Bette Steinmuller, Nancy Teel, Beatrice Nava, Linda Stern,
Steven Norris, & Kendall Hale, Written Out of History:
Memoirs of Ordinary Activists (2011). Leapyear Press, $15.00
(paperback).
On the heels of renewed activism, exemplified by the
Occupy movement, academics and activists may want to
know about the motivations and life courses of those who
have devoted at least some portion of their lives to social and
political causes. These two books-the first, a sociological examination of the career paths of self-defined activists and the
second, first-person retrospective narratives by six political activists-provide a great deal of information.
Patterns of Protest carefully investigates various dimensions of political activists' lives, including the duration of their
engagement, the strength of their activist identities, and the
significance of social interactions within the social movement
organizations (abbreviated as SMOs). The author employed a
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secondary analysis methodology of a large longitudinal panel
study conducted by M. Kent Jennings and colleagues that surveyed a probability sample of high school seniors in 1965. The
survey, repeated four times, ending in 1997 with 56% of the
original respondents, investigated respondents' political engagement (pp. 139-140). Corrigal-Brown supplemented the
quantitative data with interviews of 60 self-identified activists in four organizations, two left-leaning (Catholic Workers
and Farm Workers Union) and two right-leaning (Concerned
Women for America, an anti-abortion organization, and
Homeowners' Association). The SMOs chosen differ by structure (the degree to which they are hierarchical versus democratic) and focus (single versus multi-issue) and by size and
locale.
Survey data reveal that 65% of sample respondents have
participated in an SMO or politics at some time in their lives;
30% have engaged in "contentious" (not defined) political activity in their young adulthoods; 30 years later, only about 5%
had so participated throughout the survey period (pp. 26-27).
These changes reflected not only cultural differences (the 1960s
and 1970s were periods of significant protest activity) but also
differences in personal responsibilities and time demands experienced by the respondents over time. Indeed, it is the activists' "trajectories" that are the author's focus, and she discusses
three patterns: persistence, abeyance (disengagement followed
by re-engagement), transfer (the issue remains the same but
the location changes) and disengagement. Not surprisingly,
family and work obligations reduce the amount of time that
individuals can spend on political activities, although those
with more cultural and educational resources tend to go in
and out of participation rather than dropping out altogether.
The book examines many other variables that affect participation, including gender, race, ideology and financial resources.
Chapter 5, entitled "Ties that Bind," provides strong evidence
that social contacts and activities have a very strong influence
on individuals' joining and continuing to engage in organizations.
Written Out of History presents six first-person accounts of
what is appropriately characterized as radical activity by five
women and one man, now in their 60s (essentially the same
cohort as those interviewed by Corrigal-Brown). (N.B.: this
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is a self-published book, available commercially, that came
to my attention because two of the authors are my friends.)
The writers describe their active participation in anti-Vietnam
War protests, educational work during wartime in Nicaragua,
teaching in Cuba and community organizing and teaching in
distressed neighborhoods in Boston from the 1960s through
the 1980s. While these accounts are of activities that doubtless
were more daring and less mainstream than those of the interviewees in Corrigal-Brown's sample, in many ways these activists' trajectories resemble those in the persistence category.
Active participation was fueled by ideology but also, importantly, by social and friendship networks. Most of the contributors became politically active in college or soon thereafter, a
period of political upheaval in the U.S. Two gave up academic
careers to work, for a time, in factories, in order to do political
education and/or union organizing with their working class
colleagues. Several lived in communes where their political activities were shared with housemates. Two spent considerable
time in Latin America after their family responsibilities abated;
the others apparently dropped out during mid-life while they
were raising children. Later, most chose careers in teaching or
work at the community college level, work that is respectable
but in keeping with their tempered political ideologies. The
book is very engaging, a reminder to their contemporaries, including the less adventurous, of what those turbulent times
were like and informative for others who may want to know
more about those times and to compare them to what may be
coming.
Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Emerita, Social Work,
Salem State University

Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Banished: The New Social
Control in Urban America (2011). Oxford University Press,
$19.95 (paperback).
As has been widely documented, the 1970s ushered in a
new era of crime control. Since then, what, when, and how
punishment should be used have been topics of intense, contentious, and very public debate. Less widely appreciated,
though of equal consequence, is that during this same period,

190

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

there has been a radical expansion of social exclusion practices, which have dovetailed with the criminal justice system's
limitation of citizenship rights of the poor, the un-housed, and
people of color. In Banished: The New Social Control in Urban
America, Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert address the
growing use of legal tools to criminalize poverty and limit the
movement of so-called undesirables. Banished joins a growing
number of articles, books, and edited volumes dedicated to exploring the origins and impact of regulation-indeed restriction-of urban space and the use of the criminal justice system
to enforce such limits.
The book provides important insights into some of the
most critical and highly charged applications of crime control.
An important strength of this timely, engaging, and readable
book-and what distinguishes it from some others-is the
clarity of purpose with which it demonstrates how banishment as a feudal form of social control reemerged to exclude
certain groups of people from otherwise public areas in order
to protect the interests of property owners. Using Seattle,
Washington-a city known to be progressive yet with pronounced vigilance in law enforcement-as a case study, the
authors examine how new exclusion orders, or civility codes,
such as Stay Out of Drug Areas (SODA) and Stay Out of Areas
of Prostitution (SOAP) orders, trespass policies, and gang injunctions produce spatial marginalization.
The introduction provides a crisp and focused entry into the
issues. Beckett and Herbert argue, "... cities across the United
States increasingly employ novel social control mechanisms
that entail spatial exclusion and fuse civil and criminal legal
authority" (p. 9). To reduce unwanted social acts and enhance
security, banishment has been revived. Here the inclusion of
a short discussion on why the authors have chosen the term
"banishment" is noteworthy. Defined as "the legal compulsion to leave specified geographic areas for extended periods
of time" (p. 10), banishment is used to highlight the power of
the state, to focus on the punishment of the deviant, to capture
how those ostracized feel about their exclusion, and to suggest
the extent to which banishment begets more banishment.
The book draws upon myriad data sources to analyze the
emergence, uses, and repercussions of banishment. Chapter 5,
"Voices of the Banished," is particularly remarkable. It looks at
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how the banished feel about their ostracism. Forty-one people
subject to civility codes were interviewed about how they
understand the functions of their banishment. Beckett and
Herbert find that, with several exceptions, banishment does
not force its targets to seek alternative locations and places of
travel. For some, the threat of jail, for example, is not a deterrent. One respondent explains:
Well it [going to jail] affected me some, but, uh, to be
honest with you, you basically being a minority and
being homeless, going to jail is something which, which
is an ongoing policy. Like I say, it is the system which
you kinda get used to ... No, what can they do to you?
At this point I can say they must be doing me a favor.
I don't care. I don't tell them that, but if they see that
I'm homeless ... nothing you could do to me. It's kinda
pathetic. But what can they do? There's really nothing
they can do. (p. 110)
Others reported not complying with banishment orders
because they did not think they would get caught. Others remained in banishment zones, especially parks, because such
spaces were perceived as crucial to personal security, the only
option for dwelling, preferable to shelters, and/or important
for social interaction. Civility codes, then, do not stabilize the
poor, nor do they lead to a reduction in entanglements with
law enforcement. Banishment creates a conduit to the criminal
justice system rather than being a substitute for it. In this way,
banishment creates more insecurity.
Banished is an important contribution to the literature on
urban inequality, space and crime, and punishment as they
percolate throughout various disciplines. It will be of particular interest to readers of crime and punishment, urban theory,
social inequality and justice, and law and society. The range of
perspectives in the book helps us appreciate the role of banishment in crime control and to understand how attempts to
attack the victims and symptoms of social problems rather
than their root causes only produces an increase in both.
Lucia Trimbur, Dept. of Sociology, John Jay College,
& Dept. of CriminalJustice, The GraduateCenter, CUNY
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Richard Thompson Ford, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law Corrupts
the Strugglefor Equality (2011). New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux. $27.00 (hardcover).
Trying to label author Richard Thompson Ford into a political category is fruitless, as readers can trace conservative and
liberal elements in his sophisticated ideas about civil rights in
America. Ford skillfully transcends the political encampments
that generally monopolize the subject of civil rights to make
readers think about how law both helps and harms the cause
of equality in America.
Ford, the George E. Osborne Professor of Law at Stanford
University, specializes in the area of civil rights and multiculturalism and writes for academic and general audiences. The
strength of this particular work is its interdisciplinary dissection of modem day civil rights and its shortcomings, to include
legal, social, cultural and political analysis, thus providing a
broader view necessary to capture the enormous scope of this
subject.
The premise of the book is equally simple and powerful, as
is shown in the quotation below:
But today, civil rights do too much and not enough at
the same time. Extremists on both the left and the right
have hijacked civil rights, using them to push radical
schemes despite democratic opposition, and in some
cases even to reverse and undermine the social justice
goals civil rights were supposed to achieve. (p. 11)
After a lengthy introduction that establishes the framework to the subject matter and book, Ford uses five chapters to
support his thesis and offer a proposal on how to get our civil
rights tradition back on track.
The first chapter examines the increasing number of entitlements that Ford posits bypass the democratic process or
the normal course of a market economy. Chapter two discusses how the legal culture of lawyers, judges, and activists have
tried to make a host of social problems that are complex and
diverse fit into the discrimination mold, which makes it more
difficult for us as a society to address them appropriately. The
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unintended consequences of civil rights are explored in the
third chapter where, for example, equal protection in schooling prevents public school districts from pursuing racial integration. Ford writes about the failure of current day social activism as it is too often "an exercise in nostalgia than a focused
social protest" (p. 26) in the fourth chapter. The final chapter
provides readers with a prescription on how to re-focus civil
rights in order to restore it back to its grandeur days. The
author calls for shifting of priorities from the individual and
self-entitlements to a collective mentality focused on social
justice.
While this is not Ford's first book on the subject (his other

books are titled The Race Card: How Bluffing About Bias Makes
Race Relations Worse and Universal Rights: Down to Earth), this
work can stand alone and serve as a succinct and thorough
analysis of modem day civil rights in America. Ford writes in
an engaging and lively manner accessible by a general audience which does not require a law background or even the use
of a legal dictionary. Readers will very quickly feel the author's
passion for this topic and find his opinions insightful and original without being a rehashing or echoing from other scholars.
Like many books about socio-legal issues written by
lawyers, there is a lack of any real use of statistics or research
methodology to support claims or conclusions central to its arguments. Therefore, one might question if the law cases highlighted represent the mainstream concerns or if they are outliers which are on the periphery of both sides of the political
aisle. However, Ford uses extensive citations throughout the
book, which utilizes a variety of sources appropriate for this
topic. Readers who teach will certainly gain new thoughts and
ideas about civil rights which will inform their lectures on the
subject.
Rights Gone Wrong simultaneously renews and advances
the civil rights debate in America, making it worthy of its New
York Times Notable Books for 2011 distinction.

Robert Costello, CriminalJustice Department,
Nassau Community College
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Immanuel Ness, Guest Workers and Resistance to U.S. Corporate
Despotism, University of Illinois Press (2011). $70.00
(hardcover), $25.00 (paperback).
In this important book, Immanuel Ness, professor of political science at Brooklyn College, links the topics of guest
workers and international migration with labor organization. Ness argues that U.S. businesses actively promote the
impression of labor shortages to undermine local employees
and replace them with cheaper foreign temporary workers.
Drawing on the experience of guest workers in low-pay hospitality and high-pay information technology industries,
Ness states that guest workers are becoming the substitute for
native, immigrant, and undocumented workers, because guest
workers depend on one employer, have very few rights, and
return to their countries of origin after completing their jobs.
Guest labor thus is part of a larger capitalist strategy to undermine wages and working conditions. In Ness's critical view, it
is "capital's search for profit that directs government efforts to
expand guest worker programs that will diminish wages" in
the U.S. (p. 19).
The book's contribution to the field of immigration literature is twofold. First, it shows how the increasing number
of temporary workers in the U.S. over the last two decades
has caused job loss for local native workers, a marked wage
decline in entire industries (such as construction), and the destabilization of labor organizations. The book also links temporary labor migration to the U.S. (the host society) to Jamaica
and India (the sending countries), indicating how temporary
migrants bring relatively minor advantages (mostly in terms
of child education) to their homelands. By dismissing India enthusiasts who boast of the largest innovative, capitalist middle
class-based democracy in Asia, Ness insists that more than
nine hundred million Indians live on less than $2 per day. More
people subsist in poverty in India than in sub-Saharan Africa
(pp. 82-83). Unfortunately, little poverty elevation results from
temporary work abroad.
Ness draws on ethnographic field research in India,
Jamaica, and the United States, as well as government data
and secondary sources to underpin his claims. He emphasizes, in Chapter 1, the calculated effort by business leaders to
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influence Washington to increase the number of temporary seasonal migrant workers permitted to enter the country. The following chapter, "Political Economy of Migrant Labor," shows
that business lobbyists have traditionally argued that an increase in the number of guest workers is necessary because
American laborers either do not possess the necessary skills or
are unwilling to work in low-prestige positions. Ness suggests
that education can address the deficiency in sectors such as
information technology, and wage increases will draw native
workers to jobs in less-esteemed industries such as hospitality.
In subsequent chapters, Ness traces the consequences of neoliberal reforms in India by focusing on the city of Hyderabad,
where there are clashes between modem metropolitans and
growing numbers of poor; examines how guest worker programs contribute to the displacement of American workers
and emphasizes the abuse and mistreatment that guest
workers frequently experience at the hands of their employers and coworkers; and investigates the effects of low-wage
emigration from Jamaica. The final chapter explores the importance of new forms of transnational labor solidarity. Here
Ness acknowledges that organized labor is in disarray in the
United States.
The book convincingly argues that guest worker programs,
part of the dramatic transformation of the working class, perpetuate the shift in the global division of labor by reducing the
number of workers necessary to perform tasks and increasing
reliance on low-skilled labor. However, Ness fails to realize
that the state and labor face even larger problems. While outsourcing, off-shoring, and technological advances often erode
union jobs, guest worker programs actually invite people
to work in a foreign country. The human element cannot be
underestimated, and the book suffers from a paucity of personal stories, which would have enlivened the narrative and
strengthened the central points. The book would also benefit
from comparison with Germany, where guest workers have
been members of unions for many decades. The German case
also demonstrates that not all guest worker programs lead to
the attrition of decent-wage unionized jobs.
Ness's decision to refrain from hard, cold statistics makes
his assessment of capital (often supported by organizations
the like the WTO) less convincing. For example, his case study

196

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

of high-tech workers in Hyberabad could be an extraordinary
example of the global division of labor. Yet, insufficient data
support the argument. Ness mentions that industries such as
trucking have begun to recruit truck drivers from India. For
example, a local Indian newspaper reported that 79 truck
drivers have been cleared to obtain a Commercial Driving
License in the U.S. (p. 72). This curious example illustrates the
difficulty of providing statistical data for broader claims about
corporations in the global market. Furthermore, the book lacks
data concerning American businesses' schemes for more extensive guest worker programs.
Despite these caveats, this is an interesting and important
work that sheds light on the challenges facing both organized
and unorganized American workers if capital is allowed free
range to expand guest worker programs. In brief, nobody
but large business benefits from non-immigrant temporary
workers flooding the labor market. The book calls for further
study of the problem of the exploitation of unskilled labor in
the developing and the developed world.
BarbaraFranz, Dept. of Political Science, Rider University

Meika Loe, Aging Our Way: Lessons Learnedfor Living from 85 and
Beyond (2011). Oxford University Press, $29.95 (paperback).
Living to age 85, to become what is commonly known as
"the oldest-old," is thought of in a number of different ways: as
exciting, daunting, or as something to be completely avoided.
However, aging is a natural part of the life cycle that can't be
ignored. The 85+ population is the fastest growing age group
nationally, but is typically undervalued and ignored.
Aging Our Way: Lessons Learnedfor Livingfrom 85 and Beyond
provides an in-depth look into the lives of thirty older adults
living, mostly by themselves, in the community. It is based on
three years of interviews by Loe and is connected to current literature throughout. The references and data provided include
some of the most highly regarded sources and provide a
wealth of information. Written in an engaging style, Loe sheds
light on the realities about the well-being of those who are 85+
and illustrates resilience, creativity, adaptation and strength
among a group of people often thought of as otherwise. I have
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worked with older adults in community-based agencies and
within their homes, and the portrayals in this book are accurate accounts of people who continue to live and thrive in their
older years. Though Loe's portrayal interlaces common challenges (such as adapting to changing health and loss) associated with aging, overall it portrays older adults positively-a
much needed perspective to combat ageism.
The book is divided into chapters that reflect different
themes that emerged through the author's interviews, such as
"connect to peers," "live in moderation" and "take time for
self." Stories, quotes and examples from the thirty elders she
interviewed are interwoven in a colorful culmination of advice
and insight. The book also provides poignant photos that help
the reader to visualize and further connect to the individuals,
their lives and activities.
Loe illustrates that "one size does not fit all" by highlighting and integrating diversity throughout her portrayal of the
85+ population. The voices of both men and women are included, which is important because men are often easily ignored in
this age group, as it is mostly comprised of women. However,
it should be noted that although there is some racial diversity
represented, there is a lack of the real multiculturalism reflected in the population of elders currently living in the U.S.
Given the author's background in sociology and gender
studies, it is no surprise that this book largely focuses on social
constructs, such as gender and socioeconomic status. Thus,
this would not be an appropriate book for a reader seeking
to understand the deeper psychological aspects of aging. For
example, Tomstam's theory of gerotranscendence, which
stresses positive aging through the redefinition of life and its
purpose by gaining new understandings of the self, relationships to others, and fundamental existential questions were
not referenced. However, a number of other theories capturing
a wide range of aging perspectives (such as socioemotional selectivity and continuity) are offered, and Loe should be commended on her reference and integration of theory. She also
weaves in analysis of important policy issues, such as managing and mobilizing resources, and concludes with a section on
best practices to support aging in place.
In conclusion, this book is written in a passionate way that
is easily accessible and appropriate for a wide range of readers,
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including students, practitioners, older adults, and their family
members. It teaches how older adults have adapted to changes
in living, and it reinforces that getting older is not the end of
life, but rather, another stage of life that can be embraced.
Donna Wang, Department of Social Work,
Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus

Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of OurNature: Why Violence Has
Declined, Viking (2011). $40.00 (hardcover).
Steven Pinker is a natural provocateur. In The Blank Slate
(2002), he took on social constructionists who deny the importance of human nature in shaping behavior. In his remarkably
ambitious new book, Pinker, a cognitive scientist, broadens his
focus to essentially all of history to make the case that, in the
21st century, humans are much less violent than they have ever
been. In view of the horrors of the first half of the 20th century,
and more recent threats of nuclear war, global terrorism, and
high-tech mass murder, this contention at first seems incredible, even cavalier and callous.
What's the evidence? Pinker supports his claim by deploying reams of data that demonstrate that the rate of violence per
capita has fallen consistently over the past decades and centuries, despite nasty upticks such as the world wars of nearly
a century ago. He displays charts and graphs across a wide
range of violent domains-homicide, interstate and civil wars,
genocide, domestic violence, child abuse, among others-to
reveal similar patterns of decline not just over centuries, but
even within the 20th century and the early 21st. Although he
readily concedes that the data may not always be reliable, the
fact that evidence from so many different domains points in
the same direction suggests that the trend away from violence
is real and substantial. Whether it is irreversible is, of course,
unknowable.
It is not that human nature has changed. We remain, in
Frans de Waal's formulation, a "bipolar ape" capable of behaving both cooperatively and selfishly. What has changed, of
course, are social conditions. Pinker identifies a number of key
historical transitions that have facilitated a less violent society:
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the emergence of the state associated with the shift from hunter-gathers to settled agriculture; the rise and consolidation of
nation-states beginning around 500 years ago; the humanitarian revolution, e.g., the abolition of slavery and judicial torture,
resulting from the Enlightenment in the 18th century; the
nuclear peace and the spread of democracy and trade in the
wake of devastation of the Second World War; the end of the
Cold War that eliminated the plague of proxy wars in developing countries; and the human rights revolution since 1945
that has led to significant advances in the treatment of women,
children, racial-ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities,
and gays and lesbians.
Pinker argues that each of these historical developments
promoted, in Lincoln's famous phrase, the "better angels of
our nature," and this has led to declining violence. Why? He
points to four underlying causal factors: the advance of government, commerce and trade, cosmopolitanism, and reason.
Government, particularly liberal democracy, establishes a monopoly of legitimate violence. Commerce turns potential foes
into trading partners for whom war is folly. Cosmopolitanism,
deriving from our increasingly interconnected world, fosters
empathy and tolerance. Finally, the growth of literacy, education and modernity itself has made us more reflective, less
fatalistic about death and destruction, more motivated to
improve ourselves and our world, and more willing to pursue
alternatives to violence. Although fundamentalist movements
have arisen to reject these developments, they can at worst
only slow the tide of modernity.
Better Angels can be viewed as part of a spate of recent books
that seek to challenge a mood of pessimism regarding the state
of the world, such as Greg Easterbrook's The Progress Paradox
(2003), Matt Ridley's The Rational Optimist (2010), and Charles
Kenny's Getting Better (2011). Of course, global warming
continues unabated, the threat of nuclear war and terrorism
remains alarmingly real, the world economy is chronically
mismanaged, and a billion people continue living in grinding poverty. But it is important to recognize the progress we
have in fact made, not only to combat paralyzing despair but
to identify key factors that lead to social betterment.
The problem, without question, is that the good news
could lull us into complacency. In a January 2012 letter to The
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New York Times, Robert Jay Lifton, chronicler of 20th century
horrors, offers an important note of caution. While acknowledging Pinker's contribution to our understanding of violence,
he reminds us that technological advances in mass killing, by
separating perpetrators from victims both geographically and
psychologically, have led the human race to a truly dangerous precipice. Better Angels is a masterful achievement, but we
should take our Pinker with a grain of Lifton. If we are to repair
the world, we need to see clearly both its light and its shadows.
Edward U. Murphy, Department of Global Studies &
InternationalAffairs, College of Professional Studies,
Northeastern University
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